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IABSTRACT
Iran is ons of the best case studies among the oil producing 
countries in which the effects of oil revenue can be examined. While it 
has some of the basic characteristics of developing countries, it is endowed 
with enormous wealth. A combination of these factors has increased the role 
of the government in economic development by granting a greater possibility 
of spending and menoeuverability with regard to its economic policies. Due 
to the importance of the state in the economic development of Iran, this 
thesis has been devoted to the economic role of the government in Iran. We 
have examined the determinants of government expenditure, in three parts, 
its effects and the importance of different channels of finance.
In the first part, we have examined the determinants of government 
expenditure which indicate that on the one hand, the revenue constraint has 
determined the level of government expenditure at the aggregate level and 
changes in the pattern of expenditure have been produced by an exogenous 
factor mainly oil revenue. On the other hand, this exogenous factor which 
has granted the state a political independence from its social base, has 
affected the pattern of distribution of government expenditure. Due to the 
importance of political factors, social and economic expenditures have been 
undermined while defence expenditure has been over-emphasised.
The effects of such a pattern of government expenditure which has 
been reinforced by other economic policies, have been the distortion of 
economic development. As the second part will show, the effects of government 
economic policies have been determined by the short-run nature of the deter­
minants of government expenditure through which the government has tried to 
benefit the middle and upper classes in order to grasp some political support. 
In the main the majority of peasants have been ignored and have received no 
part of government expenditure. Also, by the emphasis on capital intensity, 
has created a maldistribution of Income which has appeared as an impediment
II
to the growth of industrial production* In the service sector, while the 
long -run needs for human capital and infra-structural investment have been 
undermined, defence expenditure has resulted in the depletion of foreign 
exchange and the distortion of the pattern of development.
As the third part shows, the above pattern has been affected by the 
structure of the Iranian fiscal system in which a relative independence of 
the state has been ensured through the external channel of finance which 
has reduced the importance of public opinion in the allocation of government 
spendings. Not only has it resluted in retarding the development of the 
fiscal system , but, has also reinforced the gearing of the Iranian economy 
to the exogenous determinant which in turn has been determined by the struc­
ture of the international oil market and the commitment of the Iranian govern­
ment to its allies.
Due to the existence of such dualistic determinants, the government 
has had to balance between internal and external factors. Because of the 
gradual rising of importance of oil revenue, the trade-off point has moved 
toward external factors which has caused . an increasing trend towards mili­
tary expenditure. In this way, the gap between the state and its internal 
/
social base has widened and the political system has no longer been able to 
reflect the long-run needs of the economy. Since economic decision making 
has been strongly affected by the political factors, a socio-political change 
may be inevitable at a time of economic crisis.
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1Introduction
Economic Back Ground of Iranian Socloty
Iran flay ba ona of tha bast casa studiaa among tha oil producing 
coutrias in which tho offsets of oil rovonuo can bo examined* On tha eno 
hand, it has soma of tha basic charstorisilca of typical developing coun­
tries, on tho other hand, it is endowed with enormous wealth*
Iran with around 34 Million population, has enough labour of a type 
for which employment may be an important objective as in other typicftl 
developing countries* Also, for soma centuries, it had a largo agricultural 
sector and was one of tha exporters of agricultural products in tho Riddle 
East* Those factors along with other natural and human endowments such as 
minerals and traditional skills as wall as traditional products and exports 
like carpets, create tha basic nocasaary condition for tha development of 
tho industrial sector end differentiate Iran from other oil-producing coun­
tries in tha Riddle East and make it mors similar to a typieil developing 
economy*
While Iran shares ths basic eharaetrlsties of non-oil producing 
economies, it has oscapod soma of the structural pronlems of development 
which a typicil developing country has been confronted with* For soma 
decades, tho lack of foreign sxehsnga earnings has been ana of tha import­
ant constraint on the development of tho industrial sector in developing 
countries* Oil eesources and their growing importance as a source of energy 
during tho last few decades have granted tho Iranian economy a potential 
source of foreign exchange by which seal of tho economic bottlenecks could 
have boon swept away* At tho same time, such resources hava increased tho 
role of the government in the eoonomic development of the country by granting 
a graatar possibility of spending and manoeuvrability with regard to its 
economic policies* In the latar ataga, tho pattern of economic development
'-•V  *
zha« avan bacaaa d«pendent on the government policies* Also* the oil resour» 
caa have affected the political structure of Iranian society because of the 
1»portane« of èli as a source of energy to the Western countries and the 
USA* Those footers differentiate Iran free non-oil producing countries and 
■agnify the role of the state in the process of economic development in 
this country*
Here* we will examine the importance of the above factors on the 
pattern of development in Iran* Ito will make an attempt to shorn the impor» 
twice of political factors in a growing economy and how they may distort the 
pattern of development by undermining the economic rationality and what will 
be the economic and socio-political consequences of such irrationality*
Out to the importance of tho role of state* this thesis will bo 
devoted to the economic policies of tho state in Iran* Although wo will 
confine ourselves to the three mein economic policies* government expenditure* 
credit and tax policies* ito will also touch upon other government policies 
such as prices* ipports and protection which are necessary for an under» 
standing of the overall affects of the economic role of the state* The thesis 
is divided into three parts*
The first patt consisting of two chaptors dealing with the deter» 
minante of government expenditure* Tho first chapter will present e brief 
survey of theories of the behaviour of public expenditure and the related 
empirical studies as wall as the method of analysis* In the second chapter* 
ws will analyse the growth of public expenditure in Iran and the importance 
of economic and socio-political factors ^ responsible for the allocation of 
functional government expenditures*
The second part is devoted to the effects of government expenditure 
on the pattern of development of different eeetora* In three chapters* the 
effects of government expenditure along with tho fiscal and credit policies
3will be examined* Chaptar thras daala with tha affacta of government invast» 
mant on tho agricultural sactor by conaidarlng tha government cradit sya» 
tom, reorganization of production and fiscal and pries policies* Tha Fourth 
chaptor consider tha structure of tho Manufacturing sector and tha affoeta 
of governasnt investment on tha development of this sootor* Both the direct 
government investment and tho indirect government assistance to the private 
sector are considered* The discussion is meinly centred around tho offsets 
of government policies on the structure ef output and employment, along 
with a consideration ef changes in' the capital-output ratio and. investment 
per worker* The fifth chapter is devoted to the evaluation ef government 
services* Depending on their effects, these services are divided into eco» 
nomie and social services* In the former.we will discuss only the importance 
ef public services in ports, railways and roads* The latter consists of 
government expenditure in education, hsalth and defence* We consider the 
structure of education with regard to the needs of tha industrial sector 
«id social services for trained manpower* In this reepeet, the importance 
of the supply of education and factors hsmpering the full utilization ef 
the supply are considered* In the case of health, wa examina the relative 
importance of government disbursement 'for healthva»d.*ita^dietribution as 
well as the effects of the health sector en productivity* In the ease ef 
defence, wa will restrict ourselves to Just the financial «id manpower 
implications of defence expenditure*
The third part deals with the financing efgovernment expenditure*
This part is divided into three chapters* Tha sixth chapter evaluates the 
structure ef the tax system with respect to the importance ef different 
sources ef government revenue and its impact on the stimulation of indus­
trial, agricultural and g«terally productive Investment as well as its 
affects en tho distribution of income* The seventh chapter~anelysee-the
4importance of deficit financing and ita short—run and long-run affects on 
the allocation of resources and distribution of incoms* The eighth chapttr 
is devoted to the development of the oil sector* This chapter is divided 
into two sections* The first section considers the reasons behind the growth 
of oil revenue in oil producing countries* In this respect« three factors 
are responsible for the changes in the revenue of host countries! changes 
in the host-oil companies relationship« change in the international oil 
price »structure add changes in the demand and thereby exports of oil* In 
the second eectien, the effects of oil revenue on the budget and foreign 
exchange earnings as well as the employment creation are considered* The 
main object in this section is to throw light on the effects of til revenue 
on changes in the structure of the economy by evaluating the impact ef oil 
revenue on the process of decision making and policy making in government 
bodies* After this chapter« a conclusion will follow*
However* here* we should indicate m iss ef the problems which have 
in one way or another affected the empirical investigation into the Iranian 
economy* These problems mainly arise from the lack of necessary data and 
inaccuracy of statistics in Iran*
sisMillssl. fattm
The lack ef data in developing countries is an important handicap 
which makes empirical analysis difficult and Pome eases almost impossible* 
The deficiency arises from two sources* first* the non-existence of m oo  
categories of statistical evidence* secend* the inaccuracy of existing data* 
In Iran there also exists another factor wleh accentuated the distortion 
and that is the political abuse of staiistica*
The lack of data is serious* from 1925 to 1960, there were only a 
few groups of data maily with regard to foreign trade* custom duties, oil 
revenue and government expenditure and revenue as well es a price index.
5Reliability of such statistics is low with tha exception of the foreign 
trade sector* The first real attempt was Made In 1956 when the government 
collected the first population census* During 1956-60, a number of sepa­
rate samplings ware Made regarding the performance of the agricultural 
and industrial sectori* Since 1959 a comprehensive time series of national 
income has been published by the central bank.of Iran, Also, population 
cansuses of 1966 and 1976 as well as manpower sampling and household budgets 
have eased the economic analysis of the 1960-76 period* Despite the exis­
tence of such a wide range of statistica for the 1960-76 period, they do 
not provide detailed and accurate information on other matters* For instance, 
the national accounts published by the central bank provide no information 
on output and manufacturing by industries* The central bank publishes only 
the pattern of value added for the main sectors of the economy in which 
no distinction has been made between the public and private value added in 
the agricultural and induatrial sectors and some of tha services* Uhlla 
some of the above information can be gathered from other sources like the 
Rinistry of Economy and the Plan and Budget Organization, thilr data is 
not comparable to that of the central bank. The information from the flints try 
of Economy on the pattern of manufacturing is still far from sufficient*
The data provided by the ministry hardly ravers the main area:of manufacturing 
activities* In particular, it lacka data on manufaturing by size of estab­
lishment and legal statue*
Here importantly, the data available suffers from low accuracy* While 
the central bank publishes the national aecounts, it has based ita data on 
information gathered within that agency or received from other government 
responsible bodies* It receives data on the growth rate of agricultural 
production from the ministry of Agriculture which most observers of the 
Iranian economy beleive to be well over stated by the ministry. With regard
6to the growth rate of value added, the central bank has Mainly relied on 
Ite regular aurvey of aelected large establishments, Therefore, the growth 
rate of the whole Manufacturing sector depends on the growth of production 
in the large establishments in a eoutry where rural and urban-small indus­
tries play an important role in production» Therefore, this estimation may 
not be truly representative of the growth of manufacturing value added.
Apart from the above short-coming, the central bank revises its estimation 
frequently which makes the time series inoeaparable in soma cases^ parti­
cularly, when the revised data covers a few successive years» Still, the 
central bank's estimation is more reliable than other sources» In particu­
lar, the dataren the manufacturing sector provided by the Ministry of Economy 
sufforos from low reliability» For instance, data for rural production is 
Only a guess-estimate without any regular sampling and has been substantially 
revised in some casees, which reduces tha rsliability of the time series. 
Also, the data on urben-amall industries which is based on regular sampling 
of 5 percent in a few large cities suffers from some degree of inaccuracy 
because of the fragmentation of the Iranian market» The most reliable data 
ia manufacturing sector is related to the large establishments for which 
data is annualy collected from all the large establishments» Therefore, tha 
mistake may arise only from wrong information provided by the factories» 
However, the main problem with regard to tha Ministry of Economy is the 
presentation of its data» In a number of cases, we have found the data 
inconsistent» For instance, the output for large soale industries in a few 
cases is greater than the total for the country as a whole or value added 
is greater than the gross output» Also figuroa related to particular Items 
which may appear several times in the same publication may be different from
one page to another» These short-comings would reduce the reliability of 
statistics provided by the Ministry of Economy,
7Apart from the above etatiatlcal problems, there are etill some 
others which cannot be considered as technical problems but are largely 
affected by political factors* Despite the existence of data on the dis­
tribution of income, the central bank has not published such data and 
has even refused to let the data be used by the ILO mission working on 
behalf of the Iranian government in 1973* Another example is the coverage 
of defence expenditure under other items in budgetary allocation and foraign 
trade statistics, although theaa groups are the most reliable statistica 
in Iran*
The above indicates the major problems of Iranian statistics and the 
low degree of reliability in a number of eases* However, these are problems 
which cvii be observed but there may still be other short-comings, such as 
made-up data for political gains and so on, that.cannot be singled out* At 
least, with regard to the price index, one may say that during 1973-76 the 
actual inflationary pressure in the market was higher than that which has 
been illustrated by the whole «id retail price Indexes of the central bank* 
The pubished price indices were mainly affected by the direct control pf 
prices by the government while the actual range of such pricss M r s  enour- 
mous and common* *
Therefore, one has to consider the restriction, which ths lack of 
data «id the low reliability of statistics have imposed on us in the analysis 
of the performance of the Iranian ooonomy*
8Part One
Determinants of Government Expenditure 
Introduction
In this part, the main concern is the investigation of the deter­
minants of government expenditure and the reasons behind the growth of 
public expenditure in Iran. We will consider the pattern of government 
expenditure with regard to its functional uses and economic categories. 
In this respect, the effects of socio-political factors and economic 
determinants on the allocation of public expenditure to different func­
tional and economic categories will be discussed.
The part is divided into two chapters. In the first chapter, we 
will critically analyse the theoretical explanation of the behaviour of 
government expenditure. Also, we will explain our method of analysis arid 
the statistical problems which we will be confronted in the analysis of 
government expenditure in Iran. The second chapter deals with the empi­
rical evidence in the case of Iran. In two sections we will evaluate the 
pattern of government expenditure for two different periods, 1928-58 and
1959-76
9Chapter One
1-1 Theoretical Explanation
In the evaluation of public expenditure, two different approaches 
have been used, the "normative” and "positive"# The former concerns itself 
with what ’should* constitute government activity and, hence, with where 
the limits to government engagement in providing goods and services ought 
to lie. In the latter, conclusions about determinants and theoretical be­
haviour of government expenditures are derived from a priori hypotheses 
and empirical invetigations. Here, our analysis is based on the positive 
approach which will briefly be discussed.
At the turn of the century, Adolph Wagner tried to generalize the 
reasons for the growth of public expenditure along with the development of 
the industrial state. However, it was not until the mid 1950’s that eco­
nomists paid attention to the growth of public expenditure and its behav­
iour. Since the mid 1950's, several studies have been carried out in which 
different economic and socio-political factors have been introduced in order 
to explain the pattern of public expenditure, particularly, after World 
War II. Generally, these theoretical explanations and empirical investiga­
tions can be divided ihto six groups: First those which relate the growth 
of public expenditure to the stage of economic development} second those 
which advocate revenue constraint and displacement effects such as wars; 
third those which relate the change to the ideological difference or eco­
nomic system^ fourth political factors, fifth productivity lag and six the 
degree of openness. Here, we will consider the first two groups in detail 
and cover the rest very briefly.
1- 1 - 1  Staoe of Development
Adolph Wagner was one of the pioneers in the evaluation of public
10
expenditure who attributed the growth of state expenditure to the rising of 
income. Wagner formulated his arguement in a "law of expanding state expen­
diture". He, in essence, argued that as a nation experiences economic deve­
lopment and growth, the growing importance of government activity and expen­
diture will be an inevitable feature of a "progressive state" and the state 
expenditures tend to rise faster than national output . To explain the 
reasons for the rising of government expenditure, Wagner distinguished three
types of state activity and tried to prove that government expenditure will
2
rise faster than national output for each of them .
Firstly, an expansion would come about with respect to the adminis­
trative and protective functions of the state. Wagnersuggested that the 
need for increased participation by the state originates in the "inevitable" 
centralization of administration and in the "atomization" of social and eco­
nomic life that results from economic development. Also, he anticipated that 
the increase in population density and urbanization would be additional 
factors leading to an increase in public expenditures on law and order and 
on economic organizations in order to maintain the efficient performance of 
the economy in the face of the increased friction of urban life.
Secondly, Wagner predicted a considerable relative expansion of "cul­
tural and welfare" expenditures, especially when the social benefits of 
the services are not susceptible to economic evaluation ( education in 
particular).
Thirdly, Wagner suggested that the inevitable changes in technology 
and the increasing scale of investment required in many activities would 
make the public corporation the only alternative to the joint stock company. 
In his view, the private enterprises and monopolies mismanage and waste 
capital during business cycles, and therefore, the state in the interests 
of economic efficiency would take over the monopolies. This type of govern-
11
rising of public expenditure in Wagner’s law, as Musgrave specifically says
” indeed much of Wagner's emphasis is on the 'expansion of public enter- 
3
prises'” .
However, Wagner's view as a "law” suffers from two structural defects 
as some economists have pointed out\ First, although Wagner adduces reasons 
why government expenditures will increase in any developing state, and some 
of these reasons are technical in character which operate whatever view is 
taken of the role of the state, there is no priori reason to believe that 
government expenditure will continue to rise faster than national output 
over time and in any stage of development. It is true that demand for some 
of the government expenditure in absolute terms such as general affairs may 
rise rapidly at the begining of industrialization and the domination of the 
capitalist state, and the demand for some others like social services may 
grow faster when a certain stage of economic development is reached. But it 
does not suggest that the growth of public expenditure will be higher than 
the output. However, it is not the lack of empirical support which weakens 
the Wagner law, but it is the lack of theoretical explanation for the general­
ization of Wagner's fiscal law which may invalidate the existance of the law.
It seems that the law of increasing government expenditures is a corollary 
of the political phllosphy and interpretation of history that Wagner accepted. 
Therefore, the existence of the law depends upon the validity of the organic 
theory of the state upon which he relies. If the state does not behave as 
Wagner predicted, therefore, there will be no fiscal law to explain its 
behaviour with regard to the expenditures.
Second, market failures have not resulted in the change of structure 
of the market with regard to the share of public and private economies 
predicted by Wagner, Although greater attention has been paid to the role
ment expenditure plays the most important role in the explanation of the
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of fiscal policy in the maintenance of stability in matured economies, this 
has not been the case for most of the developing nations in which the economic 
growth consideration has occupied the first priority. Not only can the state 
behaviour not be generalized in this respect, but more importantly, the 
fiscal role of the state with regard to stablization policy has been entirely 
different from that of Wagner's prediction. In modern economics, stablization 
policies try to affect the aggregate demand through changes in government 
spendings for social services and investment rather than taking over the 
private enterprises due to the efficiency consideration as Wagner predicted. 
Similarly, the role of the state in the developing countries is to ensure the 
development of the private enterprises.
However, Wagner's failure to produce an acceptable fiscal law of 
government behaviour arises from its concept of ".organic state", by which 
he reduces the role of the state in the complex process of economic develop­
ment to its own belief of state behaviour. He ignores the importance of 
historical changes and the vital role of socio-political factors in deter­
mining the economic role of the state in different stages of development.
In the absence of a fiscal law, one should expect to see different govern­
ment behaviour in different stages of economic development and with different 
socio-political structures.
With the historical changes during the twentith century such as World 
War I, the growing of economic crises and social pressures, World War II and 
the rising of international ideological differences have changed the economic 
role of capitalist state in both developed and under-developed countries.
This is the changing of the economic role of the state which has called for 
a vigorous study of the fiscal behaviour of the state, particularly since 
1950*s. Students of the demand-oriented approach may be divided into two 
groups: First, those who have conducted their studies to test the validity
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of Wagner's law ; secondly those who have looked for a relationship between 
the rising of per capita income, as an index for stage of economic develop­
ment, and the rising of total, functional and economic experiditure of the 
state with different reasons from those stated by Wagner^.
Those who have tried to test the validity of Wagner's law have been
confronted with considerable confusion surrounding the interpretation of
7
Wagner's law which Michas has attributed to Wagner's own inexplicit formu­
lation of his hypothesis and the inconsistency of the various English trans­
lations of Wagner's work. While there is no explicit statement in Wagner 
that the law of expanding scale relates to the share rather than the absolute 
level of public expenditures, occasional reference to "quotas" suggests the 
former. Another problem which is not clear is whether the law is applicable 
to a specific period of economic development er is valid over time.
In an extreme case, Wagner's hypothesis can be interpreted as the 
continous rising of the government share until it accounts for 100 percent 
of national output. However, Herber suggests that Wagner's hypothesis
g
applies only to industrializing nations . Further, Bird argued that"...the
law was explicitly framed to refer only to states in which income was rising
as a result of industrialization. The condition under which one might expect
the law to operate would therefore seem to be (1 ) rising of per capita income,
(2) technological and institutional change of a particular sort, and (3),
at least implicitly, democratization ( in the sense of wider political par-
g
ticipation) of the polity." Also, Pryor believes that the law is applicable
to nations which are in the process of transforming their economies from
10rural-agricultural of urban-industrial. • Herber goes even further and 
suggests that Wagner postulates a slower growth ±n the relative share of 
government in both pre-industrial and post-industrial stages of economic 
growth. But, according to Crowley, Herber does not rigorously support his
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position . The above interpretations show that the application of the law 
is far more limited than it propounds, and the law should have no implica­
tion for either developed countries or under-developed nations. It may only 
cover the middle-range income group and given particular conditions.
Further more, the confusion surrounding the interpretation of Wagner's 
law has affected the formulation of the law with regard to the choice of 
Index (see note (1 ) for different definitions of the law). Some researchers 
have interpreted Wagner's law as the elasticity of public expenditure (E)
with respect to gross national product (GNP) and above unity (E=f (GNP),
0 -i o
E.GMP) l Another writer relates the law to public consumption expenditure 
rather than total government expenditure which means the elasticity of 
public consumption (C) relative to national income (Y) is greater than
_ A
unity ( O f  (Y), C.Y) . According to another version, the elasticity of
public expenditure (E) with respect to gross national product per capita
(GNP/P) is greater than unity (E^f (GNP/P), eE.GNP/p)^. Musgrave has
interpreted the law as the elasticity of public expenditure as a share of
gross national product (E/GNP) with respect to gross national product per
capita (GNP/P) and the elasticity is greater than unity ( E/GNP* f(GNP/P),
8E/GNP.GNP/P)15. Still, another researcher looks at the elasticity of
public expenditure per capita (E/P) with respect to gross national product
*16per capita (GNP/P) as the appropriate indicator» .
The above differences in the formulation of Wagner's law coupled 
with different sets of data used by researchers have reached completely 
different results ranging from supporting the law to the total rejection 
of any relationship between the rising of income and the rising of public 
expenditures. However, as one writer has pointed out, some of studies are 
based on the international cross-section data by which the validity of 
Wagner's law cannot be tested , because the cross-section is related to a
11
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point in time while the law is applicable to the rising of government expen­
diture along with the rising of income over time and in one country only. 
Another factor which causes misunderstanding of the results is that data 
are used for developed and under-developed countries which do not fit the 
conditions under which the law operates (see above P13). When this distor­
tion and misinterpretation are considered, on balance, the evidence appears
18more to support than to controvert Wagner's law . Although some evidence 
shows that wagner's law holds in aggregate terms and for social services, 
the result is inconsistent with Wagner's original ideas in the sense that 
neither the "market failure" nor the expenditure on administration have 
appeared as important factors in explaining the rising of government expen­
diture over time. These empirical studies may suggest that Wagner's law has 
no important implications for explaining the pattern of government expen­
diture during the twentith Century due to the different historical setting 
which the law belongs to.
The second group of researchers have tried to explain the pattern 
of government expenditure in the present time. By comparing these patterns 
in developed and developing countries, they have made an attempt to reach 
general causes behind the behaviour of state expenditures during economic 
development. Also, in order to relate the causes to economic factors, they 
have distinguished between economic and socio-political factors affecting 
the pattern of government expenditure. Having chosen the per capita income 
as an index for economic development, they have reached different results 
depending on the data and the statistical methods they have used. Some of 
the researchers hold to the validity of a significant relationship between 
per capita income as an index for economic development and the share of 
government expenditure in national income. Some others reject the existence 
of such a relationship.
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Among the first group there is considerable agreement on same points 
and differences on others, and the following have had respectable statistical 
support:
1- The share of total government expenditure in the gross national product 
of developed and developing countries increases with per capita income.
2- Current expenditures as a whole increase their share of the national 
product with rising income.
3- Social expenditures increase as a percentage of total government expen­
diture with rising incomes.
However, the reasons offered to explain the above pattern of expen-' 
ditures are different from one writer to another. Martin and Lawis, in their 
cross-section have found that the difference between developed and under­
developed countries is in the amounts spent on defence, on the public debt, 
on social insurance schemes and on food or agricultural subsidies while the 
differences in the basic expenditure are very insignificance. They argue that 
" the main reason why (developed countries) now spend relatively more on 
their public services than they did a hundred years ago is not that they 
are richer, but that they have a different concept of the duties of the 
state....But this change in ideas is not confined to the richer countries, 
and is not proportional to income per head. It has affected the poor countries 
just as much,...." They, also, speculate on the relatively slow growth of
productivity in the public sector as a secondary reason for the expansion
20of this sector. But, some how, their reasons are inconclusive .
Uillimson suggests a combination of economic and socio-political fac­
tors which each or a combination of them cause the share of public expen­
diture in the national income to rise in different stages of development.
These are a number of factors including the importance of capital expen­
diture in electrification, power, transportation and urban housing in the
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early stage of development, the slow growth of productivity and the rising
of wages in the public sector, the need for social security, unemployment
insurance, a complex composition political machine and formal community
protection in urbanizing society to replace the family and village functions
21and finally social and political progressiveness .
From Thorn's point of veiw, the main reason for the rising of public 
expenditure arises from the importance of social services. He argues that 
"as development proceeds there is usually a steady social transformation, 
and growth in the relative size of the urban population accompanied by an 
increase in the relative political importance of urban industrial workers 
in the population.... The growing political strength of the urban workers 
is often accompanied by the development of more democratic institutions as 
development undermines the base of power of the ruling oligarchies, derived 
from the ownership of the land so that the urban populations can influence 
the composition of the government which further accelerates the growth of 
public social expenditures favoring the urban population.... Even under a 
dictatorship this process may operate since few dictatorships can rule by 
personal influence alone but require the support of large, organized groups
in the society. The urban population receives a voice, if not a vote, and
22the tendency for social benefits for urban groups to grow continues."
With respect to government expenditure on administrative and economic ser­
vices in the process of economic development his arguement is inconclusive,
23" There are opposing tendencies at work," he says . Dn the one hand the 
complexity of the society calls for higher government expenditure on these 
services, on the other hand, the rising of labour productivity in the public 
sector may act as an offset to the forces tending to increase government 
expenditures.
These few examples may show the great differences among the researchers
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about the causes of the rising share of public expenditure in the national 
income. But one thing is clear, although most of the above mentioned factors 
may call for higher government expenditure in process of economic develop­
ment, they do not suggest that the rise should inevitably be higher than the 
growth of national income. In other words, there is no reason for the income 
elasticity of demand for public expenditure as a whole to be higher than 
unity and remain greater over time. While the lack of theoretical explana­
tion on the demand side may leave the question open, one may wonder whether 
the empirical studies supporting the existence of a significant relationship 
between the per capita income and the share of government expenditure in the 
national income are accidental and fallacious ones. The above works share 
the general weakness of studies in this area which have attempted to explain 
government expenditure by using cross-section analysis. Such an analysis is 
limited as it only Indicates why government expenditure differes between 
countries at a particular point in time. Hence, conclusions derived from 
such studies are related to explaining differences in the share of govern­
ment expenditures in the various countries examined, rather than strictly 
concerned with the factors that may determine such shares.
Moreover, the importance of per capita income revealed by the cross- 
section analysis may be a reflection of extreme level of income in some of 
the countries examined. This may be so because when the countries are 
divided into high income and low income sub-groups, the association between 
the share of government expenditure in the national income and per capita 
income disappears. In neither case does the evidence support conclusively 
the proposition that the income-elasticity of government expenditure is 
positive and more than one. For example, confining the country sample to 
highly advanceed countries alone, revealed that government expenditure in 
those countries does not seem to be significantly associated with per capita
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income, . Also, a recent study shows that the share of public expenditure 
in national income( in real term) in some of matured economies has declined 
and the elasticity for government expenditure has fallen below one during 
1950-7025.
Also, some studies which are totally concerned with developing coun­
tries indicate that there is no significant relationship between per capita
26income and the share of government expenditure in the national income; .
While neither theoretical explanation nor empirical evidence show a con­
clusive and significant relationship between per capita income and the demand 
for government expenditure, one may conclude, ( as did Lall^2, that if the 
level of development does have an effect on the pattern end size of govern­
ment expenditure, per capita income may be the wrong index of development.
Or if per capita income is the right index, then the level of economic 
development has no special effect on the pattern of government expenditure, 
or its effects are overlaid by the influence of other factors. We cannot 
simplify the process of economic development to the rising of income when 
we deal with structural changes in the economy. What appears to be the 
problem is the attempt to reach a sort of general theory of fiscal behaviour 
of the state while the socio-political structure of any country makes the 
pattern of government expenditure unique to the particular case study.
1-1-2 Revenue Constraint
While the demand-oriented hypotheses have not succeeded in explaining 
the complete pattern of government expenditures, some reseachers have con­
centrated on the supply of revenue in relation to the behaviour of govern­
ment expenditure in the process of economic development. Such hypotheses 
suggest that government expenditure is restrained by the government's 
ability to raise revenue. It is true that government revenue may not be 
fixed at an absolute level which means no change either in the tax base
20
or tax rate. But revenue may be fixed relative to a given level of income. 
This means that although the revenue increases either due to the rising of 
income or changes in the tax structure, it will be rigid for various reasons. 
Firstly, it may be administratively impossible to bring about a significant 
increase in revenue. Secondly, revenue may be fixed for economic reasons.
The limit may be imposed by fears of disincentive effects as a consequence 
of rising of revenue, low degree of monatization and a subsistance sector 
in developing countries. Thirdly, the limit may be imposed by socio-political 
factors which is true for both developed and under-developed countries, 
although of a different nature. While in the former the revenue constraint 
may operate when a certain level of taxation is recognized as '•intolerable”, 
in the latter the political structure of the country may make the imposition 
of taxes on certain classes of the society impossible and also'affect the 
structure of the fiscal system ( see chapter 6 for detail argument ’ about 
Iran).
It may be argued that the government can obtain more funds by borrow­
ing, and hence the above argument relating primarily to tax revenue are 
irrelevant. However, even government ability to borrow is not unlimited.
Such an ability is determined by a complex economic, institutional and 
political factors. For instance, the backwardness of the money market, 
foreign exchange considerations and fears of inflation may show the impor­
tance of economic factors ( see chapters 6 and 7). These factors render 
continuous borrowing by the government difficult.
Furthermore, the seriousness of the revenue constraint varies accor­
ding to whether the short or long run is considered. One implication made 
concerning the revenue constraint is that it is in the short run that 
government expenditures are restrained by revenue. In the long run the 
problem will be overcome by the structural changes in the fiscal system
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in the process of economic development. However, this does not mean that 
in the higher stages of development the revenue constraint is irrelevent 
in the consideration of the government expenditures. But this implies that 
the nature of revenue constraint which may operate in an advanced economy 
is different from that of a developing nation. In the sense that the deter­
minants of revenue constraints in developed economies are less affected by 
economic factors and, therfore, the revenue constraints in such countries 
are not as rigid as in developing countries. In this respect other factors 
are also operating. In advanced economies, government expenditure influences 
and facilitates the government revenue. This is so, because in such coun­
tries revenue ( and in particular tax revenue) is flexible in relation to 
income and, hence, the built-in increase in revenue accommodates the increase 
in expenditure, without the need to impose higher tax rates. Also, ths 
effects of revenue constraints are less serious,because the existence of the 
highly articulated money markets facilitate and raise the possibility of 
government borrowing to meet its expenditure obligations, particularly in 
the short run.
The existence of such revenue constraints are recognized be resear­
chers both for developed and under-developed countries. In the case of
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developing nations, Lotz refers to the importance of the revenue constraints 
and their effects on the government expenditures. Also, Oshima29 in his 
time-series study of government expenditures in developed and developing 
countries has found that there is a considerable difference between the 
pattern of government expenditures in developed and under-developed countries 
after World War II. While government expenditures in the former group rose 
rapidly after the war, public expenditure did not show any significant 
change in the latter group. Since there is no reason to believe that the 
possibility of expansion of the public sector in developing countries ia
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lower, Oshima sees the differences in the revenue side in the sense that 
revenue remains as a constraint on the government expenditures in develop­
ing countries. Although the differences can be attributed to the different 
nature of the revenue constriant in developed and developing countries 
rather than the non-existence of the constraint in the former groups, the 
question is why developed countries have been able to expand their expen­
ditures rapidly after the war. It is this question which brought Peacock 
and Wiseman to introduce a new concept in this area of public finance 
that is "displacement effects".
Displacement Effects
At the turn of the Century, Wagner recognized the importance of 
revenue constraints, but, based on his "organic state” concept and progr- 
ressive state, he felt that " in the long run the desire for development
31of a progressive people will always overcome these financial difficulties." 
In a critique of Wagner, Peacock and Wiseman argued that the possible 
expansion of expenditures is essentially limited by revenue and that 
rates are fixed by political and social forces which tend to remain 
unaltered unless the system receives an external shock such as war. They 
have taken the U.K. as a case study and have tried to show the pattern of 
expenditure and the state behaviour in relation to the major wars.
For this purpose they have introduced the concept of " displacement 
effect" by which they explain the divergence of government expenditure from 
its normal trend, that is when the Idea of " tolerable burdens" of taxa­
tion cannot explain the more rapid rates of expenditure. " There may thus 
be a persistent of divergence between Ideas about desirable public spending 
and about the limits of taxation. This divergence may be narrowed by large 
scale social disturbances, such as major wars. Such disturbances may create 
a displacement effect, shifting public revenues and expenditures to new
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levels«? So the displacement effect explains or bridges the gap between
the "tolerable burden" of taxation and the "desirable level" of public
expenditure • This "displacement effect" has two aspects« On one hand; it
makes the former "intolerable burdens" an^acceptable one and on the other
hand creates a new and continuing obligation for the government«
This sort of tax constraint in a developed economy can be attributed
to the creation of the "desirable level" of expenditure« Thus, the social
upheavals, actually, create the condition for raising income through the
creation of new acceptable spendings« This point can be clearly observed
from Gupt’s explanation in the case of the Great Depression« " I t  seems
highly likely that the "shift" associated with the Great Depression occursd
because of the change in the attitude towards public expenditure« Many "new"
expenditures which were not considered very"desirable" became highly "desir—
able", and this increased the "existing gap" between the "desirable level"
of public expenditure and the "tolerable burden" of taxation during the
Depression« An increase in this gap seems to have permitted the acceptance
of new taxes and the consequent increase in the "tolerable burden", and thus,
33
a decrease in this "gap" • From the above explanation, it can be deduced 
that the sequence of decision in a developed economy runs from expenditure 
to revenue« Thit is, the tax policy tends to accept the level of expenditure 
as its revenue goal.
The displacement effects as explained by Peacock and Wiseman rest on 
their observation of the U.K. which shows that under periods of social up­
heaval people tend to revise their previous feelings towards tax levels« 
Although this implies a revenue constraint, this is a type of constraint on 
the eloctrate and legislature which presupposes a modern demcratic system 
that is different from that of a developing country« Coffman has rightly 
pointed out this point« " In many developing nations, internal dictatorship
32
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or external pressure from a foreign power or even an International agency 
may reduce the role of the ballot box and introduce a different set of 
constraints*" However, while in a developed economy changes in the feel­
ings of people may be enough to put the ballot box at work, in a developing 
country a fundamental changes in the socio-political structure of the society 
are needed to provide the necessary conditions* Changes in the internal 
socio-political structure may ease the revenue constraint whan an economy 
is in the transitional stage from fuedalism to capitalism* The socio-political 
changes would bring about the necessary condition for the raising of revenue 
by narrowing the gap between the "desirable level” of expenditure, which is
determined by the growing importance of capitaliit classes, and the "toler-
*
able burden" of taxation* Although we cannot compare the effecta of major 
wars as displacement effects on the pattern of public expenditure in developed 
and developing countries because the latter did not fight in the wars, a 
study shows that the internal socio-political changes produce important 
displacement effects* Reddy has found that, in case of India, " the displace­
ment effect produced under the impact of the world wars disappeared imme- , 
dlately after the war while the displacement effect produced after Indepen­
dence (particularly after 1951) is still in force*"^5
However, it is not only the difference in the socio-political struc­
ture of advanced and under-developed economies which may affect the nature 
and rigidity of the revenue constraints, but alsotand more importantly, it 
is the differences in the economic structure of these economies which make 
the nature of the revenue constraint in developing countries distinct from 
the advance economies* While, as has been explained above, the tax policy 
in developed countries tends to accept the level of expenditure as its 
revenue goal, in developing countries the level of expenditure is restained 
by the revenue constraint* The revenue constraint in developing countries
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rests on'the structural problem of under-development, mainly low productivity, 
lack of an efficient fiscal system, and external pressures particularly the 
foreign exchange earning. Therefore, to overcome this " revenue constraint", 
a type of upheaval is required which can, at least, reduce the impact of 
disturbing factors. Goffman and flahar found different causes for displace­
ment effects for the six countries in their study, for example the revolu­
tionary program for Costa Rica, and the changes in foreign trade condition 
for Haiti . Comparing the differences in the nature of revenue constraint 
and displacement effects in developed and under—developed economies, one 
may conclude that depending on the economic and sodio-political structure, 
an economy may experience different displacement effects in the process of 
economic development which may ease the revenue constraint in a period of 
time. The seriousness and rigidity of the revenue constraint will be alle­
viated along with the development of the fiscal system, changes in the struc­
ture of the economy and the rising of per capita income.
1-1-3 The Degree of Openness and other
Determinants
Some researchers in order to consider the Importance of revenue cons­
traint along with the normal pattern of government expenditure in the pro­
cess of economic development have chosen the " degree of openness" as the 
appropriate indicator for the level of economic development. In this way, 
they have tried to relate the behaviour of government expenditure to the 
revenue constraint as well as the rising of income per capita. The idea of 
the degree of "openness" as an explanatory factor rests on the differences 
observed in the pattern of public expenditure among developing countries. 
Hinrichs and Bird show that per capita income is an irrelevant explantory 
factor in the context of poor countries, and hence, they argue that the 
behaviour of public expenditure in such countries can be explained by the
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import ratio ( total imports/GHP ). Tha import ratio is an indsx for the 
degree of openness in these countries* The rationale for the importance 
of the foreign trade sector seems to be a two-fold one* Revenue depends 
on:the availibility of tax handles and the foreign trade sector provides 
such a handle* This is because taxing such a sector is administratively 
easy and politically feasible* On the other hand, the foreign trade sector 
indirectly provides sfiill-over effects in the economy by speeding-up the 
monetization of the economy and, hence, raisea the taxable capacity ( for 
detail argument, see chapter 6)* However, the validity of the degree of 
openness as an appropriate explantory factor is objectionable on two grounds* 
First, it is true that the foreign trade sector can easily be taxed, but, 
the expansion of foreign trade depends seriously on the availability of 
foreign exchange, lack of which is the well-known problem of developing 
countries* Secondly, by gradual development towards industrialization, the 
ratio of taxable imports will decline due to the rising need for inter­
mediate and capital goods ( see chapter 6 )• Nevertheless, in the very early 
stage of development when the structure of the economy ie transforming from 
a feudalistic structure to a capitalist one, taxing of the foreign trade 
sector efficiently may provide the government an important source of revenue 
which may shape its pattern of expenditure*
Other factors which have been introduced to explain the pattern of 
government expenditure in different countries are the ideological differences, 
political factors and the productivity lag* As far as the first factor is 
concerned, the differences spell themselves out in the different concept 
of the role of the state* These differences may not clarify the pattern of 
expenditure in the particular economic system that is the role of capitalist 
state in the economic development* Although one study has tried to make a 
comparison between different economic systems, capitalist and communist, the
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differences in the pattern of public consumption expenditure explain only
38part of the total government expenditure in these countries • Also, the
different concept of the role of the state may make the similarities and
differences in statistical terms meaningless*
The second factor is far more important in explaining the differences
in the pattern of government expenditure among capitalist countries* The
gradual change in the socio-political structure under the growing social
pressure and changes in the power balance of political groups will raise
the need for social reform and reduce the political resistance to the alloca—
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tion of resources for the provision of public goods * In the evaluation of 
the pattern of government expenditure* one cannot distinguish between the 
economic and political determinant because they are the two sides of a coin* 
The interrelations among these factors have reduced the importance of 
economic indicators such as per capita income and the degree of openness*
Ido have already mentioned the third factor that is the productivity 
lag^* Essentially* it has been argued that the productivity lag seemed 
to be reflected in the behaviour of the share of the labour force employed 
by the government* The rise in wages in the less productive sector (govern­
ment) will bring about an increase in civil expenditure can be accounted 
for by wages and salaries* But as we mentioned earlier there is no conclu­
sive evidence to show such differences* In developing countries* govern­
ments use more capital than other sectors of the economy and therefore one 
may expect productivity to rise along with the more efficient use of capital* 
The above mentioned factors will give ua the necessary theoretical 
explanation to evaluate the pattern of government expenditure during the 
economic development of Iran* Here* we will sum up the above theoretical 
hypotheses and explain the method of evaluation which will be used*
28
1 - 2  method of Evaluation
In tha above section, most of the hypotheses which may explain the
pattern of government expenditure in the process of economic development
have briefly been discussed. These hypotheses, depending on their nature,
can be divided into two groups, those which produce permanent effects and
41those factors which may cause diversions from the normal pattern .
Permanent Effects
Those factors which produce permanent effects on the pattern of 
government expenditure are mainly the riding of demand for public goods 
along with the rising of income, the growth of population and the changes 
in the relative share of urban population as well as changes in the popula- 
tiort-piramid. The population factor which also reflects the socio-political 
changes may be the most important determinant of public expenditure with 
regard to the permanent effects. Another factor which may also affect the 
pattern of public expenditure is the inflationary pressure. If the rate of 
inflation for the GNP as a whole and public expenditure are different under 
the period of the study, it may distort the pattern of expenditure ratio.
Firstly, we examine the existence of a relationship between the 
rising of income and the rising of public expenditure. The question will 
be whether the rising of income can explain the total or partial behaviour 
of the expenditure or whether the result is an accidental one without any 
important economic meaning, and if a relationship between the rising of 
per capita income and government expenditure with a significant statistical 
coefficient exists. Here, since we deal with the pattern of public expen­
diture over time and in one country only, the detailed Information about 
the nature of economic and socio-political factors would allow us to clarify 
the existence or non-existence of such a relationship between income and 
government expenditure and its real influence on the pattern of public expen—
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diture. In this way, we would not rely on the significance of statistical
results, but largely on the causes of such patterns* However, In order to
take Into account the above consideration, one problem will be the choice
of an appropriate measurement for testing the relationship between the •
rising of income and the rising of public expenditure* As we have explained
earlier, a numbers of functions have been used to test the above relation-
42ship some of which seem not to be apprppriate* Here, following flichas and 
some others, one may assume that if the share of public expenditure in the 
GNP rises along with the rising of per capita income, "ratio-income-elasticity* 
of demand for public expenditure should be positive* Thus:
(1) Ej/GNP ■ f(GNP/P) E is government expenditure and P is population
(2) Log EA/GNP - a ♦ b Log(GNP/P)
Where (b) in equation (2) is a measure of constant elasticity* Also, alter­
natively, the relationship between per head government expenditure and per 
capita income can be used which is monotonically related to equations (1 ) 
and (2).
(3) Ea/P - f(GNP/P) (4) Log Ej/P - a., ♦ b^ogiGNP/p)
Where (b^) is a measure of constant income-elasticity which should be positive 
and greater than one*
Secondly, we will evaluate the effects of population growth on the 
pattern of public expenditure ratio at constant with that of the current 
prices* The differences or similarities uould show the extent to which the 
demand for or the supply of public expenditure is affected by the different 
rate of inflation for publicly provided goods and those' of the society as 
a whole* Here, we will use a deflatory index of GNP, public current and 
capital expenditures*
Factors Causing Diversion
Us will examine the importance of the revenue constraint in Iran by
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relating the pattern of government expenditure to the pattern and different 
components of government revenue* In this respect, we will evaluate the 
importance of those factors which may have eased the existing revenue cons­
traint and may have produced diversions in the normal pattern of government 
expenditures due to both the socio-political upheavals and economic factors 
whether; exogenous or indigenous* In other words, we will examine the nature 
of displacement effects in Iran*
following the above consideration, if a revenue constraint exists, 
the allocation of the government expenditure to current and capital services 
and its functional duties will be affected by such a constraint* Therefore, 
we will also examine how the nature of revenue constraint and the socio-poli­
tical factors would affect the trade-off between different government ser­
vices.
In the following chapter, the pattern of public expenditure for the 
period of 1928-76 will be evaluated according to the above two main hypo­
theses* However, before starting the examination of government expediture, 
one should realize the limitation imposed by the inadequate data ^hieh 
does not allow a complete investigation of the changes in the pattern over 
time* The available data allows us to trace the trend of public expenditure 
in Iran during two periods. The first period starts in 1928 and ends in 1948. 
The second period is 1959-76 for which the CNP estimation is available* The 
national income accounts would make it possible to explain the impact of 
government expenditure on economic development, so we have to concentrate 
our study on this period. The scattered data for 1950's would help to fill 
the gap between these two periods and trace the trend of the government 
expenditure*
The data for the first period shows only the functional allocation 
of government expenditure and no specified data for current and capital
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expenditure is available. Also, a different price index for government 
expenditures does not exist, therefore, we will use the general index of 
wholesale prices for deflating government expenditure.
However, in tracing government expenditure in the second period we 
are initially confronted with two statistical problems. In the first place, 
prior to 1964, the following items were excluded from the government 
budget| a) the revenue collected under the heading of special budget and 
the expenditure out of this budget, and b) the revenue and expenditure of 
the commercial agencies affeliatad to the government. Although we will, try 
to give a complete view of government expenditure, we have to concentrate 
on data available from 1964 onwards. Secondly, the I960'a started with a 
recession. This may distort the overall view of the government expenditure, 
so we have to be cautious about the 1960-63 period in this study.
Due to the lack of comparative data for public expenditure as a whole 
we have to examine the growth of public expenditure in two different class­
ifications. First, we will examine the growth of government expenditure 
which covers only the current and development expenditures, that is, the 
special budget, the expenditure of commercial government agencies and debt 
repayments are excluded. This would limit our study to an sxamination of 
capital and current expenditures. Secondly, the available data for 1964 
onwards would allow us to examine government expenditure by its functional 
duties whloh are more or less comparable.to that of the 1928-48 priod's 
classification.
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Chapter Two
2 Pattern of Government Expenditure 
in Iran
2-1 Pattern of Government Expenditure 
During 1928-58
Permanent Effects
Figure (2-1) shows the pattern of government expenditure during 1928- 
58 at current prices* The growth is uneven but with a rising tendency* Up 
to 1938, the government expenditure rose slowly but steadily and after a 
sharp rise during 1938-41, a considerable fluctuation appeared in the 
pattern of government expenditure during 1941-49* However, as the same 
figure shows, in the last sub-period, each successive peak is higher than 
previous one which can be interpreted as the rising tendency of government 
expenditure. The rates of growth were around 18/j' percent for 1928-38 , 39*8 
percent for 1938-41 and around 10.9 percent for 1941-49 ( table 2-1)*
Despite the lack of data on national accounts, one may fairly assume that 
the rate of growth of government expenditure was higher than national out­
put, at least for a considerable period, if there were no inflationary effects*
However, when the pattern of expenditure at constant prices ( 1959 
prices) is considered, the tendency to rise disappeared for 19 4 1.4 9 period*
As figure ( 2-1 ) shows after the first peak in 1941, the level of public 
expenditure dropped to 6460 Million Rials by 1944 which was below the 1932 
level of government expenditure* Also, the successive peaks after 1941 
remained below that level until 1955* This considerable decline of government 
expenditure in real terms is clearly manifested in the pattern of per head 
government expenditure which also takes into account the growth of popula­
tion. Although it shows a further reduction in real terms, the pattern 
remained the same as that of government expenditure at constant prices (fig-
«9
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? Figura (2-1)
Government Expenditure at Current Billion
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ure 2 -2 )•
It is true that Iran underwent a serious socio-political and economic 
crisis during and after World War II, but the aeriousneasof the crisis of 
public expenditure was greater than that of thenational economy. In the 
absence of national accounts, one may safely assume that in an economy with 
a large agricultural sector ( around 80 percent of GNP) the fluctuation in 
the real per capita income is much narrower that what the above pattern of 
government expenditure has illustrated. At least, a tentative estimation of 
national income by Bharier ,shows that the Iranian economy recovers soon 
after the crisis. Threrefore, if one intended to relate the rising of govern­
ment expenditure to the rising of per capita income, the above pattern 
would be a complete failure.
In order to understand the importance of the rising of per capita 
Income with regard to the pattern of government expenditure, one should 
realize the different roles of income as an economic factor on the supply 
of and demand for public expenditure in different stages of development. 
Although the demand for public goods can be treated as luxury goods, demand 
for which rises along with the rising of income, such treatment is largely 
limited to the government social services in a society where the capitalist 
state has dominated and the democratic process reflects the social pressure 
to the surface. This cannot be the case for a state in the transitional 
period which is challenging the old rooted feudalistic structure and seeking 
the expansion of its bureaucratic machine and security forces to ensure ite 
domination. However, the existence of potential demand for public goods is 
one thing and its realisation is another. There is a need for a bureaucratic 
machine to produce the necessary public goods and to channel the appropriate 
income to the public sector. In other words, in this stage of economic devel­
opment, the realisation of the demand for public goods is not only limited 
by low income, but more impotantly, by the institutional barriers and state
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Figure (2-2)
Per Head Government Expnditure
Source» See Beck Ground Table 1
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machine.
However, on the supply side» the rising of income may facilitate 
an increase in government revenue by raising the taxable surplus and the 
degree of monetization. Nevertheless, in the transitional stage, the devel­
opment of a fiscal system is hampered by the economic and socio-political 
structure of the society, unless a socio-political upheaval accelerates 
the process* This bring us to the second stags of our analysis that is the 
revenue constraint*
Revenue Constraint and Displacement Effects
The level of government expenditure is related to the two main 
channels of government revenue, taxation and deficit financing* However, 
both channels are limited by economic and socio-political factors* As far 
as taxation is concerned, the limitation is imposed by the large subsistence 
agricultural sector, low degree of monetization and the power of landlors 
in the political structure of the society which hamper the development of 
a fiscal system. This limitation is important since in the absence of an 
®^flcl®nfc income taxation, the bulk of government revenue has to come from 
indirect taxes and in particular customs duties, in the very early etages 
of capitalist development ( see chapter 6 for detaied argument )* Therefore, 
in this stage, government expenditure may be limited to what the govern­
ment can collect through custom duties* Figure (2-3) shows the pattern of 
customs and oil revenue along with the pattern of government expenditure 
at current prices. It appears that up to 1936-37 a close link exists between 
the patterns of government revenue and expenditure, but a signficant diver­
gence between the two patterns developed during 1936-45* The revenue not only 
did not keep up with the expenditure, it also declined. The declining trend 
of customs revenue can be attributed to the structure of customs duties 
(see chapter 6 ), the gradual development of demand for capital goods, the
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loss of exports and combating inflationary pressure after 1941*
Since the government was not able to raise its revenue sufficiently 
to cover its expenditure* it resorted to deficit financing particularly 
from 1936 onwards ( for this year* deficit financing accounted for 31»4 
percent of government expenditure) . The limitation on deficit financing 
is clearly imposed by the inflationary pressure which developed rapidly 
during 1941-3 ( the cost of living rose by about 40 percent)^'. However* 
the question may be why the inflationary pressure did not sppear before 
1941* the year of occupation of Iran by Allied forces» Both economic and 
socio-political factors are involved»
First, the type of government expenditure during 1936-41 may have 
been an important factor» As we will explain later ( P,51 )* government 
expenditure on economic activities rose rapidly during this period) this 
covers industry, mining and communication. These productive investments 
may have raised the overall productivity and have alleviated the inflation­
ary pressure» Secondly*Reza Shah with his dictatorial power was able to 
bring about an equilibrium among the political forces ( landlors, national
bourgeoisie and others) which created an apprpriate condition for the gra—
*
dual development of capitalism.
However, the occupation of Iran by Alied Forces in 1941, on the one 
hand* led to the stoppage of development investment and the failure of 
some of projects which created an uncertainty on the side of private sector» 
On the other hand, Reza Shah's forced abdication of the throne resulted in 
an unstable equilibrium in the balance of power of the political forces.
This situation aggravated the existing weakness of the bourgeoisie. One 
may speculate and say that* at least temporarilyfand for a short time* the 
central government lost its power and 8 tendency toward a feudalistic decen­
tralization appeared during 1941-46 in particular. Under these conditions
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Annual Growth Rates 
Of Government Expenditure
. , x 1928-58 --- — ...
Table (2—1) Percentage
Year 1928-38 1938-41 1941-49 1949-58 1928-49 . 1928-58
Rate of 
Growth
18.6 39.8 10.9 19.6 18.4 29.4
Sources Back Ground Table 1
Annual Growth Rates of Functional
Table (2-2)
1928-58
Percentaoe
Year 1928-38 1938-43 1944-48 1928-48
General
Affair 13.8 18.1 11.5 16.4
Defence
Affair
13.7 19.9 10 .8 14.4
Social
Affair
18.8 24.4 18.9 20.6
Economic
Affair
36.7 - 3.7 - 5.1 15.6
Source: Back Ground Table 4
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the development of a fiscal system, In particular Income taxation, came to 
a halt ( see chapter 6 ). Also, the Inflationary pressure added to the socio­
economic problems by reducing the government revenue from the custom duties 
( see chapter 6 ),
However, after the war, the balance of political power turned in 
favour of the bourgeoisie and alongside the central government strengthened 
its control on the whole of the country* The socio-political changes ref­
lected themselves in the development of government revenue and expenditure 
during 1946-9* It was accompanied by the rising of oil revenue and the custom' 
duties* But, it did not turn in to a social upheaval until 1951—3 when the 
national bourgeoisie showed its strength and challenged British power and 
the oil company ( see chapter 8 )• Although the militant fraction of the 
bourgeoisie lost its ground, the voice of the bourgeoisie and its influence 
reflected itself in the structure of the new government after 1951-3*
By the restoration of oil revenue in 1954, the trend of government 
revenue and expenditure diverged from its normal pattern and rose rapidly*
One may attribute the change to displacement effects occuring during 1951-3, 
but there is an important difference between the nature of displacement 
effects in a developed economy like the U.K. and that in Iran. In the fomer, 
an external shock, which causes social upheavals, bridges the gap between 
the desirable level of expenditure and the tolerable burden of taxation* In 
other words, the change created in this way is indigenous and is within 
the fiscal system* In the latter, the change with respect to the fiscal 
system is exogenous and remains exogenous to the system* Therefore, with 
the disappearing of such exogenous factors, the fiscal system would not 
be able to bridge the gap between the desirable level of expenditure and 
tolerable burden of taxation* However, this exogenous factor has been the 
main determinant of the level of government expenditure since 1954. As 
figure (2-4) shows the pattern of government expenditure is almost entirely
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Pattern of Government expenditure 
and Foreign Exchange Earnings 
During 1 9 5 9 - 7 6  at current 
Prices
(10 Billion) 
Rials
Figure (2-4)
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dependent on the pattern of the government foreign exchange earnings or 
in other words oil revenue.
Now we proceed to evaluate the effects of eocio-political factors 
and the revenue constraint on the allocation of government expenditure to 
its functional duties.
2-1-1 Government Expenditure By 
Functions
Historically, up to 1949 ( the start of the first development plan) 
the government expenditures were allocated to the responsible ministries 
for development and non-development purposes. In order to trace the trend 
of the government expenditure according to the four functions, we have to 
group the expenditure of responsible ministries according to their respec­
tive functions.
A. General Affaira
This group covers those ministries which are mostly concerned with 
administrative activities. Foreign affaire, justice, court, interior- 
general (including police and Gandermaries), trade and finance come under 
this classification.
B. Defence Affairs
This concerns only the expenditure of the Ministry of War.
C. Social Affairs
This covers public health and education.
D. Economic Affairs
This group of expenditure covers the infrastructure and productive 
activities. It includes the ministries of communication, post, telegraph 
and telephone, agriculture, industries and mines.
Although the latter three groups include administrative expenditure, these 
expenditures are negligible relative to their main functions.
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General Affairs
Figure (2-5) shows the functional composition of the government expen­
diture for 1928-48 at current prices. As the figure shows the government 
expenditure for this group in absolute terms rose slowly during 1928-38 
and after a decline in 1939-40, a sharp and continous increase can be obser­
ved. Whether such a trend existed in real terms and relative to the GNP, 
in the absence of data on national accounts is hard to say. However, the 
annual rates of growth of general affairs expenditure for 1928-38 and 1944— 
48, which enjoyed a fairly stable prices, were around 13.8 and 11.5 percent 
respectively ( table 2-2). Allowing for some rates of inflation during these 
two sub-periods, the rate of growth of government expenditure in this group 
may have been around the rates of growth of the GNP, if not higher. It seems 
that this study, similar to some other case studies, shows that the share 
pf general affair expenditure in the GNP is fairly stable. However, there 
are statistical and conceptual difficulties about this category of expen­
diture and also there is no satisfactory theoretical explanation for tha 
change of general affairs expenditure' during economic development) and there­
fore drawing general conclusions is impossible. As has been expleined some 
speculations have been made by studing the relationship between administra­
tive expenditure and productivity and between administrative cost and the 
cost of production in maunfacturing) but neither of them shows any conclusive 
result for government expenditure^.
However, it can be argued that general affairs expenditure has first 
priority for the capitalist state in the early stage of economic development 
since the public goods provided in this category are vital to ensure the 
existence and domination of the capitalist state. Therefore, under the effect 
of revenue constraint one should expect that this group of expenditure 
accounts for a highrsharaof government expenditure. In the later stage of
46
»
v
(
2C.
I
1<
<
s
4
I
1
1
9
4
t
Ii.
t
*
t
!
Figure (2-5)
Components of Government Expenditure 
1928-43
_ General Affairs Services 
.. Defence Services 
* Social Services
_  Economic Services ( 1 0  Million)
Rials
47
economic development, although these services should necessarily , by their 
nature, be provided by the central government, their share in the total 
government expenditure will decline when the state machine is sufficiently 
expanded and the need for social reform has arisen« As figure (2-6) shows 
the share of general affairs expenditure in the total during the 1928-36 
and 1944—48 sub—periods remained as high as 40 percent which indicates the 
importance of the expansion of the state bureaucracy« The establishment of 
modern Iran after the mid 1920's came with the expansion of administrative 
activities in all aspects, expansion of modern financing, justice and appoint­
ment of governors by the central government« Also, World War II created the 
socio-political atmosphere for accelerating the concentration process« After 
a short period of political instability, the position of the national bour­
geoisie was strengthened and consequently more power was transferred to 
the central government« Along with this development a higher share of govern­
ment expenditure was allocated to the general affairs category.
Concerning the period of 1937-44, one may observe a divergence from 
the normal pattern of general affairs expenditure« The share of this category 
in the total government expenditure declined to 11.4 percent in 1939 which 
may be interpreted as a change in the trade-off point of different govern­
ment expenditures* In this respect, the share of economic expenditure rose 
very rapidly. But, this may well be a misinterpretation because the general 
affairs and economic expenditure were financed through different channels«
The type of revenue constraint imposed on these two groups of expenditures 
are different« The government may have treated the economic expenditures 
as elef-financing investment in the sense that productive investment will 
increase the overall productivity and increase the real output^. Based on 
this assumption, a relatively huge amount of economic expenditure was 
financed through deficit financing. Taking into account that other govern­
ment expenditures including the general affairs category were financed through
448
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taxation, ona may argue that there may not have been any trade-off between 
the share of general affairs expenditure and that of the economic expen­
diture during this sup-period.
Defence Affairs
The defence expendtirue depicts a similar pattern to that of general affairs, 
increasing in absolute terms for the whole period, rising relative to the 
total expenditure during 1928-38 and 1944-48, and declining during 1938-44 
(figures 2-5 and 2-6). With more or less the same rates of growth to those 
of general affairs ( table 2-2), it can be said that the share of defence 
expenditure in the GNP was stable, if not rising.
However, in order to explain the behaviour of defence expenditure, some 
economists have tried to relate defence expenditure to economic factors. But, 
it seems to us that these invetigations are not satisfactory and ths deter­
minants of defence expenditure are socio-political and not subject to economic 
analysis in a developing country. The explanatory factors such as the GNP
6
would not explain the high share of defence expenditure in these countries.« 
Also, some economists attributed the high percentage of defence expenditure
7
to the natural wealth of countries , but the comparison analysis of the 
composition of government expenditure in developed and under-developed
g
countries doss not support this idea •
However, it is possible to argue about economic effects of defence 
expenditure on the employment effective demand, and protection of ths 
international market in the case of developed countries in which defence 
expenditure allows the armament to maintain production and protect the 
necessary markets. But for: a developing country in the early stage of devel­
opment when the capitalist sector accounts for a very low share of national 
product and the economic structure of the society is mainly based on the 
feudalists agricultural system, the consideration of the affects of defence
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expenditure on the employment and industrial output as a determinant of 
the share of defence expenditure in the total government expenditure i8 
highly irrelevant ( see also chapter 5). In this stags of economic develop­
ment a combination of socio-political factors determine the role of army 
in the society.
However, it could be said that the protection of a country's terri­
tories and the maintenance of internal security are the first function of 
the central government. One may even emphasise the latter duty as the most 
important and vital function of the capitalist state in the early years of 
its existence. Also, the role of army is important to ensure the expansion 
of the domestic market by reducing the power of big feudal lords in different 
areas and imposing the control of the central government on the whole of . 
country. The destruction of the power of big feudal lords which was a threat 
to the power of the central government was the first function of Reza Shah's 
army in the 1928-38 period. Thus it is not surprising that defence expen­
diture shows a high percentage at the begining of the recognition and estab­
lishment of national army in Iran after the mid 1920's, Also, after World 
War II, the rising of the national bourgeoisie, thereby recognition of 
national sovereignity, gave more weight to defence expenditure. It was 
accompanied by an increase in the expenditure ©f the Internal security forces 
in the general affairs expenditure. Both these expenditures show that the 
role of the state in the transitional stage is gradually subjected to the 
political interest of the rising classes with a movement towards the imposi­
tion of the necessary institutional structure. In this respect the dis­
placement effects such as war and socio-political disturnaces would accele­
rate the process of domination of the rising classes.
Concerning the period 1938-44, similar to the case of general affairs 
expenditure, the pattern should not be interpreted as the decreasing impor-
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tance of tha defence expenditure.relative-to the economic expendiutre, when 
the effect of revenue constraint is considered ( see above PP for the argu­
ment )• Not only did the importance of defence expenditure not appear to 
be declining in the period under study, it also continued to account for
g
a high share of government expenditure ( 35 percent of the total) in the 
early 1950's despite the interruption of oil production.
Economic Affairs
As figures (2—5 and 2-6) show the economic activities of the govern­
ment up to 1934 was extremely low due to tha above-mentioned socio-political 
factors. In other words, during this pefriod the necessary state machine did 
not exist to carry out and govern the economic activities of the state. With 
a relative stability during 1935-41, the government triad to stimulate the 
economic growth by increasing its investment in the infrastructure and indus­
trial sector. In this way, by its expenditure on roads, rail ways and ports, 
the government made an attempt to expand the domestic market by reducing the 
cost of transportation. Also, by its investment in manufacturing the govern­
ment tried to open a new way to the industrial bourgeoisie and encourage 
entrepreneurial talents to establish a private industrial sector. As a state 
in the transitional stage, the Iranian stats tried to provide the necessary 
conditions and incentives for the development of the capitalist sector.
However, a financially weak government could not have financed the 
huge amount of economic expenditure through lta tax revenue. Although some 
part of the investment in rail way construction was financed through earmar­
king the 'sugar and tea' tax and oil revenue, the lion's share was financed 
through borrowing. Therefore, as was explained that part which financed 
through deficit financing could not have directly affected the trade-off 
between economic expenditure and that of other government functional expen­
ditures. In other words, the increase in economic expenditure was not at the 
cost of reducing expenditure on other government functions •
52
However, due to the occupation of Iran, a limitation was imposed 
on the expansion of economic expenditure by the inflationary effects» In 
order to control the inflationary pressures, the government's first action 
was to cease deficit financing which directly affected economic expen­
diture» By 1943 the level of economic expenditure in absolute terms returned 
to the 1936 level and its relative share in total government expenditure 
continued to decline and reached 8 percent in 1948 or almost the lowest level 
for the period 1928-48.
From the above explanation, one may conclude that economic expenditure 
is not considered as vital to the existence and survival of the capitalist 
state in the early stage of development» Also, relative to the level of ' 
government revenue at this stage, the economic projects are too costly to 
be financed through taxation» Moreover, they are not part of current govern­
ment expenditures, therefore, they can easily be ceased without creating 
further commitments» For all these reasons, under the effect of revenue cons­
traint, this group of expenditure is the most sensitive government functional 
expenditure and suffers from being accorded the lowest priority.
Social Affairs
Social affairs expenditure had a fairly stable position during the 
1928—48 period» Its share in total government expenditure fluctuated between 
7.6 end 10.2 percent for 1928-38 and between 6»5 and 15.2 percent for 1939- 
48.(figures 2-5 and 2-6)»
A large share of social affairs services was allocated to education, 
expansion of which suffers from a low priority: Firstly, the demand for 
education is highly dependent on the demand for skilled manpower and an 
economy in the early stage of capitalist development may not be in urgent 
need of such services» Secondly, the limited demand for education can be 
met by the private sector( see chapter 5)» Thirdly, the lack of this group
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of services at this stage may not jeopardise the existence of the capital­
ist state* However, the slow growth rate of social services expenditure 
conforms to the early stage of development and the growth of urbanization*
As other case studies show, the government expenditure in social affairs 
increase with the acceleration of economic growth*
To sum up the above explanation for the change in the composition of govern­
ment expenditure, we would say that general and defence affairs are the 
first functions of the central government, and they are subject to the social 
and political structure of the country* Taking a country in a transitional 
stage, the state*s expenditure goes to those socio-political institutions 
which ensure the state's existence* In this state of affairs,'social and 
economic activities come as a secondary function unless the state finds its 
position stable* Clearly, in this stage of development, revenue constraint 
discriminates against the latter two* Nevertheless, due to the productive 
nature of economic expenditures, they can be carried out above the limita^* 
tion imposed by the level of tax revenue* But, still the level of such expen­
diture is restrainted by the inflationary effects of deficit financing (see 
also chapter 7)*
The available data for the 1950's allows us to carry on our analysis 
of the effects of the revenue constraint on the allocation of government 
expenditure to capital and current services. This would clarify the diff­
erences in the effects and the nature of revenue constraint after the 1951-3 
displacement*
2-1-2 Current and Capital 
Expenditures 1949-59
In 1949 the Plan Oranization (P.0.) was established and the first 
seven years plan was introduced*.The P.0* was responsible for development 
projects but recurrent expenditure were allocated to the responsible minis-
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trias through tha Ministry of Finança» The development plan was to be entir— 
erly finance through the oil revenues» However, the first plan was never 
implemented. The oil crisis of 1951 cut off the flow of foreign exchange to 
the P.0. The restoration of the oil revenue in 1954 could not rescue the 
failure of the first plan. Practically, the oil revenues were utilized for 
current government expenditures1^»
The second development plan was not as successful as had been expected» 
Tha oil revenue were divided between the P»0» and the Ministry of Finance at 
the rate of 80 percent and 20 percent respectively» But, in 1957 the govern­
ment reduced the P.O.'s share to 60 percent and again in 1958 to 55 percent» 
The main reason for the reduction of the P.O.'s share from the oil revenues 
was the interruption of the expected foreign loans to the government of Iran. 
The government's financial position during this period shows that the govern­
ment of Iran was not concerned about its revenue in Rial terms. Uhereas the 
budget estimates show positive balances, the actual figures show large defi­
cits which have been financed through borrowing from the Melli Bank and prin­
ting money!1» This state of affairs which started in 1954 was accompanied by 
the expansion of the government's ordinary budget» The increase of wages 
and salaries in the public sector and the introduction of new government
agencies resulted in the expansion of government expenditure in general aff—
12airs » During this period, the defence expenditure was as high as 35 to 40
13
percent of the total government expenditures •
This process resulted in the devaluation of the Rial In 1958» Since 
it was not sufficient, a reduction in the P.O.'s share of oil revenue was 
necessary to meet the foreign exchange needs for reducing the inflationary 
pressure» However, the government did not reduce its ordinary expenditures 
and still resorted to the central bank (Melli Bank) for financing its expen­
ditures! e.g. during 1958-9 the government's debt to Melli Bank increased 
by 56 percent1*#
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Uhat the above explanation reveals is that during the 1950's the 
revenue constrsint in terms of the Rial had no effect on the composition 
of government expenditures since the government of Iran did not make any 
attempt to control the money supply through the application of fiscal policy. 
The foreign exchange constraint affected the development projects rather 
than ordinary government expenditures. This was largely due to the fact that 
whereas the effect of foreign exchange constraint on the investment in the 
development projects are tangible and direct, its effect on the government 
consumption is indirect and invisible since the payments are largely paid 
in Rials.
With this historical background in respect of the expenditure deter­
minants and the reactions of the government in the case of revenue constraint, 
one may expect that Iran should have a normal pattern of public expenditure 
during the 196Q's. First, because Iran was fairly stable politically during
V
the 1959-76; and secondly, the foreign exchange constraint felt by the govern­
ment of Iran has not appeared as an obstacle, due to the increase in the oil 
revenues and the increase in the government's credibility for the acquisi­
tion of foreign loans. Therefore,'-the pattern of government expenditures 
should have an economic rationality and its effect should be subjected to 
economic criteria.
2-2 Pattern of Government Expenditure 
Durino 1959-76
In the previous period we traced government expenditure in absolute 
terms and explained the fluctuations of the public spending allocated to 
the four functional categories by the socio-political upheavals during the 
period under study. However, due to the lack of data on the national income 
we could not examine the increasing share of government expenditure in the 
economy, although we made an attempt to explain the pattern by using some
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guess estimates o f ,the national income* Now, we can return to this question
in the 1959—76 period* '.......
Permanent effects .
As figure (2-7) shows government expenditure has grown very rapidly*
It presents an annual growth as high as 23*1 percent on average* The growth 
rates have not been steady; sluggish at the begining, rapid during 1963-5, 
slowing down between 1965-71, exceedingly rapidly between 1971-4 and slowing 
down between 1974-6 ( table 2-3)*
When the pattern of government expenditure relative to GNP is con­
sidered, a more or less similar pattern emerges* One may attribute the 
rising of the government expenditure ratiovto the rising of per capita income* 
In other words, the ’ratio-income-elasticity' is positive and the 'income- 
elasticity* of demand for public expenditure tends to exceed unity as the 
following logarithmic function shows ( for both equations, the coefficients 
of regression are significantly high)* (For data, see Background table 5 ).
(1) Log E/P - -4.0317 + 1.2703 Log Y/P R2 - 0.983 OF - 16
(-30.73)
(2) Log E/GNP - -O.o221 + 0.3198 Log Y/P R2 - 0.784 DF - 16
(-7.6)
As functions (1) and (2) indicate one unit increase in the per capita income 
is accompanied by a 1.2703 units rise in the per head government expendi­
ture or 0.318 unites of the government expenditure ratio. On the assump­
tion that the figures relating to 1973-76 are extremely hifch relative to 
the 1959-71 figures and this may affect the relationship between per capita 
income end government expenditure, we excluded the 1972—76 period from 
the regression. The result appeared to conform to the above relationship 
with the same significant coefficient of regression. It seems the effects of 
the increase of income on public expenditure had even been higher during 
the 1959-69 period that is one unit increase of per capita income generated 
1.85 units of the per head public expenditure.
Figure (2-7) 57
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Source: See Back Ground Table 3
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(3) Log E/P - -9.6657 + 1.8560 Y/P R2 ■ 0.981 DF - 9
(-21.51)
The above income elasticity suggests that along with the increase of 
income per capita, government expenditure rises at a faster rate. For those 
who advocate the demand influence, the reason is that since the public ser­
vices are income-elastic, demand for such services will rise faster when 
income per capita grows. This may also suggest that the government will be 
able to finance its expenditure, for the supply of necessary public goods, 
through its conventional channels of financing. In other words, with the 
rising of income, not only the demand for public goods will grow, but also, 
alongside the income elasticity of the tax system will rise (see also chapter 
6). Income elasticity may be the key pointin the above argument • This may 
be interpreted that the sequence of causes is from per capita income to 
government expenditure and revenue. However, as we will explain later, this 
sequence of causes can be questioned in the case of Iran. Before we answer 
this question we will look at the impact of other permanent effects on the 
pattern of government expenditure during this period.
The pattern of government expenditure in absolute terms at current 
and constant prices show that along with the rising of government expendi­
ture the gap between the two patterns has gradually widened. But, while up 
to 1974 both patterns moved in the same direction and with a lower rate of 
growth during 1972-4, under the inflationary pressure of 1974-76, real 
government expenditure did not show any improvement and a huge gap between 
the two patterns appeared. Even in 1975, real government expenditure declined 
accounting for only 36.2 percent of the government's expenditure in money 
terms (figure 2-7).
When the pattern of government expenditure ratio at current and cons­
tant prices are considered, the general patterns are more or less the same 
and moving in the seme direction with minor differences in the rates of
Annual Growth Rates of Public Expenditure 
At Current and Constant Prices 
and Par-head for 1959-76
Table (2-3) percentage
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Year 1959-62 1962-65 1965-71 1971-74 1974-76 1959-76
Public Expenditure 
at
Current Prices
2*0 2 1 .0 19.7 79.3 24.6 23.1
Public Expenditure 
at
Constant Prices
0.4 18.8 18.3 54.2 - 4.6 15.8
Per head 
Expenditure
- 2.5 15.5 15.0 50.2 - 5.1 13.0
Source: Back Ground Tables 1 and 3.
Distribution of Population 
By Aoe-oroup
Table (2-4) Percentage
Age - Group 1956 1966 1974
5 - 2 4 39.6 43.4 47.4
Other 60.9 56.6 52.6
Total 10 0 .0 10 0 .0 10 0 .0
Source: Plan Organization, Statistical Centre, Statistical Year Book,
1976 and the growth of population in Iran, 1976(2535)«
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Inflation for GfilP and government expenditure (figure 2-8). Comparing the 
patterns of government expenditure in absolute and relative terms,may - 
suggest that the economy as a whole has been affected by government expen­
diture in money terms during 1974—76 and that it aggravated inflationary 
pressure. Taking into account that the share of government expenditure was 
around 50 percent in 1975, such effects can be expected.
The impact of population growth on public spending arises from the 
fact that some functional types of government expenditure, such as educa­
tion are affected by the rate of population growth. In this respect, the 
distribution of population by age would reinforce such demand. The pattern 
of growth of population in Iran may have been such that would explain a 
higher demand for these sorts of expenditures. As table (2-4) shows the 
growth rate for the age-group (5-24) has been higher than average and its 
share has risen from 39.6 percent in 1956 to 47.4 perencet in 1974 which 
implies a higher demand for public services in education. Also, the higher 
degree of urbanization calls for another functional type of government * 
expenditure mainly that . concerned with the provision of socail welfare 
which results in the growth of public spending at the aggregate level. The 
relative change in the pattern of population with respect to the share of 
rural and urban areas in Iran indicates that the share of urban population 
has rapidly risen during the 1956-74 period that is from 29,6 percent to 
46.7 percent (table 2-5). Naturally, the demand for general affairs ser­
vices such as law and order and for social and economic affairs such as
public health and urban development has arisen. However, it is difficult
f"
to assess the impact of population growth and the changes it eauses to 
public spending. Here, we have used the per head real expenditure to illus­
trate the effects of population growth. As figure (2-7) shows, the growth 
of per head public expenditure is slower but the pattern of growth deos not
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Table (2-5)
Distribution of Population 
By Rural and Urban Groups
Percentaoe
Areas 1956 1966 1976
Rural 70.4 59.3 53.3
Urban 29.6 40.7 4 6.7
Total 10 0 .0 100.0 10 0 .0
Source: Plan Organization , Statistical Year Book, 1967
and The Primary Report of the Census, 1976(2535).
Income Elasticity of Tax Revenue. Non-Tax Receipt 
and Public Expenditure for 1959-76
Table (2-6)
Periods e. e n/e e t-Value t-Valua R2 R2 D.F.t n
(T) (N) (T) (N)
1959-76+1.025 +1.495 0.73 1.369 -14.63 -35.65 0.930 0.985 16
1959-69 +1.427 +1.878 0.57 1.684 -10.02 -11.53 0.981 0.937 9
Log T ■ a + e^Log Y e * efc- (e^ - en)N/E
Log N - a„+ e Log Y e/n is an average for the periods
1 n
For Source and Data see Banck Ground Tables 5 and 6.
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show any significant differences to that of real government expenditure*
The effects of population growth appeared to reduce the rate of growth of 
real expenditure* But, when its effects relative to the GNP is considered,' 
it does not affect the pattern of government expenditure ratio. As figure 
(2-8) shows the per head expenditure ratio depicts the same pattern to the 
government expenditure ratio in real and money terms*
Although the population growth and prices have some effects on govern­
ment expenditures, these effects cannot explain the fluctuation of the government 
expenditure ratio and its rising tendency during this period* Neither the 
differences in the rates of inflation for government expenditure and the 
GNP nor the effects of the population growth appeared to be the causes 
of the fluctuation of the government expenditure ratios* Uhile these perman­
ent effects do not explain the fluctuation of government expenditure relative 
to the GNP one may attribute such fluctuation to the effects of the increase 
of real per capita income on government expenditure* But, as we said above, 
the effects of, or more precisely, the sequence and direction of such effects 
can be questioned in the case of Iran* •
Revenue Constraint and Displacement Effects
As has been explained, if the rising of income can affect govern­
ment expenditure, this change should be brought about through the rising 
of government revenue* Therefore, government expenditure is ultimately limited 
by the elasticity of the tax revenue (e^), the income elasticity of non­
tax receipts (e ) and its level including domestic and foreign loans* Assum­
ing a balanced budget, the theoretical relationship between the government 
expenditure (E), and tax and non-tax receipts will be: E ■ T + N
A  E ■ AT + A  N , A E  ' 
A.E » ( et*AY/Y).T + (en
AT/T.T +AN/N.N 
AY/Y).N , A E/E
AY/Y (ef*T ♦ e„*N)
‘ E
e^ .*T + ®n*N - 0£»N + e^.N
E
or e E
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e (T + N) - N (e. - e )
e ------------ --------------- —  or e - efc - (et - en) N/E
Where e ■ income elasticity of public expenditures, T ■ tax revenue and
N ■ non tax receipts* Assuming that N^O, N/E ^ 1 and e ^ e n t it is obvious
that e would be less than , conditions which approximate to most of the
15non-oil developing countries. *
For most of the developing countries, the income elasticity of tax 
revenue (e.) is generally constrained by a very large amount of unsatis-
v
tied needs which reduce the taxable income ( see chapter 6)* So far as the 
ratio of N/E is concerned, in less-developed countries, the reliance on the 
non-tax receipts is far mors important than in developed countries* But there 
are limits to such channels of financing, mainly the low level ofcredit, 
worthiness for the attraction of foreign loans and the inflationary effects
of domestic borrowing. Also if we consider that the limits to which a devel­
oping country can use deficit financing is determined, to a lerge extent, 
by its foreign exchange earnings; the level of government expenditure that 
can be financed in this way depends on the capacity of foreign exchange 
earning*.
Since the foreign exchange earnings are the main determinant of such 
limits, the pattern of government expenditure in an oil-producing nation 
may well be an exception among developing countries* In order to consider 
the effects of oil revenue on the income elasticity of tax revenue and non­
tax receipts, we have widened the definition of (N) to cover government 
revenue from oil* We have some Justification for treating the oil revenue 
as a non-tax receipts, although a large part of the revenue is collected in 
the form of direct taxation. However, this only shows the accounting proce­
dure, otherwise, it does not bear any of ths qualifications for ordinary 
income taxes* Firstly, oil revenue comes from the utilization of natural 
resources the value of which is not necessarily related to the productive
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work of the present generation and the government revenue from this source 
is a sort of rent. Secondly, oil companies are not subject to Income tax on the 
companies operating in the country, therefore, parctically changes of the 
tax law do not affect the oil companies. Thirdly, the rates of taxes Imposed 
on the oil companies are determined differently from that of other enter­
prises. In this respect, many interrelated factors are Involved, mainly the 
bargaining position of the government and the structure of the international 
oil markets ( see chapter 8). Fourthly^ oil is a short-life natural resource 
which may distort the pattern of tax revenue in the long-run. All these 
factors may affect the share of the government of the oil revenue in a . V  
different way from that of other income taxes. Since the oil resources 
generate short-life income flows, they can be treated as a free gift to the 
society which like foreign loans would be ceased some time in the future.
With the above adjustment, the income-elasticity of the tax revenue 
for 1959—76 appears to support the idea of low income—elasticity of ths 
tax system in developing countries. As table (2-6) shows the income elas­
ticity of tax revenue is hardly above unity. The elasticity of non-tax 
receipts is sufficiently high which has been the main cause of ths increase 
of the share of government expenditure relative to GNP. However, ths - 
pattern has been affected by the figure related to the 1974-6 period which 
has led to an underestimation of the income elasticity of the tax revenue. 
When the 1959-69 period ia considered which depicts a normal pattern, the 
income—elasticity of the tax revenue seems to be well above unity, although 
it is lower than that of the non-tax receipts. Therefore, one may argue 
that a combination of both factors have determined the pattern of govern­
ment expenditure in the long-run and the pattern can be explained by the 
revenue constraint and the merits of government channels of financing.
However, while the level of (T) is determined by the rising of GNP
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and the related Income—elasticity, the level of (N) is determined by exter­
nal factore( the factors affecting the oil revenue and foreign loans) 
and,therefore, it is exogenous to the Iranian economy. Here, what we are 
trying to argue is that since (N) is an exogeous factor, it may cause a 
change in the income—elasticity of tax system and so creates the changes 
in the pattern of government expenditure. Table (2—7) illustrates the year 
by year elasticity coefficients for (T) and (N) which indicates that only 
for a few years Were the elasticities above unity. As it appears, the rising 
of the coefficient for (N) Is accompanied by the rising of the coefficient 
for (T) either in the same year or with a year’s lag, A similar change in 
the slope of government expenditure can be observed which may be attributed 
to the combination of the above effects ( figure 2-8). One may suggest 
that the causes for the rising and fluctuations of government expenditure 
relative to GNP can be the rising and fluctuation of N/GNP. With a change 
in (N) as an exogeous factor,the economy receives short-term shocks through 
government expenditure which In turn generates Income through the multiplier 
effects and at the same time raise tax revenue. The existing lag (in some 
cases) can be attributed to the type of government expenditure with regard 
to capital and current spending which produce different time lags ( from 
a few month to more than a year).
These shocks can explain the changes in the pattern of government 
expenditure and its fluctuation during the 1959-76 period. Depending on 
the significance of the changes in oil revenue, few upward changes with 
different degrees of importance have been generated in the government 
expenditure ratios. But, only the 1973-4 change may be called a displace­
ment effect which causes a divergence from the normal pattern of govern­
ment expenditure ( figure 8). However, due to the nature of the cause that 
is the exogenity of the factor, the effects of such displacement may be 
short-run and disappear from the economy after the impact of such change
66
Year By Year Income Elasticity of Tax Revenue. Non-Tax 
Receipts and Public Expenditure for 
1959-76
Table (2-7)
Year et en n/e1
e e
0 2
Periods of 
Shock1
1960 1.87 -0.75 0.52 0.51 0.95
1961 1.36 -1.61 0.51 -0.15 0.25
1962 0.42 0.25 0.49 0.34 0.35
1963 1.26 6.00 0.48 3.53 4.20 +
1964 -0.08 3.35 0.55 1.81 2.60
1965 2.63 2.13 0.59 2.33 3.74
1966 2.99 -0.16 0.55 1.26 —0.61
1967 0.27 4.27 0.57 2.55 1 .2 2 +
1968 2.07 2 .2 2 0.61 2.16 1.29
1969 0.79 1.45 0.62 1 .2 0 0.95
1970 1.26 0.99 0.63 1.09 1 .2 2
1971 0.79 1.35 0.63 1.14 3.78
1972 0.94 1.17 0.65 1.09 0.69
1973 0.51 0.98 0.68 0.83 1.58
1974 0.31 2.37 0.79 1.94 3.78 ♦
1975 5.83 2.0 2 0.80 2.78 0.26
1976 0.75 0.39 0.78 0.47 0 .2 1
Note: 1- N/e is the average of two successive years*
2- eQ is the elasticity of oil revenue relative to GDP*
Source: Back Ground Tables 5 and 6*
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on the fiscal system declines. Unless, the oil revenue continue to increase 
at a higher rate than that of the GNP, government expenditure is bound to 
decline relative to GNP. This also means that the income—elasticity of the 
Iranian fiscal system is low and cannot provide the necessary government 
expenditure without receiving the external shocks. This would suggest the 
seriousness of the revenue constraint and particularly the foreign exchange 
constraint as a determinant of government expenditure. Therefore, one may 
conclude that contrary to the demand—influence school which relates the 
rising of government expenditure to the rising of demand and income during 
economic development, the above explanation shows that the reason for the 
rising and fluctuations. of-QOvernment expenditure has been the nature of 
government revenue channels which are exogenously determined and create 
short-term changes. Also, it seems the sequence and direction of causes and 
effects are from government expenditure to the rising of income rather than 
vice versa. With this pattern, one may safely argue that the Iranian fiscal 
system is not able to increase its expenditure relative to GNP without such 
external shocks.which have mainly coma from oil revenue. Now we can explain 
the effects of such changes on the pattern of current, capiatl and func­
tional government expenditure.
2-2-1 Current and Capital 
Expenditures
After the recession, Iran experienced a rapid economic growth during 
the 1960's and the early 1970's. The government was very active and its 
share of expenditure in the GNP moved up from 18.3 percent in 1964 to 42 
percent in 1975 ( figure 2*8). Due to the effects of revenue constraint 
and the socio-political determinant of the trade-off between current and 
capital expenditures, the related patterns do not show similar changes and 
growth rates to those of government expenditure at aggregate level. Here,
figure (2-8)
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us will use the budgetary definition for current and capital expenditures 
and ue will try to explain the behaviour of these two groups of government 
expenditures*
Current Expenditure
Current expenditure is defined S3 those expenditures which cover 
wage and salary payments* maintenance expenses* replacement investment and 
payments on goods for current purposes* In other words* it does not include 
expenditure for new investments* At least more than 70 percent of current v
expenditures are for peronnel expenditure* in the form of wages and salries*
, , 1 6  allowances,and bonuses. •
The pattern of current expenditure in absolute terms shows that up 
to 1970 the growth rates ware more or less the same for all years and after 
a rising tendency during 1970-3, an exceedingly sharp Increase can be obser- 
ved( figure 2-9)* However* the above pattern is more or less in the same 
direction to that of the GNP, although the current expenditure enjoys a higher 
rate of growth,( figure 2-10). Consequently, the pattern of current expendi­
ture ratio depicts narrow fluctuations during 1959-76 with a clear steady 
upward trend* The share of government current expenditure rose from about 
11 perecnt in 1962 to 26 percent in 1975. Also, current expenditure at cons­
tant prices illustrated a similar pattern* although with a somewhat lower 
rate of growth during 1962-70 and higher growth rates during 1970-76* This 
difference arises from the different rates of inflation for government con­
sumption and the GNP. However* it does not explain the reason for the rising 
of government current expenditure ( figure 2- 1 0 )*
The above pattern can be explained by the demand—influence and the 
priority of current expenditure relative to capital expenditure under the 
effects of revenue constraint! Firstly* in the absence of any revenue cons­
traint, in line with Engel's law, the rising of public consumption can be 
justified* The increasing complexity of economic organization along with
Figuro (2-95
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economic development would bring about the conditions for the public reme­
dial activities which would call for a highar public consumption. Secondly, 
since current expenditure covers those government activities which have 
already been established,,to maintain the existing services, public consump­
tion i8 the first to be dealt with. Also, employment considerations can be 
an important factor because the government cannot easily lay off its eim.», 
ployees, unlike the private sector. However, most important is the priority 
given to defence expenditure which is totally financed as current expenditure. 
As will be explained later (see p82), this factor alone may have been suffi­
cient to increase government consumption. Since the share of defence expen­
diture is politically determined (see82)» it has given the current expen­
diture a priority relative to capital expenditure under the effects of ; 
revenue constraint. This priority is also reinforced by the other above men­
tioned factors.
Also, in the occurence of any displacement, it seems that it would 
be a matter of preference between public,current and capital expenditures 
recognized by the government which could determine the scope of public con­
sumption. In this respect the socio-political factors have been the major 
determinants of the allocation of public expenditure between consumption 
and capital formation in Iran.
Capital Expenditure
Capital (or development) expenditure is defined as expenditure relating
to the government's investment operations. " These are mainly ' not current*
or 'current' in nature and form part of the functions of the government for
a limited period of time only. Thus the construction of a road,-a school.or
a hospital is a development and investment operation, but once constructionie
completed maintenance . thereof is a current government function expenditure
17whereon must be funded from the Ordinary Budget."
Figure (2-10) shows the capital expenditure ratio for 1959-76. It
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illustrates a different pattern from that of current expenditure* There is 
no regularity in the pattern and its share in the GNP fluctuated between 
4*9 percent to 14*5 percent* We have used real capital expenditure in order 
to show whether the irregularity is affected by the permanent effects* The 
share of real capital expenditure in the GNP shows a higher percentage 
relative to that in current prices for most of years, but more Importantly, 
the pattern remains the same as the money pattern* It reveals that the per­
manent effects cannot explain the variation of capital expenditure*
This irregularity seems to be in disagreement with the literature of 
economic development whioh suggests that in the early stages of development 
the public capital formation is of particular importance. This agruement is 
based on the existence of a high marginal capital—output ratio due to the 
lack Of adequate infr»-structural investment in communication, electrifi­
cation, transportation and so on* Based on the above arguement Williamson 
suggested that, "... in capital goods expenditure at least, this would imply 
high government expenditure share in low income and developing nations relative 
to the middle-wealthy income groups who have already made that "lump" invest­
ment and whose marginal public capital outlay concomitant with output growth 
is much less*" Another example of the regularity of public capital expen­
diture can be deduced from Musgrave’a work,"*** it should be noted that the 
ratio of total (public plus private) capial formation to GNP tend to rise 
with economic development* This will countrebslance a possible tendency for 
a declining ratio of public to private and tend to maintain the ratio of 
public capital formation to GNP*" Also, Horowitz has found some empirical 
support for the high rate of capital formation* " In the developing count­
ries the high share of government expenditure in the GNP is explained by 
public investment in economic development and is one of the causes of an 
accelerated rate of growth*" This result would not be sufficient for the 
illustration of regularity of public investment* Since the study is based
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on the cross-section data and does not show the growth of public expenditure 
in the context of economic development, the irregularity of the capital ' 
expenditure remains unexplained.
While there is no satisfactory theoretical reason to explain such 
irregularity during economic development, the irregularity of public capital 
expenditure is not uncommon in matured economies. To analyse the irregulari­
ty of the capital expenditure Wiseman and Peacock suggested two reasons.
"By definition, capital expenditures create durable asseats, and such expen­
ditures must, therefore, tend to occur"irregularly. Also, the well known 
phenomenon of "bunched investment" can affect public as well as private 
investment, . . . . " 21 It is doubtful that these reasons can explain the irregul­
arity of capital expenditure in a developing country. First, the nature of 
durable assets, in this respect, will be important only if the replacement 
investment is taken into account. Since in a developing country the capacity 
for new investment is far larger than in developed countries, the irregula­
rity of capital expenditure cannot be attributed to the non-existence of the 
replacement investment due to the nature of the durable assests.
Secondly, the "bunched investment" arises from the anti—business
cycle policy of the government in matured economies. Peacock and Wiseman
have observed on their study of the British economy, the "growing pressure
22for capital spending in time of unemployment." Since the occurence of the 
business cycle is less important and the nature of unemployment is differnt 
in developing countries, the"bunchiness" of investment may not be a con­
sequence of stablisatlon policy. In this respect, we should consider that 
the role of fiscal policy in a developing country is to be regarded as 
an economic policy for development. The major task of the development plans 
in a contemporary capitalist country is to ensure a high captial formation 
and maintenance of rapid economic growth. Therefore, it may be argued that
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tha "bunchiness" of investment may arise from the uneven distribution of 
projects in a period of the development plan which may create irregularity 
of the capital expenditure* But, figure (2-10) shows that the variation of 
capital spending during each plan is narrower than between development plans* 
The Third Plan shows a rapid growth of capital expenditure ratio (1962-68) 
while the Second Plan verifies a declining trend (1959-62) and the Fourth 
Plan illustrates a downward tendency (1968—73)* This pattern may suggest 
that there must be a factor which affects the government's decision making 
with regard to its overall expenditure and its distribution between current 
and capital expenditure rather than the nature of durable assests and the 
"bunched investment"*
As has been explained, the fluctuation of government expenditure at 
aggregate level are determined by the exogenous factor mainly oil revenue j 
or, broadly, foreign exchange earnings* Therefore, one may attribute the 
fluctuations of capital expenditure to such determinants which are also . 
affected by the political factor with regard to the distribution of govern­
ment spendings between current and capital expenditures. Taking the foreign 
exchange earnings ratio as an index for revenue constraint ( figures 2 -8 and 
2- 10 ), it shows a similar pattern to that of government capital expenditure 
for the period 1959-70, verifying a downward trend for 1959-62, a rapid rate 
of growth for 1963-67 and a downward tendency for 1967-70* Whereas this 
pattern of foreign exchange earnings ratio can explain the variation of the 
capital expenditure for 1959-63 and 1963-70, the downward trend of capital 
expenditure during 1970-73 cannot be explained by the rapid growth of the 
foreign exchange ratio* However, the expected foreign exchange earnings has 
affected the Fourth Plan which can obviously be seen from the fear of the 
planners in the projection of the Fourth Plan (1968-73): " By the begining 
of its last year (of the Third Plan), Iran has became increasingly sure 
that unless its oil revenue became even greater and the exports other than
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oil and traditional farm products were successfully promoted* the country 
would faca serious deficits in its trade balance* The Fourth Development 
Plan (1968-73) stipulated that its objectives could be met only if oil 
offtake increased at an average annual rate of approximately 16*8 per — 
cent." * 0
Despite the growth of oil production* it seems the foreign exchange 
constraint has remained as the major limiting factor of government capital 
expenditure* In thie respect* two more factors seem to be influencialj first* 
government development policy; second* the allocation of government revenue 
into consumption and capital formation* In 1970* in order to bring about 
higher participation by the private sector* a new government policy was 
announced* This called for basic changes* such as limiting the expansion 
of the exisiting public enerprises to their specialized fields and cutting 
off new government investment during the Fourth Development Plan,*
As far as the second factor is concsrned* the allocation of govern** 
ment revenue inte consumption and capital formation is subjected to the 
political factor and the budget line. Since the sequence of allocation of 
revenue to expenditures runs from the current to the development expendi­
ture* the budget line will discriminate against capital expenditure* In 
other words, current expenditure is financed through the tax and part of 
oil revenue while the development plan receives the rest of the oil revenue 
and possible deficit financing ( foreign and domestic loans* see chapter 
7 for the importance of deficit financing in Iran), Therefore, whenever 
foreign exchange earnings are restrained or fear of inflation exists* the 
first thing to be cut off is that part of expenditure which is financed 
through deficit financing which directly affect capital expenditure. Hou h 
ever* the rising In importance of current expenditure* as has been explained* 
is largely determined politically. In this respect* the rising of defence 
expenditure can mostly affect public capital expenditure rather than other
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components of current expenditure which have their own priority.
Distinguishing between differnt factors affecting capital expenditure 
does not mean they are mutually exclusive. The government development policy 
implies the prefernce between consumption and capital formation as well as 
the foreign exchange constraint. But, if we take the foreign exchange cons-» 
traint as an external factor, the government's economic policy would be sub­
jected to the foreign exchange constraint rather than vice versa. So, ulti— 
mately, the sequence of decision will be affected by the foreign exchange 
constraint as well as different determinants of the government current expen­
diture, As far as the latter is concerned, the determinants of current expen­
diture would also determine the scope of public capital expenditure. While 
some of the functional types of government expenditure are subjected to 
economic factors, some others have socio-political determinants.
For a further examination of the expenditure determinants, we would 
carry on with an analysis of the functional type of government expenditure 
for 1964-76, This analysis would make clear how the sobio-political factors 
change the relative share of the different functional expenditures of the 
total under revenue constraint.
2-2-2 Government Expenditure By 
Function
Government expenditure has been disaggregated by function as follows*
1- Economic Services- This covers public expenditure in the agricultural, 
industrial and mining sectors as well as Infrastructural expenditure,
2- Social Services- This includes education, health and soial welfare expen­
diture,
3- Defence Services- This category covers only the expenditure of the Mini­
stry of War.
4- General Services— This s^ows the internal security expenditure as well as 
the administrative expenditures. For the last five years the state construe—
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tion expenditure is included.
5- Oebt Repayment and Miscellaneous Expenditure- This includes interest, 
commission and other expenditure on loans, and the repayments of foreign 
and internal debts.
Economic Services
Following on from the previous section (see P 51 ), it is expected 
that during a period of socio-political stability, economic services would 
gain an important share of public expenditure, at least, in the early stages 
of development. The basic socio-economic changes during 1962-64 called for 
a rapid growth in economic services in later years. In this respect, the 
land reform of 1962 and the begining of the economic recovery after the 
recession of 1961-3 combined with the growing socio-political stability, 
due to the strengthening of a dominant political group in the ruling class, 
brought about the necessary conditions for a higher public economic expen­
diture. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that Iran allocated about 
40 percent of its government expenditure to the economic services during 
1964-68 (figure 2-11).
However, since the economic services are largely financed through the 
development budget ( about 80 to 65 percent of the economic services is 
in the form of capital expenditure), its share in the government spending 
18 subjected to the above mentioned factors(e.i. foreign exchange constraint 
end the priority of current expenditure) particularly those determined by 
the socio-political factors. Since a large part of the economic services 
are financed through deficit financing(foreign end domestic loans), with 
the growing of government debt and the pressure of the foreign exchange 
constraint, the share of economic services declined rapidly from 39.4 per­
cent in 1967 to almost 21.5 percent in 1974 (figure 2-11). Also, it is 
not accidental that the share of economic services and debt repayments 
have moved in the opposite direction. Increasing debt repayments have been
Figura Í2-*11)
Government Expenditure By Function Percentage
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Source: Back Ground Table 9
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allocated from the development budget which has affected the economic 
services*
The decreasing trend of the share of economic services in the total 
government expenditure was so rapid that it could not keep step with the 
growth of the national income despite the rapid growth of government expen­
diture at the aggregate level* As figure (2-12) shows the ratio of expen­
diture on economic services to GNP declined from 12*1 percent in 1968 to 
7,2 percent in 1973. The rising of this ratio during 1973-76 was due to 
the rapid growth of government revenue and expenditure at the aggregate 
level,the relaxation of revenue and foreign exchange constraint and thereby 
the increase in the share of economic services in total government expendi­
ture*
Social services
fl As has been explained the permanent effects such as the growth of
population as well as the degree of urbanization would call for an increase 
in the social services* In this respect, education expenditure is affected
f . s*.
by the population growth and so one may expect that the social services 
should grow up, at least, at a higher rate than the growth of population, 
particularly if the pattern of population is taken into account (see P60 )• 
With respect to the other factors we would expect that the socail service, 
increases would be almost as fast as the growth of national income*
However, in case of Iran, the ratio of expenditure on social services 
to GNR shows an upward tendency with sluggish growth rates for 1964-76* The 
growth rates have not been steady but the fluctuation has been narrow* As 
figure (2-12) shows this ratio has fluctuated between 5*3 to 8*5 percent 
with an upwarditendency* Although the rates of growth of government expen­
diture on social services have been above than those of GNP, this group 
has been losing its share in the total government expenditure which indicates 
the low priority of this category of expenditure relative to general and
3ei
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defence services ( figure 2-11),
As far as the composition of social services is concerned, educa­
tion and health expenditure shous a decreasing share* However, the educa­
tion services account for the largest share in this category, accounting 
for 44 percent on the average* "other expenditures", including urban devel­
opment expenditure, social welfare and insurance expenditure has grown 
relative to education and health services* The repective figures for 1969 
and 1972-76 show an increase of.8 percent in the latter figures for the 
total social services over the former ( table 2-8)* This was largely due 
to social pressure in urban areas as a consequence.of the rising of degree 
of urbanization.
Iilhen we take a Composition of social and economic services as "devel­
opment expenditure", it show a downward trend from about 18 percent of GNP 
in 1968 to 13*8 percent in 1973. A similar but a magnified pattern can be 
seen if the share of "development expenditure" in the total government ex­
penditure is considered* This share declined from'65 percent in 1967 to 
38.5 percent in 1973} although it rose up to 49 percent, it remained "  ' 
well below the 1967 level* This pattern of expenditure clearly shows that 
the 1967-73 revenue and foreign exchange constraint discriminted against 
"development expenditure" and was affected by the political determinant of 
government expenditure with regard to the increase in defence expenditure 
(figures 2-11 and 2-13)*
Defence Services .....
While in the pre-war period and during 1940's and 1950's the national 
defence force was used in cooperation with the internal security forces 
to overcome the internal problem of sovereignty and to reinforce the autho­
rity of the central government, it seems that by the early 1960's, Iran 
had become involved in regional and international conflicts and by mid 1969 
with growing socio-political stability its involvement became greater*
Composition of Social Services
Table (2-8) Billion Rials
Service 1969 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Education
(%)
22.0
(47.0)
39.7
(47.0)
53.0
(44.8)
90.3
(38.9)
125.1
(40.6)
174.7
(43.7)
Health
(%)
9.9 ' 
(2 1.0)
13.6 ‘ 
(16.0)
18.2 ' 
(15.4)
39.7 ' 
(17.1)
51.2 ' 
(16.6)
62.3
(15.6)
Other
■ 00
14.6
(32.0)
13.5
(37.0)
47.0
(39.8)
102.3
(44.0)
131.9
(42.8)
163.1
(40.7)
Total
(50
46.5
(10 0.0)
84.6
(100.0)
118.2
(10 0.0)
232.3
(10 0.0)
308.2
(10 0.0)
400.1
(10 0.0)
Source: Budget Acts 1970-77*
Composition of General'Services
Table (2-9) _____________________________ Billion Rials
Service 1969 1972
<
1973 1974 1975 1976
Internal
Security
(%)
10.4
(43.5)
15.4
(46.4)
17.5
(39.4)
19.2
(40.2)
39.3
(41.4)
53.7
(41.3)
Others 13.4 17.8 61.9 43.4 55.7 76.3
(*) (66.5) (53.6) (60.6) (59.8) (58.6) (58.7)
Total 23.8 33.2 44.4 72.6 95.0 130.0
(55) (10 0.0) (100.0) (10 0.0) (100.0) (10 0.0) (10 0.0)
Note: 1— Excluding the state construction* 
Source: Budget Acts 1970-73
Figur« (2-13)
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The strategic situation of Iran i.e. being on the doorstep of a 
communist country seems to be of great concern and vital to the capitalist 
world* Withdrawal of English troops from the Persian Gulf by 1969 and the 
Nixon Doctorin which required a greater military participation and respon­
sibility from its allied forces, called for higher defence expenditure in 
Iran* In this respect, the position of Iran as the largest country in the 
Persian Gulf imposes on the economy, the heavy burden of the protection of 
the interest of the capitalist world. Also, most important of all was the 
willingness of the ruling class to undertake such responsibility. As far as 
the.regional problem is concerned, the aggravation of.diplomatic relations 
between Iran and Iraq caused a serious threat to Iran during the late 
1960's and early 70's* ^
Therefore, it is not suprising to find that the defence expenditure 
ratio to GNP has grown up from 5.2 percent in 1964 to 14 percent in 1975.
The largest increase came about during 1973-4 which was around 4.8 percent 
relative to the previous year (figure 2-12). A similar rising trend can be 
seen in the share of defence expenditure in the budget. Its share steadily 
and rapidly moved up from 18 percent in 1967 to 29 percent in 1975 (figure 
2-11). However, it seems that defence expenditure would show a higher per­
centage if hidden military expenditure is taken into account. This expen­
diture is mainly for the construction of military bases and has come under 
the general services. To avoid distortion a composition of defence and 
general expenditure has been used as "non-development" expenditure. Figure 
(2-13) shows a steady growth from 7.1 percent of GNP in 1964 to 19 percent 
in 1975.
Ganeral Services
• As has beenexplained (see P17), there is no satisfactory theoretical 
explanation for the behaviour of general services during economic develop­
ment. Depending on the relative expansion of the state bureaucracy and the
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rising of productivity in the public sector , the ratio, of general service 
expenditure to GNP may fluctuate during economic development. However, it 
may be reasonable to sssume that after the state bureacracy is sufficiently 
expanded, at least for a shert period, the ratio to GNP will not rise at 
a significant rate due to the rising of productivity. Figure (2—12) shows 
an upward tendency since 1971. But this was due to the state construction 
figures which had before been excluded . When this distortion is avoided, 
the ratio of the general service expenditure to GNP illustrates a downward 
trend from 3.6 percent in 1968 to 2.6 percent in 1974 which returned to 4 
percent by 1976.
However, as far as the general services component is concerned, the 
internal security forces gained the largest share i.e. about 42 percent on 
average. Although with complexity of the relations; in urban areas and with 
the resulting social pressure, an increase in the internal security expen­
diture would be expected, its share of total general expenditure does not 
show any clear tendency , verfying a fluctuation of between 39.4 to 46.4 
percent (table 2-9).
Finally, this category may not reflect the foreign exchange constraint 
since most of the payments are in the local currency. Therefore, as long as 
the control of the money supply is not concerned with fiscal policy, the 
reflection of foreign exchange or revenue constraint cannot be expected in 
the general affairs expenditure.
Debt Reypayment and miscellaneous Expendlture_
To bridge the large gap in the Third Plan, the government resorted 
to the utilization of internal and external loans. This accumulated debt 
resulted in the rapid growth of repayment from 1968 as verfied in figure 
(2-11). It shows a rapid growth of repayment from 1.1 percent of the GNP 
in 1969 to 7.9 percent in 1972. The rising of oil revenue during 1973-4 
allowed the government to accelerate its debt repayment. The.share of
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group in tha GNP rose to 12 perecent. This reduced the debt repayment in 
the later years and the share declined to 3*8 percent*
However, the break-down figures show that internal loans have enjoyed 
a rapid growth relative to foreign loans* On average its share in total 
reached about 30 percent* The utili2ation of the banking system as well as 
the foreign loans has resulted in a large debt interest* It accounts for 
more than 55 percent of the total (table 2-10). As far as the expenditure 
in Rial terms is concerned, this pattern illustrates a conformity with the 
experience of the 1950's which shows the negligence of the government in 
using fiscal policy as an instrument for mobilizing financial resources*
To the extent that the pattern is related to foreign exchange cons­
traint, the effect is reflected in the repayment of foreign loans* As shown 
in table (2- 10 ) the foreign loan repayment in absolute terms has developed, 
but the growth is not significant except for 1974* On averarge, the share of 
foreign loan repayments is about 20 percent* This pattern of growth implies 
that the debt repayment is elastic relative to the foreign exchange earnings*
Debt Repayment and Miscellaneous
Table (2-10)______________ _____________________________________Billion Rie»
1968 1969 1972 1973 1974 1975
IT..-— -.-,’. 1
1976
f1iscellaneau8& 15.9 34.8 42.6 87.0 84.1 127.8
Obligations % 11.3 (64.9) (32.2) (54.4) (47.0) (67.7) (66.9)
Internal Loan (69.0) 3.2 43.6.1 35.8 37.2 20.0 20.8
% (13.1) (46.6) (37.7) (20.1 ) (16.1) (1 1 .6)
Foreign Loan 5.1 5.5 15.1 17.6 60.8 2 0 .1 20.6
% (31.0) (22.4) (16.2) (18.3) (32.9) (16.2) (11.5)
Total 16.4 24.6 93.5 96.0 185.2 124.1 179.2
% (10 0.0) (100.0) (10 0.0) (10 0.0) (100.0) (100.0) (10 0.0)
Source: Budget Acts 1971-77.
Table (2-11)
Stats Construction
Billion Rls.
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Governmental . . 1.4 1.4 3.4 2 .2 3.3
Buildlnga % (10.7) (4.4) (7.5) (3.2) (4.9)
military 0.5 0.7 1 .8 3.0 2.3
Buildings % (3.5) (2.2) (4.0) (4.4) (3.4)
Other State 1 1 . 2 29.5 40.3 63.2 61.3
Buildings % (85.5) (93.4) (88.5) (92.4) (91.6)
Total 13.1 31.6 45.5 68.4 66.9
% (10 0.0) (10 0.0) (10 0.0) (100.0) (10 0.0)
Source: BFII, Annual Report, 1972-76#
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Conclusion
It can be said that the government expenditure showed its'normal' 
pattern during 1963-68 when the capital and current expenditure showed 
their normal pattern of growth* However, government expenditure hss always 
been affected by a revenue constraint which by 1970 emerged as an obstacle 
to the normal pattern of public expenditure* In this respect, the serious­
ness of the revenue constraint has been alleviated by the external shocka 
which the ecnompy had received from an exogenous factor that is oil revenue* 
Outing 1971-74 the increase in the power of bargaining against thaoil consorti­
um due to the political changes and the change'in the structure of the oil market, result 
ted in the growth of oil production'and changes in oil prieee, end was the mein 
cause of the displacement effect* In 1974, after a period of disturbances, 
government expenditure reached a new level* However, due to the nature of 
the cause, these effects may disappear from the Iranian economy in a short 
period of time* Thie ie so because the shocks have remained exogenous to the 
Iranian fiscal system and have not improved the income elasticity of tax 
system*
As far as the impact of the revenue constraint on the components of 
government expenditure is concerned, it seems the economic services are the 
first to be affected} partially because they largely contain capital expen­
diture which is elastic in relation to foreign exchange earnings, and partially 
because the economic determinants are overshowed by the socio-political deter*- 
minants, due to the political structure of the society* The distribution of 
government expenditure has been such as to ensure the perpetuation of the 
status quo* What has determined the allocation of government expenditure to 
different functions is the commitment of the state to its Western Allies 
and its commitment to the domestic social forces to ensure political stabi—
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lity. On the one hand, it has had to balance these two factors, while on 
the other hand, it has had to ensure its domestic social base or even to 
create such a base by elaborating on its economic policies within the country. 
However, the increase in oil revenue has gradually changed the sequence of 
cuases and effects and has made the economy as a whole gear to the govern­
ment expenditure wh&se level has been exogenously determined« This has 
granted the state more autonomy in determining its poicy end has given the 
external factor more weight. This particularly has been noticeable since 
the mid 1960's when the stability of the Persian Gulf has bean undertaken 
by the Iranian government which also means a higher commitment of the Iranian 
government to its Western Allies« A higher share of government expenditure 
has gone to the expansion of the army to fulfill such commitment, The expan­
sion of the army, has on the one hand.,reduced the share of domestic social 
forces from the government expenditure and, on the other hand, the role of 
the army as a determinant factor in the domestic politics has increased 
which in turn has reinforced the above process and meant a lower reliance of 
the state on other political forces* In other words, the change in the ><•; 
balance between external and internal factors has affected the trade-off 
point among different government expenditures within the Iranian economy 
and under the rsnvenue constraint. While up to 1966—67, the trade-off point 
was more or less a reflection of the relative importance of domestic social 
forces and the stats had tried to gain the support of urban dwellers and 
particularly the urban middle and upper classes, since then, with the expan­
sion of the army, the room for attraction of such support has become narrower 
and the trade-off point has boon affected by the weight of the army in the 
political hierarchy.
Analysis of government expenditure shows that the share of public 
activities has been increasing and reached 42.3 percent of GNP in 1975« If
91
we take the government commercial agencies and the government profit-making 
enterprises into account, the shsre of public expenditure will reach an 
astronomical figure.i,e. about 65 parcent of the GNP. With such a large ahare 
we expect a great Impact on employment, production and investment» This rapid 
growth of government expenditure during the 18 years of this study should 
also be accompanied by rapid changes with regard to Income distribution» The 
evaluation of these effects is the object of this study» Although the analysis 
of government expenditure has indicsted that the psttsrn hss been greatly 
affected by socio-political factors, they have created economic affects which 
ars subject to economic analysis»
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Part Two
Effects of Government Expenditure 
On Economic Development of Iran
Introduction
In the previous part we have evaluated the determinants of government 
expenditures and the factors responsible for disbursement of public spending 
to the functional duties of the central government and with regard to public 
current and capital expenditure* Ultimately, the direction and the type of 
government expenditure along with other government economic policies, produce 
important effects on the economic performance of the country, evaluation of 
which is the main purpose of the three following chapters* Ue will examine 
these effects from several points of view, in the main, output, capital forma« 
tion, employment as well as the degree of market integration and distribution 
of income. Before we discuss the effects of government policies and the alloca- 
tion of public expenditure on the performancr of the main economic sectors 
(agriculture^ industry and serivces) in detail, it is necessary to look at the 
economic performance of the country at an aggregate level with .regard to out­
put, capital formation and employment*
Chanoe in the Pattern of Output
The growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) at current prices has 
been rapid during the 1959-76 period* The growth rate ranged between 6*5 percent 
for 1959-61 to 60.6 percent in 1972-74. The rapid growth for 1972 to 1974 was 
largely due to the increase in oil prices and was to some extent affected by 
inflationary pressure existing in other sectors* Despite the continuing infla­
tionary pressure, the relative stability of oil prices and the negative growth 
rate of oil production, the growth rate of GDP at current prices declined to 
22.1 percent during 1974-76. This can clearly be seen from the difference in
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Annual Rates of Grouith of GDP 
and Its Components
Table(ll-l) At Currant Prices Percentage
Year Agriculture' Oil ’ Industry' Services ‘
GOP
including
Oil
GDP
excluding
Oil
1959-61 4.2 10.3 8.3 6.5 6.5 6*1
1962-66 5.9 1 2 .2 13.2 10.7 10 .0 9.7
1966-70 7.2 23.3 15.2 12.7 1 2 . 1 1 0 .2
1970-72 1 2 . 1 37.0 21.3 23.1 26.1 23.5
1972-74 22.6 134.0 32.9 36.5 60.6 32.6
1974-76 19.1 9.9 23.0 28.5 2 2 .1 32.0
1959-70 5.8 15.3 12,3 10 .0 9.5 8.7
1970-76 17.9 60.3 25.7 29.4 36.3 29.4
Source: Back Ground Table 10
Annual Rates of Growth of ODP
Table (II-2)
and
At
Its Component 
Constant Prices
Percentage
Year Agricultur ' Oil
\
Industry Services '
~ GDP
Including
Oil
GDP
excluding
Oil
1959-61 1.4 12.7 8.0 2.9 4.4 3.4
1962-66 3.8 14.4 12.3 9.6 9.2 8.4
1966-70 5.8 15.3 11.9 1 1 . 6 1 1 . 0 1 0 .2
1970-72 0.8 10.9 15.0 19.0 13.3 13.9
1972-74 5.8 5.6 19.1 18.9 14.8 16.6
1974-76 6.6 -0.02 22.3 14.1 13.2 15.4
1959-70 3.8 14.3 1 1 . 1 8.6 8.7 7.7
1970-76 4.4 5.4 18.8 17.3 13.8 15.3
Source: Back Ground Table 11
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the rate of growth of GDP with and without the oil sector# The growth rate 
is higher in the case of the latter than that of the former. However, a large 
percentage of the growth since 1970 can be attributed to the rapid increase in 
the oil prices and its inflationary impact( table II—1)#
When the growth rate at constant prices is considered, although the 
rates are fairly rapid, they are far lower than those at current prices# The 
annual growth rate of GDP at constant prices moved up from 4,4 percent during 
1959-61 to 11.0 percent in 1966 and has since remained stable around 13.5 per­
cent (table II-2).
The contribution of different economic sectors in the GDP growth rate 
has changed during the period under study. This contribution depends on the 
share of each sector in the GDP and its rate of growth. In order to illustrate 
the share of contribution of each sector, the weighted rates of growth at 
constant prices have been considered. As table (II*-3) shows the agricultural 
sector was able to stabilize its share of growth during 1959-70 at around 10 
percent. This was largely due to its relatively dominant share in GDP which 
allowed this sector to keep its contribution in the growth share, despite its 
relatively low rate of growth. During the seme period, the service and oil 
sectors accounted for 37.0 and 26.4 percent of growth share respectively. The 
industrial sector accounted for 26.4 percent of growth share on average. But, 
clearly a decreasing trend ban be seen for this sector of the economy. Its con­
tribution declined from 31.8 percent in 1959-61 to 25.4 percent during 1966-70 
which indicates that the changes in the relative growth rate of output in 
this sector were lower than those of other sectors. The above pattern shows 
that the oil and service sectors were the main contributors in the growth of 
the Iranian economy during 1959-70. However, since 1970, shares of agricultural 
and oil sectors in the growth in real terms have declined to 4.3 and 7.2 per­
cent respectively (during 1970-6) while those of industrial and service sectors 
have risen to 32.6 and 55.9 percent respectively.
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Share of Growth of Economic Sectors 
In GDP(Welqhted Growth) ^
At Constant Prices
Table ( II-3 ) Percentage
Year
i
Agriculture Oil
* Industry 
&
Mining
Services
' GDP 
including 
Oil
1959-61 0.4;
(9.1)
1.4 * 
(31.8)
1.4 • 
(31.8)
1 . 2  ‘ 
(27.3)
4.4 * 
(100.0)
1962-66 1 .0
(10.7)
2 .1
(22.6)
2.5
(26.9)
3.7
(39.8) 9(10 0.0)
1966-70 1 . 2
(10.9)
2.5
(22.7)
2.8
(25.4)
4.5
(40.9)
1 1 . 0
(10 0.0)
1970-72 0 .1
(0.7)
2.0
(15.1)
3.5
(26.3)
7.7
(57.9)
13.3
(10 0.0)
1972-74 0.8
(5.6)
0.9
(6.2)
4.4
(29.8)
8.7
(60.4)
14.8
(10 0.0)
1974-76 0.8
(6.1 )
-0 .0 2
-(0.1 )
5.6
(42.5)
6.8
(51.5)
13.2
(10 0.0)
1959-70 0.9
(10.3)
2.3
(26.4)
2.3
(26.4)
3.2
(36.9)
8.7
(10 0.0)
1970-76 0 .6
(4.3)
1 .0
(7.2)
4.5
(32.6)
7.7
(55.9)
13.8
(10 0.0)
Note: 1- Figures in ( ) indicate the share of sectors in the growth of GOP.
Sources Back Ground Table 11
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One important implication of the above pattern is that the oil sector 
which has been the motor of the economy may not ba able to expand its produc­
tion at a desirable rate to contribute in the growth of economy. The negative 
rate of growth of oil production during 1974-6 points at a disappearance of 
the oil sector as an important contributor in the growth of the economy (see 
chapter 8). Therefore, in the evaluation of the performance of the Iranian 
economy, the GDP without oil sector may be a more appropriate index than the 
GDP including oil. However, the oil revenue has affected the factor proportion 
and the relative importance of other sectors of the economy and its effects 
are so deep rooted that may not disappear from the pattern of development of
the Iranian economy even in the medium run,
When the pattern of non-oil GDP is considered, there exists-an obvious 
changes that is the declining share of the agricultural sector in the GDP from 
35..8 percent in 1959 to 14 percent in 1976 (figure II-1). As will be explained 
in chapter 3, the bad performance of the agricultural sector depicts the struc­
tural problem of the Iranian economy. Although the decreasing trend of the 
share of the agricultural sector up to a certain stage of development in the 
process of;economic development is expected , the decline in the esse of Iran 
has been so rapid that it cannot be explained by the normal difference in the 
labour productivity in different^ sectors of the economy. However, to the extent 
which this decreasing share of agricultural sector is caused by the difference 
in the labour productivity, it can be attributed to the nature of economic 
development in capitalist system which leaves ths-'dlscripencies in labour 
productivity to ba narrowed by the market forces in the long run. 8ut, in the 
case of Iran, the process has also been affected by the government policies 
as well as the effect of oil revenue on the factor proportion. How these 
factors have affected the performsene of the agricultural sector is the main 
concern of the chapter on agriculture (chpater 3).
The industrial and service sectors have been able to continue their
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growth at a higher rate than the average* Consequently, their shares in the 
non-oil GDP at constant prices have risen from 19 and 45*2 percent in 1959 
to 30*8 and 55*2 percent in 1976 (figure II-1)* As far as the industrial 
sector is concerned, the growth rate has been fairly hii)h (i1* 1 percent for 
1959-70 and 17*3 percent for 1970-76, table 11-2)* However, as will be explained 
in chapter 4, the structure of the industrial sector which is characterized 
by low market integration and high dependency on the foreign sectbr has'been vul­
nerable to the influence of oil revenue* Therefore, the disappearance of the 
oil revenue may also affect the growth and the pattern of industrial output*
How the government economic policies, under the effect of oil revenue, have 
affected the pattern and the growth of industrial output and market integra­
tion will be discussed in chapters 4 and 8*
One of the most important features of the pattern of economic develop­
ment in Iran is very high share of the service sector relative to other pro­
ductive sectors* The non—proportional growth of this sector does not necessarily 
reflect the higher productivity in the service activity* To a large extent, the 
growth of this sector can be attributed to the expansion of unproductive acti­
vity (such as land—speculation) and the rising of salaries in the public ser— 
vices(defencs and top civil servants in particular)* However, the expansion 
of the service sector has been brought about by the enormous growth of oil re­
venue during 1959-76 which has allowed unproductive activity and salaries to 
grow rapidly during this period* With the decreasing trend of oil production, 
the expansion of the service sector may come to a halt* Therefore, when the 
oil resources run out, the Iranian economy may lose its two important sectors, 
which have contributed the largest share of the growth of the economy, in the 
foreseeable future*
Pattern of Employment in Iran
The overall manpower situation during the period 1956—76 may be charac—
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terized basically as one in which the supply of manpower out-stripped the 
demand for it* Howvere, important changes can be seen in the growth of popu­
lation and the pattern of employment,
While during the 1955-66 period the population of Iran expanded at a 
rate of 3.1 percent per annum, the rate declined to 2.7 percent during 1966-76 
period (table I1-4). Despite the high rate of growth in both periods, its 
impact on the Iranian labour market was less than is suggested by the above 
rates. As far as the first period is concerned, there are two basic reasons 
which affected the growth rate and the share of active population in the total 
population: First, the relatively higher growth rate of population in the age 
group below labour force age (i.e., under ten years). Second, the decline in 
the rate of labour force participation among persons aged ten and over, mainly, 
a higher number of students in the total population.
Due to the above factors, the rate of active population growth was 
around 2.06 percent during 1956-66 which is lower than the rate of population 
growth. Consequently, the share of labour force in the total population declined 
from 32 percent in 1956 to 28.0 percent in 1966 (table II-4).
In the second period (1966-76), despite a declining rate of population 
growth, the rate of growth of aconomiely^etive population on average 'remained 
more or less unchanged, that is about 2.04 percent. This pattern implies that 
the impact of a high rate of population growth during 1956-66 has started to 
appear during 1966-76. However, as table (II-4) shows, up to 1973 the share 
of labour participation had been declining, which suggests that the impact of 
a high rate of population growth on the labour market began after 1973. By 
1976, the share of economicaly active population reached 27.1 percent of the 
total (from 25.8 percent in 1973). This pattern suggests an increasing rate 
of labour force participation and a big.Increase in the supply of labour in 
the future.
Despite the existence of the easer conditions, that is, the declining
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Distribution of Population By 
Classification of. Active. Uhactjvs and Employed
Table (II-4) (’000) Persons
Total
l
Active Population .......- - -.—
y ear
Population
Total Employed Unemployed
1956 18955 6067 5908 159
(32.0) (31.2) (2.6)
1966 257B9 7445 6715 730
(28.9) (26.0) (9.8)
1971 28664 7826 7009 817
(27.3) (24.4) (11.7)
1973 31925 8228 7146 1082
(25.8) (22.4) (13.2)
1976 33592 9120 9023 97
(27.1) (26.9) (1 .1 )
Growth Rats 
1956-66 3.1 2.06
Growth Rate 
1966-76 2.7 2.04
Note: 1- Figures in ( ) indicate the share of groups in the total population.
SOurce: Plan Organization, Statistical Centre of Iran, 1956(1335), 1966(1345) 
and 1976(2533) Population Censusesjnan-Pouer Sample Survey and Bill, 
Annual Reports 1973-76 •
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of rate of population growth and the labour force participation, during 1955- 
76 the demand for labour did not match the supply of it and unemployment rose 
from 9.8 percent in 1966 to 13,2 percent of active labour force in 1973 (table
II-4). The main reasons for the rise in the unemployment rate were the failure 
of government economic policies in expanding the service and industrial sectors 
as well as the wrong choice of technique in the manufacturing sector which did 
not create the job opportunities for the new comers in the labour market and 
those who left the agricultural sector for new Jobs in towns and cities.
Up to 1956, the rapid development of basic industries, mainly textiles 
and food was the main cause for the change in the pattern of the employed 
labour force. The share of the agricultural sector declined from 56.3 percent 
in 1956 to 50.3 percent in 1966 while that of the industrial sector rose by 
8 percent from 20.1 percent to 28.1 percent. During 1966-73, with the change 
in the pattern of development of the industrial sector,.the impact of the 
expansion of this sector on the labour market was not in the form of higher 
demand for labour. As table (II-5) shows the level of the employed labour 
force(in absolute terms) in the industrial sector remained unchanged. Conse­
quently, its share in the total employed labour force declined to 26.3 percent. 
Although the service sector was expanded to absorb a higher share of labour 
force, the combined effect of the industrial and service sectors was not suffi­
cient to change the pattern of employment at a significant level (the share 
of the service sector rose from 2 1 .6  percent in 1966 to 25.2 percent in 1973). 
Therefore, the agricultural sector remained as the main source of employment. 
Its share declined by only 1,8 percent during 1966-73 from 50.3 percent to 
48.5 percent. However, the employment in the agricultural sector does not 
arise from a genuine demand for labour. But, largely, because this sector 
can keep the labour in the form of disguised unemployed end so the large 
share of employment in this sector also represents a high percentage of under­
employment. So long as there exists migration from rural to urban areas, it
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Sectoral Distribution of Employed
Labour Force
Table (II-5) (’000) Persons
Year Agriculture
Industry
i
dining
Services Total
1956 3326
(56.3)
1188
(20.1 )
1394
(23.6)
5908
(10 0.0)
1966 3380
(50.3)
1887
(28.1)
1448
(2 1.6)
6715
(10 0.0)
1971 3437
(49.0)
1735
(24.8)
1838
(26.2)
7010
(10 0.0)
1973 3466
(48.5)
1879
(26.3)
1801
(25.2)
7146
(10 0.0)
1976 4195
(46.0)
2
2400 :2
(26.3)
2525
(27.7)
9120
(10 0.0)
Note: 1- Figures in ( ) indicate the share of sectors in total employed
labour force.
2- Includes manufactruring and mines 
Source: See Table (ÌÌ-4) ;
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can be attributed to the disguised unemployment in the agricultural sector 
(see belou for migration in Iran)* Therefore, a slower rata of change in the 
pattern of employed labour force during 1966—73 in comparison with the period 
1956-66, should not be interpreted as an increase in demand for labour in the 
agricultural sector*
During 1973-76 when the economy received a shock through the rising 
of oil revenue, one would have expected a crack-down of the above pattern of 
employment along with the changes in the pattern of output* But, the primary 
data avaiable does not suggest a significant change during this period* In the 
absence of data on the share of different sectors in the total employed labour 
force, we have to rely,on the scattered data avaiable and to use a proxy 
measure to explain the pattern of employment during 1973-76*
Table (II-5) shows that the share of the manufacturing and mining sector 
(excluding construction and public utilities) is around 26,3 percent, therm 
fore, the share of industrial sector in the total employment should be higher 
than that of 1973. Since usually the BNI estimation of the employed labour
2
force in the manufacturing sector is higher than that of the SCI estimation , 
the above share may be over stated relative to the previous years* Considering 
the above over—estimation, the 26*3 percent may represent the share of indus­
trial sector as a whole rather than the share of the manufacturing and mining 
sectors alone* Even if the increasing share of the industrial sector in the 
total employed labour force had been accompanied by a significant change in 
the pattern of employment is not depicted in table (II—5)* Assuming changes 
in the share of agricultural employment in the total employed labour force 
are also related to the change in the share of rural-urban population, one 
may be able to estimate the share of agricultural employment in 1976« As table 
(ll—6 ) illustrates the share of rural population in the total has gradually 
declined from 59.3 percent in 1966 to 53.3 percent in 1976. Assuming a similar 
change in the share of agricultural employment (including under—employment),
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the share may be estimated around 46 percent in 1976 which indicates that 
the agricultural sector is still the main source of employment (including 
under-employment). However, this pattern shows the changes in the permanent 
employment and it does not reflect the changes due to the temporary and seasonal 
migrations from rural to urban areas. Since a large share of demand for seasonal 
employment comes from the construction sector, therefore, the effects of 1973-4 
increase in the oil revenue may have appeared in the form of temporary employ­
ment in the construction sector rather than creation of structural change in 
the pattern of employment. The reasons why the pattern of employment has not 
structurally changed along with the pattern of output should be sought in 
the problem of migrations from rural to urban areas as well as the government 
policies with regard to the development of agricultural, manufacturing and 
construction sectors (see the relevant chapters for the government policies).
However, since the expansion of service and industrial sectors during 
1959-76, have benefited from the increase in oil revenue, with the decreasing 
importance of the oil sector in the Iranian economy, the pace of changes would 
slow down and the agricultural sector may be able to increase its relative 
share in production. Despite the fact that one may expect a brighter future 
for the Iranian agricultural sector, this sector may not be able to absorb 
the new comers in the labour «Market in the future. The main reason is the 
change in the structure of manpower in the Iranian economy.
The expansion of the service sector, in particular.education, has 
created a structural change in the pattern of the labour force, mainly, 
has increased the share of educated manpower with a variety of qualifications 
who seek Jobs in the industrial and service sectors. With this change in the 
pattern of manpower, the importance of the agricultural sector as a source 
of demand for new comers is bound to decline. Whether the structure of the 
manufacturing sector allows the demand for skilled manpower to grow fast en g 
to absorb the future supply of labour is our concerned in chapters 4 and 5.
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Distribution of Population 
By Rural and Urban Classification
Table (II-6) Percentaoe
Year Rural Urban
1956 70.4 29.6
1966 59.3 40.7
1971 57.8 42.2
1973 56.1 43.9
1976 53.3 46.7
Source: see Table ( H - 4)
Relativo Sectoral Productivity 1 
At Constant Prices
Table (I1-7)
Year Agriculture
Industry
&
Mining
Services Total
1956 0.67 0.91 1.79 1 .0 0
1966 0.56 0.89 2.18 1 .0 0
1971 0.43 1 . 1 2 1.95 1 .0 0
1973 0.36 1.06 2.16 1 .0 0
1976 0.30 1.15 2 .0 1 1.0 0
Note: 1 - The Ratio indicate the ratio of the :
Share of Economic Sectors in GDP
Share of Economic Sectors in Total Employed Labour Force 
Source: see Table(H-.4. )and figure (II— 1 )
107
Whether the supply of education is sufficient and its type is appropriate to 
match the demand for and supply of skilled manpower in the labour market is 
also the concern of chapter 5» However, not only is it the Iranian economy 
which is facing a relatively new pattern of supply of manpower, but, also the 
pressure on:the Iranian labour Market is increasing, that is the share of 
active population has started to rise. This may be sufficient to cause the 
Iranian economy to face a serious unemployment problem.
Comparing the pattern of output with that of employment, a clear critical 
divergence between these two patterns can be seen in the Iranian economy. On 
one hand, while the agricultural sector has lost its share in the GOP, it has 
still remained over populated. On the other hand, the industrial and service 
sectors have rapidly raised their share in the GDP while their contribution in 
total employed labour force have remained relatively unchanged. Consequenly, the 
gap between the relative productivity of these sectors has widened. As table 
'(1 1-7) indicates the relative (real) productivity of the agricultural sector 
has rapidly declined from 0.67 in 1959 to 0.30 in 1976. In the same period, 
a rising tendency in the relative productivity of industrial and service sectors 
can be observed. Although the widening gap can be attributed to the capitalist 
path of development, as we will explain in chapter 3, the deding relative 
productivity of the agriculturial sector has not only been in relative terms 
but it has also been in absolute terms. As will be explained, government poli­
cies have been the major factors in accelerating the above process.
The most important implication of the above pattern of development is 
the ever-worsening distribution of income snd the widening gap between the ruel 
and urban areas. This pattern of distribution has appeared to be not only an 
obstacle to the development of the manufacturing sector (chapter 4), but also 
to be the base for the whole economic and socio-political problems (see the 
general conclusion on all chapters and particularly the chpater on oil).
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Pattern of Capital Formation
The pattern of capital formation in Iran ie characterized by a slow 
but steady rise during 1960*8 and the rapid growth during the 1970*8. As figure 
(11-2) shows the ratio of the gross domestic capital formation (GDCF) relative 
to the GDP, both at constant and current prices, has risen from 19.8 percent 
in 1959 to 36.4 percent in 1976 (at constant prices). The pattern of develop­
ment of capital formatation at constant and currant prices illustrated a simi­
larity which indicates that the effect of prices has not been in the form of 
a distortion in the pattern of development of capital formation. But the degree 
of fluctuation is somewhat different due to the difference in price changes 
for capital goods on one hand, and the consumer goods and service, on the other.
The up-ward trend of the GDCF ratio on the aggregate level is clear, 
but, in some cases, the fluctuation is plausible. As figure (II-2) shows the 
fluctuation has largely been caused by the irregularity of private investment. 
However, the fluctuation cannot merely be attributed to the cyclicle nature 
of investment in the private sector. To a great extent, it has been affected 
by the government credit and investment policies. For instance, the declining 
trend of private investment during 1959-64 was the consequence of the recommen­
ded economic policies of the IMF in order to check the inflationary pressure, 
to reduce the balance of payments deficit and to bring the economic soundness 
to the country3. The policy recommended that the banking system could produce 
the necessary credit for the private sector provided the government paid back 
its debt. Since the government was not able to reduce its expenditure and still 
resorted to the central bank to make the necessary payments, the policy resul-
4
ted in cutting off the credit to the private sector during this period • In 
the same period, private investment was affected by the agrarian reform (see 
chpater 3 for the effect of the land reform on the capital formation in the 
agricultural sector during this psriod). Similarly» during 1967—70 when a
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Figure (II-2) .....R a t io  o f  G ro ss  D m oestic  F ix e d  C a p it a l  Form ation R e la t iv e  to  GDP By S e c t o r s a t  C o n s ta n t and C u rre n t P r ir e s  ( P e r c e n ta g e )
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serious foreign exchange constraint started to appear, the government invest­
ment policy discriminated against private investment by giving public projects 
the first priority with regard to access to the foreign exchange earnings* The 
above examples show that whenever a trade—off existed between the public and 
private sectors with regard to the available scarce financial resources, it 
has discriminated against the private sector* However, to the extent that the 
fluctuation has been due to the irregularity of investment in tha public 
sector, as has been explained (see part one), is affected by the irregularity 
of foreign exchange earnings, particularly, through tha oil revenue* Despite 
the irregularity of public investment, the rising trend is clear and this is 
also responsible for the rising trend of GDCF on the aggregate level* As the 
consequence of the higher rate of growth of public investment, its share in 
the total GDCF rose from 32.8 percent in 1960 to 59i9 portentin 1974* With* 
the above pattern of capital formation with regard to the responsible bodies, 
the change in the structure of capital formation can largely be attributed 
to the public investment and the priority given to the deffernt sectors of 
the economy by the government.
The structure of capital formation shows that the industry and mining 
sector has the largest share of the capital formation* But, its share has been 
declining from 55 percent of the total in 1966 to 47 percent in 1975 (figure 
II—3)• This sector consists of manufacturing and mining, housing, and public 
utilities. Uhen the composition of capital formation in this sub-sector is 
considered, housing shows the largest share of the capital formation in 1966(fi­
gure II—4) # The declining trend of capital formation in the industrial sector 
has been due to the rapid decrease in investment in the housing sector* Its 
share declined to 18.2 percent of the total by 1975. From the two other com­
ponents of the industry and mining sector* the public utilities have an stable 
share while the share of manufacturing sector has been rising from 11.3 per­
cent in 1965 to 22.1 percent in 1976. As is shown in figure (I1—4), ths oppo-
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sits trend of investment in the housing and manufacturing sectors can be inter­
preted as the competitive nature of investment in these two sectors* Although 
with the improvement of investment opportunities and a reduction in the degree 
of riskiness of investment in the manufacturing sector, to some extent, pri­
vate investors have moved from housing to manufacturing and service sectors» it 
should not be considered as a significant change in the pattern of private in­
vestment* Taking into account that housing has been the main area of the pri­
vate sector» accounting for 75 percent of the private investment» the declin­
ing trend of investment in housing should be interpreted as the total reluc­
tance of the private sector to increase its contribution in the total capital 
formation as fast as the public sector» rather than a move away from the housing 
sector. As will be explained» the public investment contribution in the capital 
formation in the manufacturing sector has been rising during the period under 
study» and this has been the main reason for the upward trend in the investment 
in the manufacturing sector (see chapter 4)*
The service sector accounts for 35 percent of gross domestic capital for­
mation in 1975* Although it shows an increasing tendency» the trend is net es 
clear as ih the case of industrial and mining sector (figure II—3)* However» a 
structural change can be seen in the composition of capital formation in this 
sector* The share of capital formation in transport» which had reached 23*7 per­
cent of the total GDCF in 1967 declined to 12.4 percent in 1973 and again 
moved up to 18 percent in 1975* While investment in transport shows a decreasing 
trend» the 'other service* including the public and private services shows a 
steady upward trend from 7,6 percent of GDCF in 1967 to 17.9 percent in 1973,
The sharp increase in the share of investment in the service sector» from 10*1 
percent in 1972 to 17.9 in 1973, is particularly the result of government 
spending in the public services (figure II-4).
The agricultural sector has the lowest contribution to the domestic ca­
pital formation, that is around 6,5 percent in 1975. Its share has remained 
stable during 1965-75 period. Relative to the share of value added of different
18
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sectors, the lack of capital formation in the agricultural sector is very 
significant.
The three main indexes of economic development clearly indicat the 
uneven development of the Iranian economy during 1959-76. Basically, this 
uneven development may have been the result of the government economic policy 
in the assumption that the multiplier effects would take care of development 
of different sector as long as the effective demand had been created. Based 
on this assumption, the development of manufacturing end service sectors has 
largely been emphasised while the agricultural sector has relatively been 
ignored. However, contrary to the assumption, the multipier effects has failed 
to influence the development of the agricultural sector due to the effects 
of oil revenue on the structure of the economy and other economic bottlenecks 
(see chapters 3,4 and 5) and therefore has resulted in the non-proportional
growth of different sectors of the economy.
This uneven development is also characterized by a dualistic condi­
tion in the sense that the change in the pattern of output has not been accom­
panied by a similar change in the pattern of employment. While the develop­
ment of the manufacturing sector has increased the overall productivity, its 
effect on employment has been insignificant. As will be explained, the empha­
sis of government economic policy in the development of the maunfaturing sec­
tor has largely been on the growth of productivity and output rather than 
employment (see chapter 4).
However, alternatively the service sector has been expanded with the 
help of oil revenue in order to create the necessary Jobs for the new comers 
to the labour market. But, its effects, together with that of the industrial 
sector has not been in the form of a structural change in the composition of 
labour force, and the agricultural sector has remained as the main source of 
employment.
Another effect of the non-proportional growth of the service sector,
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which its desirability and necessity can be questioned on economic grounds 
( see chapter 5), is the expansion of aggregate demand above the capacity 
of other productive sectors and particularly the agricultural sector. Not 
only has it aggravated the pressure on the balance of payments in the short- 
run and has retarded the development of agricultural sector (chapter 3), it 
has also created short run high consumption with a long run expectation effect 
which the Iranian economy no longer can provide without the expansion of the 
oil sector.
These structural problems of the Iranian economy are by and large 
caused by the irrational economic policy, both with reagrd to government 
expenditure and the over-utilization of the oil resources(see chapter 8), 
which have mainly been affected by the socio-political structure of the so­
ciety. In the following chapters, we will analyse the government expenditure 
and credit policy which has resulted in the above structural problems.
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Chapter Three
3 Development of Agricultural 
Sector
Introduction
In order to evaluate the effects of government policies with regard 
to the development of the agricultural sector# one has to recognise t the 
possibilities granted by the factor endowment of the country end desirabi - 
litiy of the expansion of the agricultural sector in relation with other 
sectors of the economy. While the first factor determines the importance of 
the agricultural sector at the aggregate level with regard to employment and 
production, the second consideration largely affects the chdice of products 
and the banalnce between products (a) primarily for exports, (b) crops which 
are industrial raw materials, and (c) basic food stuffs. Although a combina­
tion of the types of output may affect the maximization of output , here, we 
confine our analysis to the aggregate performance of the agricultural sector
and the related government policies.
There are two general considerations which should be taken into account 
with respect to development of the agricultural sector, first, the importance 
of employment and the raising of output. Tha employment consideration comes 
as an important factor when we consider the factor endowment of the country.
It is the factor endowment which theoretically determines the policy which 
should be pursued by the government. In other words, the factor endowment may 
determine the appropriate technique which s h o u l d  be encouraged in the agricul 
tural sector.
Taking the maximization of output as the first object of the govern­
ment policy, it can be achieved through a combination of factor endown ant 
(capital, labour and land). Depending on the constraining factor in the economy 
whether it is capital or labour or land, the government should encourage a
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particular techinque of production which maximize the utilization of the
constraining factor. Taking land as a given factor, the choice of technique
will be dependent on the degree of substitutiblity of capital for labour
and vice versa, and constained by the diminishing rate of return of land.
But, there exists an important consideration with regard tb the use of capital
in the agricultural sector which makes it suitable as a substitute (to some
extent) for both labour and land. We have to distinguish between two types
of capital- those which replace labour (e.g. tractors, combines and ao on;
generally mechanization), and those which replace land (e.g. fertilizers,
improved seeds and so on; generally biological capital) •
With such possibilities, in a developing country like Iran where the
agrarian labour force is abundant and there is a considerable volume of
unemployment (open and disguised), there is obvoiusly a strong argument for
3 .
putting in as much investment as possible in biological capital«, The importance of 
agrarian employment will be doubled when we recognize the slow growth of 
employment in the industrial and service sectors. Therefore, the government 
has to consider productivity of labour through the raising of land producti­
vity rather than substitution of labour by capital. In othoer words, the 
government has to emphasis the utilization of biological inputs rether than 
mechanization in the Iranian agricultural sector. Based on this argument we 
analyse the performance of the Iranian agricultural sector and the effects 
of the government investment and credit policies on the performance of this 
sector.
3-1 Performance and Problems of Iranian
The Iranian agricultural sector consists of farming, animal husbandry, 
fishing and forestry. Farming, on average, accouts for 68 percent of pro­
duction in this sector while animal husbandry contributes another 30 percent
Composition of Value Added in 
The Agricultural Sector
Table (3-1) Current Prices Billion Rials
Sector 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1970 1973 1976
Farming
%
58.8
(68.8)
60.0-
(64.7)
67.1 - 
(68.2)
83.1
(69.3)
87.6 • 
(68.2)
113.7 - 
(70.8)
150.2 • 
(64.1)
281.2 - 
(65.4)
Live Stock 
Breeding ^
25.5
(29.9)
31.4.
(33.9)
30.2 ■ 
(30.7)
35.4 . 
(29.5)
39.2 - 
(30.5)
44.3 • 
(27.6)
77.3 • 
(33.0)
138.1 . 
(32.1)
Forestry
%
0.9
(1.0)
1.0
(1.1)
0.7.
(0.7)
1.0.
(0.8)
0.9-
(1.0)
1.6-
(1.0)
5.4-
(2.3)
8.3.
(1.9)
Fishing
%
0.2
(0.3)
0.3
(0.3)
0.4
(0.4)
0.5
(0.4)
0.7.
(0.5)
1.0
(0.6)
1.5
(0.6)
2.5-
(0.6)
Total
%
85.4
(100.0)
92.7
(100.0)
98.4
(100.0)
120.0
(100.0)
128.4 - 
(100.0)
160.6
(100.0)
134.4
(100.0)
430.1.. 
(100.0)
Source: BPlI, National Income of Iran, 1959--71; and Annual Reports, 1972-6.
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(table 3-1), The performance of these tun sub-sectors Is the main determinant 
of the performance of the agricultural sector. During 1959-76, the performance 
of this sector has been poor, not only relative to other sectors, but also, 
in absolute terms. The growth rate of output in the agricultural sector has 
been low by any criterion. The official figures show that growth rates ranged 
between -7.1 to 8.9 percent for different periods (table 3-2 ), sometimes 
higher but occasionally lower than the population growth rate. Some experts 
of the.Iranian economy believe that the growth rate in this sector has never 
been higher than 2.6 percent^ during 1960-76 which is lower than population 
growth (around 3 percent).
This poor performance of the agricultural sector cannot be attributed 
to totally bad harvests, although some truth may be behind it. Water shortage 
charaterizes the Iranian agriculture and it makes the economic performance 
of this sector heavly dependent on rainfall, particularly, if we consider 
that the share of unirrigated lands in the cultivated areas is large. How- 
ever, without any change in the organization of prodution and the social 
relation the poor performance of the agricultural sector could have been 
attributed to bad harvests. But, with the advent of land reform in 1962 and 
the possible intervention of the government in this sector, one would expect 
to see some fundamental reasons behind the poor performance of this sector.
Basically, the Iranian agricultural sector suffers from low producti­
vity of labour and land. Using the official figures for agricultural output, 
which may be overstated, the output per worker (at constant prices) has im­
proved at annual rate of 2.8 percent during 1959-76. The output per worker 
has risen from 25.0 thousand Rls. in 1959 to 40.1 thousands Rls. in 1973 
and has since remained unchanged (table 3-3). The above rate of growth of 
productivity has been very slow in comparison with those of the industrial 
and service sectors (9.9 and 8.7 percent respectively).
However, due to the change in the structure and organisation of produc-
KAnnual Growth Rates of Agricultural Output - -
Table (3-2) Percentage
1960 1961 1952 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Annual 
Growth Rate 2.0
0.9 1.0 1.7 2.1 7.9 - 3.4 .7.8 7.8 3.1 4.6 -7.1 8.9 5.7 5.9 - 6.8 6.4
Source: see Tibie (3-1)
Labour Productivity 
By Economic Sectors
Table (3-3) At (1959) Constant Prices Thousand Rials
1959 1966 1971 1972 1973 1976
Annual Growth Rate
1959-66 1966-72 1972-76 1959-76
Agriculture 25.0 30.5 35.1 35.5 40.1 39.8 2.9 2.6 2.9 2.8
Industry 34.1 48.8 96.0 97.0 119.4 169.3 5.2 12.1 9.7 9.9
Manufacturing - 49.7 - 94.0 - - - 11.2 10.4 1 -
Construction 42.0 60.4 - - - 6.2 - -
Service 66.9 119.2 163.8 185.6 253.5 277.7 8.6 8.6 9.2 8.7
2
GOP 41.0 65.0 104.2 111.6 137.8 158.0 6.8 9.4 9.1 8.2
Note: 1- for source see BMI.
at *
Annual Report, 1973-76. 2 - GDP includes oil production.
Source: see Table (II—4) and Back Ground Table 11
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tion in this sector, the performance of labour productivity has been better 
than that of land productivity in the case of farming sub-sector* As table 
(3-4) shows the growth of per hectare output (in physical terms, Kilogram) 
of wheat and barley, which together accounts for 75 percent of the sown 
area(60 percent wheat and 15 percent barely), has been almost zero for wheat 
and negative in the case of barley* Since the table covers a long period, the 
bad performance cannot be attributed to climatic changes* Comparing the per 
hectare output during 1963-74 to that of 1950, it is clear that the former 
has been lower than that of the latter for most of the period* This poses 
a question why, despite the change in the social relation and the organiza­
tion of production towards the domination of the capitalist farming in the 
agricultural sector, the productivity did not improve* There are two sources 
of explanation: political factors and technical factors*
Historically speaking, after the set back of the national bourgeoisie 
during 1950-4, the political situatation came to an unstable equilibrium of 
compromise among the dominant social classes during 1950's and early 1960's* 
In order to break down the feudalistic structure of the society,.a land 
reform program was introduced which in the main did not attack the economic 
interest of the feudal landlords but largely reduced their political power* 
Due to the political nature of the reform, the program did not evaluate the 
economic consequences of the reform$ economic"organisations and particularly 
the Plan Organization as the main economic planning centre was not aware 
of the avent of the land reform5. The ignorance of the Plan Organization 
can be seen from the third plan's final report where it refers to the failure 
of the government to achieve the plan target* " The third plan objective 
of a 4 percent growth rate presupposed substantial investment during the 
plan period on part of private individuals and companies* However, in prac­
tice not only did this presumption fail to materialeze, but investment in 
this sector was actually lower than it had been in previous years because
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Land Productivity
Table (3-4) Kilogram Per Hectare
Year Wheat Barley
1950 900 1010
1963 750 830
1964 700 750
1965 750 830
1966 760 830
1967 1050 1360
1968 900 830
1969 820 950
1970 710 640
1971 700 650
1972 900 721
1973 920 . 659
1974 ■ 820 654
Source: Food Agriculture Organization, FAO Production Year 
Book, 1976,
Disbursement Of Plan Organization 
For Agriculture and Water 1
Table (5-8) Million Rials
Sector Third Plan
Fourth Plan Fifth Plan
(1963-68) (1968-72) (1973-78)
Agriculture 25622' 45704 239000
% (12.5) (9.0) (8.4)
Water 21670 42009 160000
% (10.6) (8.3) (5.6)
Total Plan 204600 506800 2847000
Note: 1- Figures In ( ) indicate the share in total plans.
Source: Plan Organization, Final Report on the 3th Plan; BMI, Annual 
Report 1972; Plan and Budget Organization 5th Development 
Plan,
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the implementation of land reform led a number of landlords to believe 
that there' was insufficient security for investment in this sector.
However, the distribution of land into uneconomical units has dimi- 
nished the marginal productivity of labour(as far as it caused under-unti- 
lization of the existing machinery and other inputs) and has reduced the 
possibility ofmechanization of cultivated plots. Generally, the land reform 
has decreased the private capital formation in agricultural sector ; on .one 
hand, the previous productive land was left to low income peasants almost 
without necessary capital. On the other hand, the high propensity to con­
sume and the illusion of a promising future in regard to a higher income 
level increased the own-consumption of peasantry who lived at subsistence 
level and made the increase of private capital formation out of question.
This chaotic situation after the land reform has well been explained in the 
final report of the third plan where it refers to the utilization of agri­
cultural loans to peasants; "... a large portion of these loans granted in 
1342 (1963) and 1943 (1964) were used for non-productive purposes because 
of drought and especial conditions consequent upon the implementation of
q
land reform legislation,. ...w This situation left the responsibility of 
capital formation entirely on the government programme for development of 
agricultural sector. However, "the government failed to take effective measure 
to compensate for this deficiency of investment, and failed to exploit fully
g
ita investment in dam construction."
The lack of technical assistance and inefficient utilization of irri­
gation capacity were important factors in the poor performance of the agri­
cultural sector. But, the greatest deficiency was in the creation of the 
necessary credit for the peasants after the land reform. The agricultural 
sector did not receive sufficient assistance duting the third plan. The dis­
bursements of the third plan shows that about 20.B Billion Rls. was spent 
for agricultural development (also, about 21.6 Billion Rls. was allocated
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to irrigation). It accounts for 12.5 percent of the total plan spendings 
(together with irrigation, it accounts for 23.1 percent of the total plan, 
disbursements; table 3-5). In order to evaluate the spendings on the develop­
ment of the agricultural sector, table (3-6) has been reclassified according 
to:the Oirect Government Investment (DGI) and Direct Government Assistance 
(DGA). The former includes the overhead capital for agricultural develop­
ment and its effects are to be realized in the long run. It covers improve­
ment of agricultural products, conservation of natural resources, animal 
husbandry and veterinary services, vegetable produce and research and training. 
The latter has an Immediate impact on the capital formation or consumption 
and its effects would materialize in the short run.
Table (3-6) shows that DGI accounts for 38 percent of the government 
expenditure for development of agricultural sector while DGA has the largest 
share that is 62 percent of the total. About 29.2 percent of the share of 
agricultural development was spent for the implementation of land reform 
and was used for financing of the land acquisition from the lanlords, estab­
lishment of the co—opratives required by the law and other relevant expen­
ditures; this should not be considered as agricultural development (for the 
landlords' compensation, see Appendix A). Thus, only 32.8 percent was allo­
cated for the backing the peasants after the land reform* As it was men­
tioned, due to the poor peformancs of agricultural output, most of the 
credit available to peasants (including the credit made through Agricultural 
Development Bank) was spent for consumption and had little effect on the 
capital formation and the future output. In fact the share of agricultural 
credit was as low as 3.3 percent of the total development plan which by any 
criterion would have been low even if the credit had been properly utilized.
The above explanation shows that the structural problem of the Iranian 
agricultural sector in the early 1960's was mainly the lack of capital for­
mation..One of the probable reasons for the unsatisfactory economic perfor-
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Disbursement of Plan Organization
For Development of Agricultural and Water Sectors
Table (3-6) Million Rials
Disbursement \ Third Plan (1963-68)
Fourth Plan 
' (1968-72) ’
Fifth Plan 
(1973-76) '
Direct Government 
Investment
%
7889 • 
(38.0)
23253 ■ 
(50.9)
53644 - 
(47,0)
Direct Government 
Assistance
%
12934
(62.0)
22451
(49.1)
60437 . 
(53.0)
1- Land Reform
%
’ 6100 " 
(29.2)
10620'
(7.9)
—
2- Large-Scale 
Agricultural Units
%
- 8230 ■ 
(18.0)
17932.
15.7)
3- Agricultural 
Credit
%
6834
.... (32.8)
3601 . 
(23.2)
42505 ■ 
(37.3)
Sub-total
%
20883
(100.0)
45704
(100.0)
114081
(100.0)
Irrigation 21670 42009 98179
Total 47292 87713 212260
Note: 1— Figures are related to the actual disbursement during 1973—76. 
Source: See Table (3-5)
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mance after the land reform was that the government had not considered the 
economic consequences of the land reform and it was only socio-political 
factors that determined their objectives of breaking down feudalist social 
relations* Also due to the same factors, the importance of the agricultural 
sector was undermined in the prepration of the third development plan*
However, it is after 1967, when the government realized the signifi­
cance of the economic consequences of the land reform* It has tried to im­
prove the situation through a set of economic policies* However, the over­
all performance of the agricultural sector as pictured above indicates that 
the government has not been successful in its development programme in this 
sector even after 1967* Here, we will examine the effects of the government 
intervention on the performance of the agricultural sector and the reasons 
for the failure of such intervention*
3-2 Government Policies
In the evaluation of government economic policies, we are mainly 
concern with the effects of the DGI and DGA on the performance of agricul­
tural sector* Nevertheless, in order to clarify those effects, we also con­
sider the importance of the organization of production and the government 
import and price policies* Therefore, the government policies towards agri­
cultural sector can be divided into following categories:
1) Provision of technical assistance
2) provision of credit
3) Restructuring the organization of production
4) Policies which affect the price of agricultural products and incentive for 
investment, e*g*, price controls of one kind or another, import of agricul­
tural goods and so on.
Before discussing the government policies towards the agricultural 
sector in detail, it is necessary to look at the relative importance of this
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sector in the total development plans. As table (3-5) shows the total govern­
ment payments for development of agricultural sector hardly reached 9.0 and 
8.4 percent during the Fourth and Fifth Plans which were lower than that of 
the Third Plan allocation for this sector. Together with water, the total 
allocation reached 17.3 and 14.0 percent in the Fourth and Fifth Plans which 
still are lower that the previous plan. The above indicates that the agri­
cultural sector has lost its relative importance in the total plans' alloca­
tions. However, in absolute terms, the allocation has rapidly increased 
during these plans. The disbursement of the last two plans were 185 and 843 
percent higher than that of the third plan allocation for the agricultural 
sector.
However, a change can be seen in the allocation of plans with regard 
to OGI and DGA in the agriculutural sector. As table (3-6) depicts the 
government has emphasised on the DGI during the Fourth end Fifth Plans. DGI 
accounts for 50.9 and 47 percent of disbursement of plans for development 
of agricultural sector. The higher emphasis on the OGI can be interpreted 
as the higher provision of technical assistance. This change in the pattern* 
of allocation shows that the government has tried to improve the performance 
of the agricultural sector indirectly and through the introduction of new 
method of cultivation, biological and technological changes in the agricul­
tural sector. This.change of emphasis could be beneficial in the long run 
only if the technical assistances were the right sorts and were fully uti­
lized by majority of farmers, the problems of which are the main concern of 
the following section.
3-2—1 Provision of Technical Assistance
Government technical assistance in the agricultural sector covers 
a number of government activities which may indirectly improve the perfor­
mance of the agricultural sector by providing new improved seeds, chemical
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fertilizers, mechnization, the introduction of new method of cultivation 
which ensure a higher utilization of scarce resources and provision of mar­
keting facilities. Here, we may enlarge the definition to cover 61so the 
government investment in infrastructure maily for development of water 
resources and irrigation system.
Despite the enormous government spendings for technical assistance, 
it seems, the government has not successed in affecting the performance of 
the agricultural sector and particularly the land productivity (see PP 
122-3)* However, it does not mean that the use of technical inputs has not 
increased at the national level, but in fact, it explains the structural 
problem of the Iranian agricultural sector and inadequacy of government 
assistance*
Classifing the government assistance to biological and mechanical 
assistance, we may use the growth of chemical fertilizers and tractors as 
proxy measures for the degree of effectiveness of government technical assis- 
tacne in the agricultural sector* As table (3—7) shows after the land reform, 
the total chemical fertilizers used in the agricultural sector reached 215 
thousands tons in 1967 when the economy came back to its normal trend after 
the disturbance period of the land reform. During 1967—72, the use of chemical 
fertilizers in the national level increased at a rate of 12 percnet annualy, 
although with some fluctuation. However, the pattern illustrates a sharp 
increase during 1972-4, that'.is an annu&l growth rate of 27.5 percBnt(a simi­
lar pattern can be seen in the case of improved seeds). This was largely 
due to the new government policy which came along with the increase in the 
oil revenue. In order to encourage the private sector investment in agricul­
tural and related areas, the Budget Act of 1973 and 1974 authorized wide 
investment incentives. These incentives in the case of biological assistance 
cover the use of chemical fertilizers, improved seeds and spalings, dis- 
infacting chemical and seeds and spalings etc. The incentives are given in
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Tha Application of Technical Inputs 
To Iranian Agriculture
Table (3-7)
Year Chemical
Improved Seeds Distributed 
(100 Tons) Tractors
(1000 Tons) Wheat Cotton (Unit)
1957 mm 725
1958 - - - 1301
1959 - - - 1169
1960 mm - - 1283
1961 - - - 1223
1962 - - - 645
1963 58 24.0 7 133
1964 71 30.0 27 714
1965 86 38.0 20 1347
1966 124 76.3 17 1133
1967 215 56.0 20 2382
1968 184 ■65.0 25.7 2967
1969 208 25.0 3369
1970 243 127.9 34.0 1894
1971 328 329.8 31.2 2458
1972 379 340.0 93.2 5787
1973 482 355.0 111.8 4781
1974 616 646.2 110.0 7561
1975 624 580.0 95.2 9038
1976 601 - - 6626
Source: Plan Organization, 
Book, 1967 and 1972
Statistical
-76.
Centre of Iran, Statistical Year
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the form of subsidies or grant depending on the legal status of the recei-
pients (individuals, co-operatives, or farm corporations)« The ratio of
subsidy for fertilizers is 20 percent at most, for seeds 50 percent; for 
10
other 100 percent •
However, despite the large subsidy granted to the private sector, the 
use of such incentives are dependent on the ability of farmers to invest in 
the agricultural sector. Therefore, the main receeipients of such assistance 
are those organization which are able to embark on the basic investment (see 
PPl53-63for the government discriminatory policy). It is clear from the 
above explanation that although the provision of technical inputs is nece­
ssary, it is not sufficient, since the lack of necessary credit to peasants 
makes the application of such inputs in the agricultural sector impossible. 
Thus, only the minority, large scale agricultural units, are able to utilize 
such assistance. At least, data available for 1971 shows that only 2.3 per— 
cent of fertilizer used in the agricultural sector was chemical fertilizer .
It is not known that to what extent the government subsidies, since 
1973, have induced the traditional farmers to use new improved seeds or 
chemical fertilizers. But, the land productivity in the national level shows 
no improvement and this can be interpreted as the failure of the government 
policy with regard to technincal assistance. The land productivity may be 
a good proxy measure for the degree of effectiveness of biological inputs 
since they mean to raise the land productivity • The reasons for the failure 
may be the lack of complemetary assistance apart from the credit policy« In 
the main, the use of new seeds and chemical fertilizers can only improve 
the land productivity, if the irrigation system and the method of cultiva­
tion allow a higher and more efficient utilization of water,.The experience
of other countries shows that the new seeds and fertilizers require more
13
water, otherwise, the productivity of land may even decrease* • The shortage 
of water and the lack of qualified personnel to spread the new method
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of cultivation characterize the Iranian agriculture sector. These factors, 
too, can limit the use of biological inputs to large scale agricultural units 
which are able to invest in the irrigation system or receive the government 
assistance for irrigation.
However, our second proxy measure, the growth of tractors in use, also 
shows a similar picture. Before';the land reform, the number of tractors sold 
by Organization for. the Development of Agricultural Machinery (public orga­
nization) reached at 1283 units in 1960. During the land reform, the invest­
ment in the agricultural machinery declined and therefore only 133 tractors 
were sold in 1963 and it was not until 1967 when the trend came back to its 
normal pattern. However, one can hardly speak about the rising of tractors 
in use in the agricultural sector} the growth rate did not exceed 0.7 percent 
during 1967-70 peiiod. Since 1971, the number of tractors used in the agri­
cultural sector has risen at an annual rate of 38 percent and reached 9038 
unite in 1975—76. The pattern has been affected by four major factors:
First, since 1968 the government has encouraged the large scale agricultural 
units with different organization of production (see P R 50-63 )•’This has 
resulted in the rapid mechanization of the new farms established under the 
government poliby for restructuring of the organization of production.
Second, the government through its macro-economic policy (fiscal and monetary 
policies) under the effects of oil revenue has influenced the factor propor­
tion in favour of capital.
Third, the inflationary pressure resulted from the government over-spending 
during 1973-76 has raised the average wage level in the agricultural sector 
and created a temporary change in the structure of employment in the sense 
of shortage of manpower in the agricultural sector. This has induced the 
capital intensity in this sector.
Fourth, since 1973, the government subsidy for land leveling and irrigation 
at a 50 to 100 percent of the actual costs (depending on the type of organ!-
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zation of production)^ may have encouraged the mechanization of agricultural 
unit9 even in the medium size.
However, mechanization largely affectes the labour productivity and 
the cost of production rather than rising of land productivity. It may induce 
the land intensive techinque of cultivation by lowering the cost of ploughing, 
land leveling and so on. It is true that by bringing more land under culti­
vation, the output at aggregate level increases, but the application,pf.land 
intensive technique is limited by the available arable land of the country. 
With the expansion of cultivated lands, bringing new land land under culti­
vation will' be more and mors costly. Although the government has been fairly 
successful in the mechnization of new farms and raising the output at the 
aggregate level, it does not mean this policy would continue to produce 
fruit. On one hand,sooner er later, the expansion of cultivatable lands will 
come to end, on the other hand, an efficient utilization of such investment 
in the agricultural sector under the existing structure of organization of 
production is very much in doubt even in the case of large scale agricultural 
units (see PP150-63). Therefore, a higher attention towards the biological 
improvement will be necessary for rescuing the Iranian agricultural sector.
The higher mechanization of farm units has created two main effects 
with regard to the structure of employment and distribution of income: First, 
it has created a large seasonal unemployment in the rural areas. Although 
during 1974—6 the government—overspending in the construction has absorbed 
a large share of seasonally unemployed (see chapter 4), it has not created 
a structural change in the pattern of employment. Ignoring the short-term 
effects, one may assume that it will take a long time before the number 
of employed labour force in the agricultural sector in the absolute terms 
starts to decline, particularly, if we consider that the expansion of the 
industrial and service sectors will be limited by the declining trend in 
oil revenue in near future. Assuming the level of employment in the agricul­
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tural sector is mainly determined by the level of employment creation in 
tha industrial and service sectors, the government policy with regard to 
expansion of mechanization would add to the problem of employment creation 
in the medium and long run. Secondly, assuming the rising of peasant's income 
depends on the growth of land productivity, mechanization may not contribute 
in the rising of income of traditional farmers, therefore, the government 
subsidy and direct investment may largely widen the existing gap of income 
within the agricultural sector in favour of those who have benefited from the 
government intervention. The above effects indicates that with respect to 
the employment and distribution of income policies, the government inter­
vention has aggrevated the situation in the agricultural sector. Had the 
government paid greater attention to the biological inputs and an efficient 
utilization of such inputs, the productivity of land could have risen and 
thereby an improvement in the farmer's income could have been made. However, 
the utilization of such investment efficiently is largely dependent on the 
complementary inputs in particular water.
However, the most important problem of Iranian agricultural sector
arises from water shortage for irrigation. Around 65 percent of the 100
Billion cube meters of water available for use has annually been diverted
15for irrigation uses. • Out of which at least a quarter comes from ground
water resources. Some experts have estimated that if water reseviora are
fully utilized, it would be sufficient to adequately serve 8 to 10 flillion 
16hectares of land which accounts for 80 to 100 percent of cultivated lands 
in 1974. However, it is believed that only up to 4.5 Million hectare or 27.4 
percent of the cultivatable lands can be fully irrigated and thereafter the 
costs of exploitation would rise rapidly. In 1974, around 4.1 Million hectares 
were irrigated which accounts for 39 percent of total land under cultiva- 
tion . Therefore, if the above estimation is correct, the possible expan­
sion of irrigatable lands with no significant change in the cost of produc­
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tion is very limited, that is not more than a further 3 percent can be irri­
gated in this way. This estimation indicates that the cost of irrigation 
will rise sooner or later even when ue account for more efficient utiliza­
tion of the existing water resources.
Under the above circumstances in which water is regarded as the cons­
training factor, the most important government technical assistance will 
be in the form of DGI in irrigation. The plans' disbursements for water 
suggest that between 8 to 10 percent of the total government investment 
during 1968-76 was allocated to this sector. Although the government invest­
ment in water covers both the utilization of surface and ground water, it 
has mainly been concerned with the exploitation of the former. Generally, 
the government policy has been as such to leave the exploitation of ground 
water to the private sector and has limited its investment to exceptional 
cases which mainly benefited the farm corporations (see PP159-60), The main 
reason for taking such policy is that the government believed that the pri­
vate sector is able to develop the ground water in which the necessary invest­
ment is not substantial. Although during the Fourth Plan, not more than 1.8 
percent of the government investment in water wee directly allocated to the 
exploitation of ground water, the government subsidies for irrigation have 
been large since 1973-4..
However, in the exploitation of surface water, the government has 
mainly been concerned with the construction of multi-purpose dams rather 
than the utilization of such investment in the agricultural sector. At least, 
some reports suggest that the inefficient utilization of investment in dams
for irrigation purposes has been due to the'lack-of.'Investment in the infra-
18
structure in irrigation net work during the Fourth Plan. Nevertheless, the 
government tried to increase the utilization of irrigatable lands under 
dams through restructuring the organization of production. Since 1968 the 
government has encouraged the establishment of large agricultural units
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under the dams. This policy was taken due to the following consideration: 
a) the government assumed that the large private (foreign and local) investors 
are able to invest in the necessary irrigation net work, b) based on the 
non-lrrigated per hectare output in the dam areas, the government assumed 
that the income generated through the traditional small farming would not 
be sufficient to cover the cost of exploitation of water resources in the 
dams areas( see PP 153-6).
As far as the first assumption is concerned, practically, the govern­
ment has undertaken a large share of the cost of utilization of surface 
water through its direct investment and its subsidies to large scale agri­
cultural units (see PP 150-63). Altogether, it is estimated that the cost 
td the government for the development of irrigated lands under dams has 
averaged 2000,-per' hectare^.' excluding the cost of land acquisition from 
petty farmers in the areas. In the case of the latter assumption, one report 
indicates that over five years the traditional farmers were able to increase 
their income from land by 300 percent with the help of irrigation facili- 
ties available to them. . As we also will show later (see pp152-3 )» the 
performance of the large scale agricultural unite under the dams lands has 
not been better than that of small traditional farmers whose lands have 
been irrigated. Therefore, both cases show that the government assumption 
have been based on inadequate research on the cost—benefit analysis of govern­
ment investment in the exploitation of water for irrigation purposes and the 
lack of understanding about the effects of necessary incentives on the pro­
ductivity of traditional farming.
However, since 1973 the government has emphasised the subsidies and 
has left the investment in the Irrigation facilities on the part of private 
sector. 85 to 100 percent of the cost of studies, design and other prepra- 
tion and 50 to 100 percent of construction costs for on-farm irrigation 
and drainage have been undertaken by the government. These subsidies mean
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to benefit private farmers and co-operatives at a rate of 50 percent and
21the farm corporations at a rata of 100 percent • Therefore, taking these 
subsidies into account, the cost of development of irrigated lands to the 
government is very much higher than the estimation based on the direct 
government investment in the irrigation and dams construction. Considering 
that around 60 percent of cultivable lands is not irrigated, the cost of 
raising land productivity through irrigation will be still higher in the 
future. The cost is affected by the uncomformity of the geopgrphical dis­
tribution of cultivatable lands and the pattern of precipitation. The Caspian 
littoral and Western regions, with only 25 percent of total land area, account 
for 52 percent of total precipitation. The central plateau, with 5o percent 
of total land area, accounts for only 28 percent of total precipitation,
and the east and south of the country, with 25 percent of total land area,
22!?
account for the remaining 20 percent of total precipitation . With the 
above patterns of land resevoir, a large substantial investment for the 
diversion of necessary water to the irrigatable lands has to be undertaken 
if full exploitation of ths surface and ground water is to be achieved. The 
estimation given in P.135 , seems to be based on the above consideration 
about the pattern of distribution of lands and water. Nevertheless, if the * 
land productivity is to increase, a higher cost of irrigation is to be under­
taken since the performance of the agricultural sector is largal dependent 
on the possibility of irrigation (see Appendix B for the difference in the 
land productivities) in the future.
Altogether, the provision of technical assistance shows that despite 
the high government investment in technical assistance and irrigation, its 
policy with regard to distribution of such assistance has led to inefficient 
utilization of investment in the agricultural sector. In the main, the govern­
ment policy has discriminted against the majority of farmers by emphasising 
mechanization and development of large scale agricultural units. With regard
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to irrigation policy, similarly, the government has weighed the development 
of surface water in order to be utilized by large scale agricultural units* 
This has left the majority of farmers to rely on the traditional method of 
Irrigation. Considering water as the constraining factor in Iranian agricul­
ture^ the government policy with regard to irrigation has also caused an 
inefficiency in the utilization of government investment in technical inputs 
such as new improved seeds, chemical fertilizers and so on. Consequently, 
one may say that the the DGI has benefited those organiztion of production 
which have been able to bear the basic investment in irrigation and tech­
nical inputs. This, to a large extent, leaves the utilization of the OGI by 
different organization of production to the government credit policy which 
ensures such basic investment.
3-2-2 Provision of Credit
The importance of the provision of credit by the government arises 
from two factors: First, as was mentioned above, the utilitzation of OGI 
by farmers is largely dependent on the possibility of the basic investment 
by these groups of producers. Therefore, the sufficcient credit may make such 
utilization possible. Second, since peasants have traditionally received 
their credit through maoney lenders who in one way or another extract a 
large percentage of peasants' disposable incomes, the provision of cheap credit 
by the , government not only will raise the immediate peasants disposable 
income, but also, it may reduce the need for such credit in the future 
when the peasants saving become sufficient to finance the basic investment.
Here, we will look at the government credit policy from two points 
of views: a) whether the government credit has been sufficient to eliminate 
the importance of the rural money lenders, b) which organization of produc­
tion have benefited the most from the government money ? Whether such dis- 
criminatary policy has improved the performance of the agricultural sector
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or not (section (b) will be discussed under heading of'restructuring of orga­
nization of production).
On average around 30 percent of the agricultural disbursement was 
spent on supporting peasants through agricultural credit which is lower 
than that of the Third Plan allocation (tables 3-5 and 3-6). It accounts 
for only 1.4 percent of total Fourth and Fifth Plans which is too low to 
lead to a considerable change in the agricultural sector particularly if 
we consider that the peasant saving is almost zero or even negative. It may 
be argued that the establishment of co-operatives would lead to a- self-finan­
cing stage and the provided capital under the land reform allocation would 
come to its fruitful point. However, as will be explained later, co-operatives 
appear to be complete failures (seePP 163 ).
Table (3-8) shows the total credit granted by the banking system to 
the agricultural sector including the agricultural disbursement of the Plan 
Organization through co—operatives} the plan* s share accounts for about 
10 percent of the total credit. The share of the agricultural sector has 
never been more than 11.4 percent of the total credit to the private sector 
and at lowest it was 6.3 percent. If it was evenly distributed, it could 
provide a sum of 1077.4 to 2133.7 Rials per hectare which is well below 
the minimum required credit as will be explained below.
This minimum for productive purpose in the agricultural sector has
been estmited at 70.0 Billion Rials in the agrregate level for 1970 and
22
1971 . Based on this estimation the credit required for one hectare would
be about 4400 Rials. Allowing for the rate of inflation and therefore an 
increase in the cost of production, the minimum credit for 1972 and 1973 
would be 4700 and 5300 Rials respectively. As table (3-9) shows the total 
credit available through the banking system (including government credit) 
is still not sufficient to cover the minimum required. Assuming no peasant 
saving , in 1971, about 75 percent was to be provided through the traditional.
Bank Credit to the Aoricultural Sector
Table (3-8) Billion Rials
1967 ‘ 1968 1 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 -i 1976 .
Total 1
Credit Granted By Banking 
System To Agricultural Sector
/°
15.0
(10.7)
18.9
(11.4)
20.3
(10.4)
18.4
(8.0)
17.4
(6.3)
.28.9
(8.0)
37.3
(7.7)
62.6
(9.0)
94.0
(8.8)
131.1
(8.9);
2
Government Credit (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (8.9) (9.6) (14.4) (22.8) (39.4) (58.7) (84.7)
Total Credit Granted 
in the Country 140.0 165.0 195.7 228.5 274.9 359.7 486.7 691.9 1068.5 1464.9
Note: 1- Figures in ( ) indicate the share of banking credit to the agricultural sector in the total credit granted 
in the Country.
2- Credit distributed by Agricultural Co-operative Bank of Iran and Agricultural Development Bank of Iran (ADBI). 
The contribution of ADBI for 1973-76 are, 2.8, 8.3, 23.4 and 42.3 Billion Rials.
Source: BMI, Annual Reports, 1969-76.
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Source Of Credit
Per Hectare of Land
. 1
Table (3-9) Rials
1971 1972 t 1973
Minimum Required 
Per Hectare
%
4400
(100.0)
4700
(100.0)
5300
(100.0)
Government 594.4 939.3 1304.3
% '(13.5) (20.0) (24.6)
Banking System 483.0 945.9 829.4
% (11.0) (20.1) (15.7)
Peasant Saving 55015 658.2 672.2
% (12.5) (14.0) (12.7)
Money Lenders 2772.1 2156.6 2494.1
% (63.0) (45.9) (47.0)
Note: 1- The calculation hae been made according to the assumption» 
in the text.
Source: For data on Banking system see Table(3-8)
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sources such as money lenders* shopkeepers and so on. It seems the provided 
credit in 1971 was exceptionally low compared with the previous year. How­
ever, the banking system and the government provide about 40 percent of the 
required credit and still 60 percent had to be sought through the traditional 
channels*
If the credit was evenly distributed, based on Katouzian's estimation, 
each houshold would receive a credit of 21875 Rials, assuming 3*2 Million 
rural family. Out of 21875 Rials the banking system and the government
provided only 9031 Rials which is about 42 percent of the total* It has
24been argued by G.Pyatt ^ that peasants should have, at least, a minimum 
savings for perpetuation of their life; he assumes a 5 percent savings for 
the agricultural sector in Iran* Even if we allow for a 5 percent peasant 
8aving,it would not have a con aider able contribution in the total required 
credit; only 13 percent of the credit could be provided through peasant 
saving* However, it is not the poor peasants who have this savings, but it 
is the large scale—private enterprises who are able, to some extent, to 
8elf-financ8 their activities.
The above estimation is too crude to show the minimum required credit 
for a houshold survival* Also, it cannot show the possibility of using the 
credit since it may not be economically efficient for a very small unit of 
farming even to obtain such a loan* It may only result in a deep involve­
ment of the farmer in the credit system while there is no possibility of 
increasing productivity and thereby clearing off debt* To illustrate these 
points an alternative estimation has been made (see Appendix 8 for the cal­
culation).
Table (3-10) shows the minimum size of a farm either irrigated or 
unirrigated which allows the peasant to live at his previous living stan­
dard. The three lowest groups of consumption, which are far lower than the 
total average, have been chosen to show the minimum possible consumption*
Minimum Required Land mid Credit For ft Peasant Family
Table (3-10)
I
Consumption - Group (Rials) ---- ------ .....
Un-Irrigated Lands Irrigated Lands
- Less Than 
24000
24000 ' 
36000 t0
36000
48000
Less Than 
24000
24000 
36000 to
36000- 
48000 to
Minimum Land 
(Hectare)
( D
5.2
(4.8)
8.8
(8.0)
*
12.0
(11.0)
2.0
(1.82)
»
3.4
(3.1)
4
4.7
(4.3)
Cost of Production 
Per Hb ctare 
(Rials)
1655.2 1655.2 1655.2
!
4197.3 4197.3 4197.3
Cost Per Hectare Twice 
Production a Year 
(Rials)
3310.4 3310.4 3310.4
!
8394.6 8394.6 8394.6
Value of Production 
Per Hectare 
(Rials)
3554.4 3554.4 3554.4 9097.3 9097.3 .. 9097.3 _
<L
Net Income Per.Hectare.
(Rials) 1899.2 1899.2 ' 1899.2 ' 4900 " ' 4900 ' ' 4900 . •
Income ■ Consumption 
(Rials) 18067.7
30625.3 41938.3 18067.7 30625.3 • -  41938.3
Cont. . .
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Coni«••
Saving 5% of Income 
(rials)
1706.0 2843.5 3909.8 1683.0 2820.2 3911.8
Total Disposable Income 
(Rials) 19773.7
33468.8 45048.1 19750.7 33445.5 45850.1
Total Required Credit 
(Rials) 15889.5 26483.2 36414.4 15530.0 26023.3 36096.8
Note: 1- Figures in ( ) indicate the minimum land when the saving is excluded« 
Source : see Appendix B
Distribution Of Holdings By Size
Table (3-11)
* Sire Of Holdings 
Hestere(H)
Under 1 (H) 1 (H) and 
under 2 (H)
2 (H) and 
under 5(H)
5(H) «id 
under 10(H)
10(H) «id 
under 50
50(H) and 
under 100
100(H) and 
over Total
Thousand Holdings 801 342 542 434 394 10 7 2530
Percentage (31.6) (13.5V (21.5) (17.1) (15.6) (0.4) (0.3) (100.0)
(45.1) (38.6) (16.3) ">
Source: PlaniOrganization, Result of Agricultural Survey 1972«
¿
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Assuming the peasant has no means of production except his labour (and land), 
the minimum size of a farm under unirrigated cultivation which can provide 
him with the minimum consumption in the Province of Pars is 4.8 hectares. 
Allowing for a.5 percent savings yearly he needs 5.2 hectares. For the 
second group of this category the minimum is still higher, that is 8,8 hec­
tares, when the savings allowance is included.
In this case, the minimum required credit for per hectare would be 
1655 Rials which well below the first estimation. One of the reason for 
the low required capital per hectare is that it excludes the cost of irriga­
tion which is fairly high. Assuming an even distribution of credit, 37 per­
cent of it should be provided through traditional sources. The peasant savings 
can provide only 9 percent of the total requirement.
Uhen an irrigated farm is considered, although the required capital 
per hectare is high, only 1.82 hectares of land would be sufficient for pro­
ducing the minimum living earnings. With the 5 percent savings allowance,
2 hectare is needed . The productivity of land per hectare is higher than 
that of unirrigated land due to higher capital in use. Although the per hec­
tare required credit is higher for the irrigated land -than that of unirri­
gated, the minimum credit needed for'survival is about the same for both.
The family whose land is sufficient for the minimum consumption that is the 
lowest group has to be provided with about 15500 Rials which is still higher 
than that provided by the government.
The second and the third groups of housholds still need a higher 
credit to maintain their consumption. Respectively, they are to be provided 
with 26023 and 36096 Rials which are far higher than that of the first 
estimation. The government (including banking system) could provide only 
35 percent and 25 percent of their needs respectively..Thus, around 70 per- 
cent of the required credit is to be sought from the traditional sources •
It is important, because they account for about 70 percent of the families
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under study, that is about 37.3 percent of the total rural family. It is 
also important, because most of the land holdings which could provide the 
minimum living standard come under these categories.
As table (3-11.) shows that 45.1 percent of the holdings are under 
the minimum farm size. According to above calculation the peasants who are 
holding these farms live well below the subsistence level and the credit 
available to them cannot increase their productivity. It has to be considered 
that farming may not be the only channel of their earnings and there may 
not be a danger of serious starvation, because, probably, the peasnats live 
in the rural areas do farming as a by product activity and self-sufficiency. 
One estimate shows that over 50 percent of the credit has been spent for 
consumption; it seems a large portion of it has to come from this group
The group which can provide the necessary condition of the minimum 
consumption is the 2 to 10 hectares group which accounts for 38.6 percent 
of total farms under cultivation. Out of the total farms, 21.5 percent have 
to be irrigated to produce the minimum income . Thus, the total required 
credit would be far higher than that of first estimation if a higher pro 
ductivity on land is to be achieved through higher irrigation of lands.
The above gives an idea of minimum size farm and the minimum required 
credit that the government has to provide. Based on our assumption of the 
peasant without means of prodution this minimum credit should be granted 
every year since the peasant saving is negligible. If the interest payment 
is taken into account, under the above circumstances, the peesant svaing 
is almost out of question. Assuming the rate of interest paid to the money 
lenders to be around 18 to 30 percent and that of banking system about 6 
percent, the farmers have to pay between 14 to 23 percent of their disposable 
income as the interest payment. Thus, contrary to Pyatt’s argument, the 
peasant life is based on accumulated debt rather than minimum savings. Based 
on the even distribution of credit, if the government had provided the suffi-
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cient credit enough to eliminate the money lenders, the peasants' incomes 
would have gone up by around 20 percent which may be regarded as higher 
rate of saving.
However, we have to drop our assumption of equal distribution of 
loans since it is more likely than not that those with a better credit 
worthiness would receive a large portion of their credit through banking 
system and the poor has to resort to the traditional supplier of funds.
To evaluate the distribution of credit among different organization of pro­
duction we will examine the pattern at disaggregated level.
3-2-3 Restructuring of Organization of 
Production
After the land reform and particularly since 1967 as a result of 
direct government intervention and its indirect assistance to the agricul­
tural sector, four different organization of production have come to exist. 
Although all these organizations share the capitalist sturcture of produc­
tion which distinguish them from the pre-land reform of feudalistic struc­
ture, they are widely different in their methods of production, ranging 
between the traditional method of cultivation to a highly capital intensive 
one. This different in the method of production has been created by govern­
ment direct investment and assistance. On one hand, the government has empha­
sised the development of two newly established organizations of production 
with high capital intensive techniques, the agro-business and farm corpora­
tion. On the other hand, it has silently undermined the development of the 
traditional section of the agricultural sector which consists of co-opertives 
and private farming.
Tdking into account that the traditional section accounts for about 
95 percent of agricultural output, performance of agricultural sector is 
determined by the growth of the traditional section. Therefore, considering
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the relative importance of the traditional section, the poor performance 
of the agricultural sector can be attributed to the over-emphasis of the 
development of the newly established organisation of production which accounts 
for 0.4 percent of agricultural output in 1973 and the undermining of the 
development of the traditional section in the government economic policy 
for agriculture. Below, we will examine the utilization of the DGI and govern­
ment credit by these organizations of production and the importance of their 
performance in the development of agricultural sector. These organizations 
are: a) agro-business, b) farm corporation, c) co-operatives, d) private 
farming.
Agro-business
This organization is one of large-scale commercial farming run be
foreign and local investors, largely for export. Since 1968 four ventures
have been formed with foreign partners, Iran Shellcott, Iran California,
Iran America and Iran International. The agro-business companies are located
in the previous unirrigated land under the Dez dam held on 30 year leases.
The area allocted to the companies is around 60800 hectares which accounts
for 75 percent of net irigateble land under the Dez dam. Out of which, only
8200 hectares have been brought under cultivation during 1968-76,which is
2-9
not more than 13.4 percent of the cultivatable lands in the area . However, 
these companies are highly specialized and their methods of cultivation are 
highly mechanized. They enjoy cheap loans as well as tax privileges from 
the government.
Although it may be too soon to evaluate the long term performance 
of agro—business, the available evidence shows that their future is rather 
gloomy and it certainly is not as bright as was expected. For various reasons 
which will be discussed later, the utilization of land has been delayed and 
with 0.2 percent share of the total land under cultivation in the country
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one cannot expect important effect on the performance of the agricultural 
sector. The share of agro-business in the total agricultural output in 1973 
hardly reached 0.2 percent . However, the disappointing performance is also 
clear from the per hectare ouput. If we compare the output in wheat produc­
tion, that of agro-business may show a higher productivity per hectare than 
that of the national average (table 3-12). But, this is not the whole story 
since the national average also includes the wheat production from unirri­
gated lands which has a significant contribution. If we take the small plots 
which could be better irrigated or that of large lands which have irrigation 
facilities, we can see the agro-business output per capita is not signifi­
cant. In some products, it even show lower productivity than the national 
average. Therefore, if the government's aim in encouraging such organization 
has been the^r^isingof output, the above shows a disappointing result.
From the companies point of view, the performance of their activity 
can be evaluated by the rate of return or profitibility • Based on this cri­
terion, the land productivity may not be the only determinant although it 
can affect the profitibility of the investment. The profitibility is mainly 
determined by the labour productivity and the cost of production. It was 
believed that this method of cultivation would be successful and the internal 
rate of return would be higher than the national average or similar to that 
of the industrial sector. For instance, one of the companies, Iran Shellcott, 
expected to cover its cost of operation in four years and get a return 
between 10 to 20 percent . However, practically, due to the following
factors during 1958-75, three of the four companies have piled up losses
3 2believed to be at least $ 5 Million and probably much higher"3 :
a) it is believed that the area of 19000 hectare is too large for one company 
to run without creating management and cultivation problems.
b) The information provided by the Government research station proved inade-
Per Hactare Output Of Major Products By Different 
Oroanizatlonsof Production In 1972. 1973^and 1974
Table (3-12)
197^
Agra- Farm Faro under Faro over Country
Business - Corporation 10 Hectare 5000 Average
(Irrigated) (Irrigated) (Area - Hectare (-Irrigated
Irrigated) (area — and Un-ir— 
Irrigated) rigated)
Wheat 1971 1646 1419 1978 718
Barley 1611 1682 1710 2182 699
Beans 1748 963 1257 1421 1226
Sun Flower 100 861 1592 613 654
Cotton 1445 1242 1629 1877 1694
Tomato 12754 13646 8229 2803 10235
Alfalfa 4472 5173 4160 2983 3977
Clover 2763 3690 2867 3515 3291
Sugar Beet 33972 23767 18199 23773 24556
1972
Lesa*Than 
1 Hectare
1857
1750 “
e
1 Hectare 
to less 
Than 2 
H ictare
1974
less^ Than 
1 H etere
1 Hectare 
to less 
Than 2 
H ctare
1259 1593 973 ~
1176 1424 995
Note: 1- The Output per hactare by different 
organizations of production is only 
available for 1973« All figures for 
1973 are related to per hectare out­
put of irrigated land« except for tVie 
national average in which the share 
of un-irrigated is included • Figures 
for 1972 and 1974 are related to the total
of irrigated and un-irrigated land per»
hectare output. yj
Source: Plan Organization, Agriculture Censuses, 1972, 1973 »id 1974
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quate. On the basis of very limited testing* decision were taken to plan 
large areas.
c) Since the companies located on the lands previously run by small farmers, 
the workers( previously farmers) are reluctant to work for others on land 
which historically they regarded as theirs,
d) Development costs, in particular land leveling, escalated beyond all cal- 
- culations. Companies believe that the development costs are infrastruc­
tural cost which should be undertaken by the government.
Here, we are not concerned with all above factors. The last factor 
which is related to government investment and the cost of production may be 
considered in more detail. This factor which has created a long delay in 
the utilization of lands and thereby under-utilization of capital has been 
the main reason for the accumulated losses. In the calculation of the rate 
of return, the external costs which are to be undertaken by the government 
is excluded. In other words, if the government had taken the total external 
cost, the companies could have reached their planned internal rate of return. 
However, from the government point of view, one of the reasons for encouraging 
the large scale agricultural units has been that it was believed that these 
companies are able to accept a part of irrigation coats and land leveling.
This lack of understanding about the social and private costa led the govern­
ment to take over management of three of the four comapnies engaged in the 
agro-business, through its Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) after the 
disaster in 197533, It may be possible for the agro-business to operate at 
a profitable level in the long run and to overcome the problem of coat and 
management. But all these will come about when the government has undertaken 
all the external cost of production. Having used wrong criteria for the 
evaluation of the projects, the government has failed to achieve its objec­
tive of raising the land productivity and lowering the cost to the govern­
ment. It has also created an employment problem and has aggravated the income
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distribution in the area.
The cost of encouraging and establishing the agro—business to the 
government has been far above what we consider as the minimum credit. The 
Agricultural Development Bank of Iran (ADBI) from the begining has been 
contributing to this activity either through loan or share participation; 
in other words, it has been the main source of financing the agro-business 
companies. Table (3-13) shows that the share of agro-business in the total 
approved projects by ADBI in 1974 was as high as 42 percent. Thus, ADBI’s 
contribution per hectare is not less than 38826 Rials in 1973 which is about 
500 percent higher than the minimum required. As far as the effects of the 
DGI is concerned, the plan allocation has been about 15 to 18 percent of 
total allocation of agricultural sector (table 3-6). This has largely been 
for providing the large scale enterprises (including the agro-business) with 
sufficient water-supply for irrigation. Also, the cost of Dez dam construc­
tion which goes up to 5377 Million Rials for irrigation channels has to'be 
considered as the government direct assistance to agro-business which has 
reduced the cost o „irrigation for the companies involved . Altogether the 
DGI effect has been estimated to be around 2000 Dollar per hectare for
35development of lands and another $ 1000 for irrigation and other expenses .
Taking into account the above external cost undertaken by the govern­
ment, the agro—business companies may be able to operate at a profitable 
level in the future by some elaboration on the choice of product. The choice 
of product in particular can be important when the climatic conditions and 
the minimization of the cost of production are considered. In this respect, 
their promising future in sugar beet production should be seen as the 
result of the lower cost of production rather than higher productivity per 
hectare (for the pattern of production see table 3—21). However, whatever 
their chances of survival, their effects on the pattern of employment and 
distribution of income haveobeen most damaging in these areas.
Approved Projects of the Agricultural Development Bank of Iran
In 1974
Table (3-13)________________ __________________________________;___________________________________ million rials
Net
b
Number Investment
Percent-
tags
--- Share
Type Of Activity of
Project
rrsvious 
Investment Applicant'sShare
Loan & Equity 
Share Partici­
pation
Low Interest 
Loan & Free 
Grant
Total
Poultry Breeding 56 815 1686 3631 - 6132 19.9
Gardening 134 477 348 642 64 ~ 1531 5.0
Cow Breeding 37 331 309 1016 22 1678 5.4
Farming &
Sheep Breeding 222 1637 766 2192 1190 5785 18.8
Agri — business 34 2430 4164 6328 15 12938 41.9
Other Activities 47 55 865 1851 2 2773 9.0
Total 530 5745 8138 15660 1293 30836 100.0
Source: 8P1I, Annual Report, 1974*
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Around 6500 families were moved from the land to be allocated to the
335agro-business companies, , out of which, the agro-busine9s has employed only
37
40 percent • This has caused rapid migration. But as the government officials
opposed to the establishment of agro-business argued, the employment in the
future may even be lower. "... although in the past two years of drought
many farmers have been able to find employment in construction work on some
3flof the projects, the agro—business will never be labour intensive." There­
fore, if one considers the social cost of projects, it will be (in the case 
of agro-business) far above what is estimated by government direct invest­
ment and government assistance.
It is worth mentioning that the government decision about the establish­
ment of the agro—business was opposed by many observers of thB Iranian economy 
both from inside the government and outside it. Many of them recommoneded to 
the government the alternative of assisting the small and medium size farmers 
and leaving the initiative to the farmers themselves. In this respect, most 
reports have realized that the small and medium size farmers can increase 
their production if they receive the necessary biological inputs, irrigation 
facilities and sufficient credit. In cases where the above constraints 
have been removed, much higher yields have been achieved, even under a par­
tial irrigation regime. Thus small, labour intensive farms, with the assis­
tance of the present system of contractors of larger farmers, who provide 
machinery on hire to small farmers, are shown to be capable of achieving much 
higher yields, given the necessary inputs of modern technology and infra­
structure, without the need to resort to large-scale reorganization and the
39introduction of large-scale mechanized methods .
Farm Corporation
After the second phase of the land reform, the government realized 
the problems of small farmingj and this has led to the bringing of the small
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lands under a farm corporation system. A farm corporation is run by an offi­
cial manager while the shareholders work on the land collectively (although 
it is not required by the regulation, about 95 percent of the shareholders 
are engaged in woking on the land) and receive their earnings partially 
through wage system and partially through dividends ( a land owner's share 
depends upon the value of land and other elements, e.g. tools, he has placed 
at the disposition of the farm corporation). The method of cultivation is 
simi—mechanized and the large area under cultivation make the greater use 
of moder technique possible^.
However, the farm corporation system covers only one percent of the 
total households engaged in the agricultural activity in the country. The 
land allocated to farm corporations has hardly reached 318.7 thousand hec­
tares by 1976 which less than 2 percent of the total cultivatble lands, out 
of which only 53.2 thousand hectares were brought under cultivation by 1972 
( the planned areas to be cultivated by 1976 was around 130.3 thousand hec­
tares) which accounts for about 30 percent of the allocated lands to farm 
corporations (table 3-14). With such a small area under cultivation one 
cannot expect any significant effect on the total agricultural output. The 
share of farm corporation in the total output was as low as 0.3 percent in 
1973 (table 3-15).
One of the reason for emphasising the establishment of farm corpora­
tion has been that it is believed the internal rate of return of this form 
of organization is above the national average. However, as we argued before, 
it may be a wrong criteria to evaluate the social cost of projects by the 
relative importance of the internal rate of’return since this criterion 
does not reflect, the importance of external cost of production which has 
to be undertaken by the society. If the rate of return of these corporations 
has been higher than average, it has not been because of better performance 
of per hectare output. As table (3-12) shows there is no significant diffe-
Status Of Fara Corporations"
1968-76
Table (3-14)
Unit 1968 1970 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Number Of Fare 15 19 43 65 65 85 89
Corporation#
Area Of Land 1000 Hectares 58.1 77.6 169.9 231.8 231.8 310.0 318.7
Land Under Cultivation 1000 Hectares 13.8 19.3 53.2 87.0 1 87.0 1 138.2 1 130.3 1
- Population Covered 1000 Persona 43*2 55.0 134.3 196.4 196.4 290.8 299.7
Population Of Share 
Holders 1000 Persona 24*4 33.2 81.4 123.9 123.9 177.9 185.4
No* Of Share Holders 1000 Persona 4.3 6.2 15.3 22.8 22.8 32.5 33.7
No* Of Share, Individuals 1000 Units
Government 1000 Units
Noninal Value Of Capital 
Share
nillion Riáis 198 269 685 992 992 1381 1420
Credit : Subsidies nillion Riáis 214 173 592 1234 2005 „ -
Loans nillion Riáis 69 73 249 314 324
Note:1-> Figures are estimated for the planned areas for * cultivation during 1973-76 . The actual cultivated area
for 1973 was not more than 56.0 thousand ’ hectare* •l «+
Source: Plan Organization, Statistical Year Book, 1972-76*
159
Farm Production And Value By Organization Of Production In 1975
Table (3-15)
Items
\
Price 
Thousand 
Rials Per 
Ton
< Farm Corporation 
(1)
Agro - Business
(2)
, Total Of Production (3) 
And Value In The Countr^ Ratio Of 1 + 2
Production
(Ton)
Value
(•000) Rials
Production Value 
(Ton) ('OOO)Rials
t Production 
1000 Tons
Value * 
mil. Rials
3
%
Wheat 6.4 18699 119673.6 10721 68614.4 4545.9 29094.0 0.65
Barley 4.4 3176 13974.4 1676 7383.2 1157.8 5095.4 0.42
Rice 12.2 5387 65721¡4 — — 936.9 11429.9 0.57
Beans 20.7 125 2587.5 85 1759.5 48.1 995.3 0.44
Peas 24.1 86 2072.6 — — 9.0 216.9 0.96
Sun Flowers 11.9 168 1999.2 9 107.1 58.2 692.2 0.30
Oil seeds 12.3 75 922.5 18 221 .4 559.6 118.9 Q.96
Cotton 18.3 1546 28291.8 815 14914.5 559.6 10241.2 0.42
Sugar Beets 1.1 43970 48367.0 42940 47234.0 4086.2 4494.8 2.2
Potato 6.6 512 3379.2 — — 503.0 3320.0 0.1
Onion 4.4 179 787.6 118 519.2 205.1 902.4 0.14
Tomato 3.8 2545 9671.0 552 2097.6 284.7 1081.9 1.1
Alfalfa 3.5 2522 8827.0 4602 16107.0 1133.3 3966.5 0.6
Clover 3.6 2897 10429.2 807 2905.2 168.2 605.4 2.2
Grapes 41.7 2 83.4 74 3085.8 590.0 24604.7 0.01
Tea 21.3 - - - — 61.3 1304.9 —
Pistachio 99.1 — — -  — — 18.1 1789.3 —
Almond 30.2 - - — - 0.1 3.4 «
Date 10.0 - - - — 158.3 1583.3
Tobacco 0.5 - .. . - . 16.8 8.4
Other - - - - - — 10072.2 • _
Total At 1972 Pr. 316787.4 164948.9 111620.0 0.4
Total At 1973 Pr.1 348525.4 181474.7 128300.0 0.4
(0.27) % (0.13) %
Note: 1- Percentages show the share of Farm Corporation and Agro-Business in The total.
Source: Plan and Budget Organization, Statistical Centre Of Iran, Results Of Agricultural Censuses of 1972 4 1973.
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rence between per hectare of output of farm corporation and those of small 
lands which have been irrigated. Therefore, the higher rate of retrun is 
to be considered as the lower cost of preoduction and better marketing faci­
lities.
Their success has been largely dependent on the government assistance
and the large area under cultivation. On average each houshold has received
10 hectares of land for cultivation although only one third has been brought
under cultivation. The capital per household has been around 42000 Rials out
of which a large shareshas been contributed by the government. Apart from the
government share participation, in 1974,-each-household received 14000 Rials
as a loan and another 88000 Rials as a free grant which * altogether, the
cost to the government was around 146000 Rials per household. The cost of
development of land for cultivation under the farm corporation system on
average .has been around 48000 Rials which is 600 percent higher than what
we consider.as minimum cost of production (see table 3-16). Despite the very
high cost to the government, the farm corporation system suffers from ¿two
main weaknesses: First, dependence upon the ability and integrity of a single
manager, with resulting management constraints for many large corporations.This
deficiency is accentuated by the lack of financial-iifteentives for the public
management staff members and the lack of satisfactory alternatives for use
41
of entrepreneurial and managerial talents of the previous farmers . Second,
these corporations have created a sort of uncertainty with respect to the
alienation of the farmer from his land and his ability to reap the fruit of
his own initiative and capability. One case shows that in the years of bad
harvest during which the corporation ran at a loss and consequently farmers
lost about half of theit earnings, the farm corporation lost 50 percent of 
A 2its members . A reapt of such conditions may result in the take-over of 
the farm croporation by a few richer farmers.
With regard to the effect of farm corporation on the employment,as table
Capital Per House-hold and The Cost Per Hactare 
To the ‘Government Forthg. Development Of Farm Corporations
T^ l. (3-16) _____________________________________ _____________________________ Rial,
1968 1970 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Capital Per Household 46000 43000 45000 44000 44000 43000 42000
Subsidies Per 
Household 50000 28000 39000 54000 88000 - -
Loans Per Household 16000 12000 16000 14000 14000 - —
Total Capital Per 
Household 112000 83000 100000 112000 146000 - -
Cost Of Development 
Per Hactare 35000 27000 29000 45000 48000 1 - -
Share Of Farm Corpo-
• ration In The Total 
Population Of The Areas
56.5 % 60.4 % 60.6 % 63.0 % 63.0 % 61.2 % 61.9 %
Note: 1- It is assumed that of.areas'allocated‘to farm corporations, 30 petcent was cultivated land* ‘ 
Source i see Table (3-14)
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(3-16) shows, these corporations have usually employed between 56 to 63 per­
cent of the total households in their areasj in this way as the agro—business 
they have created a large number of unemployed.
Rural Co-operatives
The government plan has been to integrate the small holders, whether 
affected by the land reform or not, under a co-operative system. The main 
objectives have been the provision and distribution of credit and the estab­
lishment of consumer co-operative shops. The rual co-operative system is to 
cover all the 3.2 Million farm families of the country. By 1976, a number 
of 2.9 Million has been brought under thi9 scheme. The rural co-operatives 
are responsible for about 70 percent of agricultural output and accounts 
for the largest share of agricultural employment.
The rural co-operatives are highly undercapitalized] as table (3—17) 
shows the capital per household has hardly reached 2.4 thousand Rials by 1976. 
Also they have been ignored by the government, and no direct contribution 
(apart from what have been allocated through Plan Organization for establish­
ment of co-operative required under the land reform act).or assistance have 
been granted to the co-operatives. The government has also discriminated 
against the co-operative with respect to subsidies in comparison to those 
given to the farm corporation (see pp.130-1).
The only government assistance to the co-operative has been a cheap 
loan through the Agricultural Co-operative Bank. The loan granted to each 
member or household hardly reached 6900 Rials in 1972 when the minimum 
credit required wa3 not les3 than 15500 Rials. Although the per household 
credit has moved up to 14700 Rials by 1976 (table 3-17), there are two consi­
derations which reduce the significance of the improvements First, since 
the minimum required is estimated for 1972, we should take into account the 
rate of inflation during 1972-76 in order to be able to make such a compa-
Statua Of The Rural Co-operatives
1963-76
Table (3-17)
> 1963 i 1965 < 1968 , 1970 , 1972 , 1973 , 1974 . 1975 < 1976
No. Of Co-operatives 2722 5518 8388 8298 8261 2717 2847 2858 2886
No. Of Membar> 
(1000 Persins) 542 746 1260 1606 2065 2263 2488 2685 2868
Capital
(million Rials) 369 673 1639 2379 3329 3857 4677 5690 6962
Capital Per Household 
(Rials) 680 880 1300 1481 1612 : 1704 1879 2044 2427
<1
Credit Per Household 
(1000 Rials) 6.3 7.2 4.2 5.5 6.9 8.8 12.5 13.1 14.7
Note: 1— For the aggregate loans paid by the Agricultural Co-operative Bank Of Iran see Table • Here we
have assumed the total loan granted by The Bank has been utilized by the rural co-operative. Thus* the 
credit per household can be over-estimated.
Source: Plan Organization, Statistical Year Book , 1972-76 and H*ll, Annual Report, 1970-76.
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rison. With such consideration, the minimum required for 1976 is about 
22500 Rials (rate of inflation has been 45 percent during 1972-6)^. How­
ever, this shows that the situation has slightly improved; while in 1972 
the government provided only 44 percent of the required credit, in 1976 
it was able to provide around 65 percent of the minium fund required.
Secondly, as it has been estimated if farmers are to repay their loans 
on time, they have to receive another loan to cover their cost of produc­
tion for the year after. In practice, since most of them have been unable 
to clear off their debt, the co—operatives as in the case of ADBI (see note 
27) have granted loans on the strocks of pen and the farmers have to pay 
the interest burden; in other words, the farmers never receive the loans.Thus, 
regular repayments as shown in table (5-18) should not be considered as the 
ability of farmers in repayment of their loans.
These are groups which rely heavily on the money lenders as the major 
source of money and due to their poor credit worthiness they have to tolerate 
an interest rate as high as 18 to 30 percent. It is hardly possible to talk 
about peasant savings under these conditions and it is not surprising that 
a large amout of loan has been spent on consumption.
Private Farming
Those farmers whose legal status were not affected by the land reform 
and are not member of co-operatives are classified as independent farmers.
The size of their holdings ranged between 10 to 300 hectares. It is believed 
that their method of cultivation is reasonably • mechanised and they account for
/|A
20 to 25 percent of the total value of agricultural output .
Those private farming which are mechanized seems to have a better 
credit worthiness than those of small farming under co-operatives, the other 
may have the same condition as the small farmers. It is not possible to work 
out the government assistance to the private farming but as the IL0 delega-
Loans Granted Bv Tha Agricultural 
Co-operative Bank Of Iran. 1963-76
Table (3-18) . « Million Rials
Year Number Of 
Loans Granted 
(1000)
' Amount 
Paid
Amount
Collected
1963 320 3427 1467
1964 603 4131 2089
1965 548 5480 3607
1966 250 5168 3943
1967 327 5188 5030
1968 352 5290 4521
1969 350 5415 5086
1970 212 8909 7765
1971 233 9582 9452
1972 263 14381 12179
1973 346 19993 14363
1974 414 31116 18536
1975 306 35295 27590
1976 327 42352 32413
Sources Plan Organization, Statistical Year Book, 1972-76.
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tion found out the credit available to them is not sufficient.
3-2-4 Price Cotrol and Import Policy
The government has tried to achieve two contradictory objectives 
through elaboration of price control and import policy. On one hand, it aims 
at raising the farmer’s income by minimizing the price fluctuation of main 
agricultural products as a complementary policy to its subsidy and credit 
system. On the other hand, it has tried to stabilize prices of basic nece­
ssity in order to protect consumers in the urban areas through its direct
4 5price control and importation of agridutural produce • Reaching both objec­
tives at the same time may need an integrated market in which the price mecha­
nism can take care of the allocation of resources and where the organization 
of production operates on the basis of a capitalist structure and responds 
to the market signals with a minimum economic bottleneck. The Iranian economy 
with its fragmented market can by no means provide such essential conditions 
for successful government intervention in the market mechanism with the 
purpose of redistribution of income.
In order to explain why the above objectives under the prevailing 
conditions in the Iranian economy seems to be contradictory snd why the 
government has failed to achieve its aim of raising of farmer's Income, first, 
we will examine the structure of price control, seoncd, we will look at the 
trend and importance of food importation and finally the effects of such 
policies will be discussed.
The government has intervened in price determination in three ways :
a)- Those products whose prices are determined by an interministerial pricing
4 5
board including tobacco, tea, sugar and oil seeds • These prices are deter­
mined basically upon the changes in the international markets, relative 
changes in the level of prices in the domestic market and the cost of pro­
duction with the objective of increasing production of these crops. Although
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ths principles of price determination are the same for all these crops, the 
effects on ths farmers' incomes are widely different from one kind to another, 
depending whether the domestic production is sufficient to meet the domestic 
consumption. For instance, in the case of tobacco which is the monopoly of 
the government and its production is sufficient to meet the domestic consump­
tion, the price increase has usually lagged behind other products and the 
government officials are very inflexible with regard to bargaining against 
producers. In the absence of a market-price, we may rely on our experience 
of the south of Iran which indicates that the offical prices are well below 
the existing black market prices (around 50 percent lower). Since the impor­
tation of cigarettes is prohibited, there is no link between domestic and 
international prices.
Another example is thé price of sugar which is determined well above 
the international market. Since the cost of production of the crop is rela­
tively high and the level of production is well below the national demand, 
the government has practically supported the production of sugar in the 
domestic market. However, it is the protection of sugar industries which 
has forced the government to consider the cost of production of the crop.
Also with regard to the price stabilization the government has increased 
its subsidies for sugar production which has been estimated to be around 
21,404 Million Rls. in 1976.(table 3-19). The annual losses which are born 
by government-sugar factories are due to the under utilization of capital 
as a consequence of insufficient inputs i,e, sugar beet. Taking into account 
the fact that the price of sugar is established above the international 
markets and that thé sugar industries have always been protected by the govern­
ment protection policy, the losses do not reflect under pricing. In fact it 
indicates that the government subsidy should have benefited the producers 
of sugar beet. However, although the government's policy with regard to 
control of prices has made the production of sugar beet possible , it does
Budqet Subsidies to Input and Output of Agricultural
Products
Tabls (3-1» ____ __ _______  ____________ nilllon Rls,
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
1— State Cereal and Sugar and 
Tea Organization 610 655 939 771 4923
(3205)1
25333 36421 35473
Cereal (610) (655) (939) (771) (11698) (15278) (14069)
Sugar - - (1718) (13635) (21143) (21404)
2- Meat Organization 105 238 339 241 23812 4709 3 7431
3- Central Organization 
of Rural Cooperation 322 524 505 1094 1694 2521 2640* 2681
4- Fertilizer Company - - 300 200 - 75 78616 6497
5- Foreign Trade Company - - - - - 75007 135007 -
Total 1037 1417 2083 2306 8998 40070 60422 52082
Note: 1- Inculdes 831 flilllon Rls* payments related to 1971 and 1972*
2- Includes 15 nilllon Rls* redisbursement of custom duties end 150 Million Rls* losses related to 1971 and 1972*
3- There has been a contribution of 5219 nilllon Rls* by the general budget (see No* 6)
4- Includes 17 nilllon Rls for the compensation of losses of purchase and sale of date in Prowlcss of Sistan and 
Bluchstan*
5- Paid by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources for adjustment in prices of chemical fertilizers*
6« Contribution by the general budget to Fertilizer Company (Distribution Section) for purposes of market adjustment*
7— Compensation for the loss in the value of purchase and sale of imported rice and vegetable oil*
Source: Budget Acts 1970-77*
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not mean that the small farmers have benefited from the high price 
paid by the sugar factories. There are two reasons which may explain why 
the income of those farmers who grow sugar beet may not have grown suffi 
ciently and the government policy may not have been successful to encourage 
the production of this crop. First, since a significant share of domestic 
sugar consumption is provided through imports, the price of sugar has largely 
been affected by changes in the international markets and with respect to 
price stability in the domestic market. This reduces the possibility of 
raising price for this crop and transferring the cost of prodution to con­
sumers. Secondly, the high price paid by sugar factories does not mean a 
high disposable income for the small farmers because the cost of collection 
accounts for a large percentage of the production cost. Since the small farmers 
have to hire the service for collection of the crop, this should be consi­
dered as the cost to the small farmers rather than their value added to the 
production. One rese¿rch on the cost of sugar beet in the Province of Fars 
shows that after the land reform, peasants have been reluctant to grow this 
crop due to its high cost of collection despite the relatively high price 
paid by the sugar factories4®. On the part of large-scale agricultural units, 
the collection is a part of their value-added and therefore the high price 
may encourage the production of this crop.
b)— There is a wheat pricing policy which attempts to stabilize price, with
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government prepared to buy and sell at pre—announced prices • The govern­
ment has tried to use its price policy as a floor in order to protect the 
farmers. However, in practice, either the prices announced by the govern­
ment have been lower than those of market prices, or the insufficient fund 
makes any significant intervention impossible. The insufficient fund not
only does not allow the Cereal Organization to purchase more than 10 per-
50
cent of the wheat which cannot affect the market prices , but more impor­
tantly, 80 centres of Cereal Organization are not able to cover the whole
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fragmented market of the country 1 . Also, the cost of transportation of 
wheat to the centres has to be born by farmers themselves# These factors 
add to the problem of low official prices and force the farmers to resort 
to their traditional middle—men. The farmer midlle-man relationship is also 
strengthened by the fact that middle—men are also one source of money supply 
in the rural areas who usually buy the farmers production in advance# There­
fore, it is not surprising to see that farmers sell their wheat at some 30
52percent lower than the nominal minimum price • Taking into account the fact
53that the official price has hardly changed within a year or between years , 
one may assume that over a period of time the floor—price may become a ceiling 
price above which the middle-men would be reluctant to pay, and government 
intervention practically will do more harm than good in the long-run# How­
ever, the government subsidies have rapidly risen from 655 Million Rls# in 
1970 to 14,069 Rls in 1976 (table 3-19). Taking the above factors into account 
and that the demand for wheat is price inelastic, it is the consumer that 
benefits from the subsidy rather than the farmers.
c)— Aiming at keeping prices of~food low, the government has determined the 
prices of meat, eggs and diary# The government price policy with regard to 
these products has been accopanied by continuous importation of these con­
sumer products# These products have also been subsidized through Budgetary 
allocation . For instance, the Meat Organization is charged with supplying 
meat to Tehran, in the case of shortages to other cities. The amount of the 
subsidy has risen from 238 Million Rls. in 1970 to 7431 Million Rials in 
1976 (table 3-19). Whether the farmers have benefited from the subsidies 
or not is .hard t^o „explain • However, there are two factors which 
should be considered in this respects First, to the extent that the demand 
for meat is price elastic, it is the farmer, domestic or foreign, who bene­
fits from the subsidy. The larger the share of imports, the higher the 
benefit to foreign producers which has been the case since 1973. Second,
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since the middle-men play an important role in matching the supply and demand 
for meat, it is reasonable to assume that the real beneficiary of the sub­
sidy is the merchant rather than the farmer in a fragmented market like Iran. 
Therefore, the subsidy may benefit neither the consumer nor the producer, 
but rising the profit of merchants involoved. Not only the government policy 
may have little effects on the growth of production in the domestic market, 
but also, the government liberal policy with regard to imports may have 
created disincentives with regard to animal breeding. Altogether, the total 
cost of the subsidy to carry out the government price policy with regard 
to agricultural products to the government ha9 risen along with the appear­
ance of inflationary pressure during the 1970’s from 1,417 Million Rls. in
1970 to S3,032 Million Rls. in 1976( table 3-19).
Although the government has left the price of other products to be 
determined in the market, its generous and liberal import policy with regard 
to consumer goods and particularly food products should be interpreted as
zero protection for the agricultural produce.
The above structure of price control shows that the government has 
not been able to influence the farmers income. Its intervention, in the main, 
has been in favour of consumers rather than producers. In this respect, the 
oil revenue has opened the opportunity to the government to pursue a price 
policy which has ensured low consumer prices, despite the growth of food 
consumption far above the domestic production. If the economy had been con­
fronted with a serious foreign exchage constaint, like other developing 
countries, it could have influenced the agricultural prices and created the 
necessary incentives for the agricultural producers. The oil revenue has 
allowed the government to increase the food imports during 1966—70 at a rate 
of 1.7 percent and during 1970-76 at a rate of 52 percent which is more than 
900 percent higher than that of domestic production(table 3-20). In pursuing 
a price policy as pictured • above, one has to also consider the importance
Imports Of Food Stuffa During 1966-76
1
Table (3-20)________  _________________ _______Million Dollars
Item 1966 1970 Item 1970 1973 1976 SnRstir-
1970-76
Live Animals 4 10.7 30.0
Foods 4 Live Animals 68 327 1182 60.9 %
Animal Products Dairy Products 4 Eggs (1 0 ) (32) (118)
Tea 1 1 . 1 9.3 pauses 4 their Products (6 ) -(113) (327)
Sugar 4 Sweets 17.3 7.2
Sugar, Its Derivatives 
4 Honey (7) (76) (243)
Wheat 4 Wheat Flour 17.0 2.3 Tea, Coffee, Chocolates 
4 Other Similar Products (13) (19) (43)
Fats, Fluid Oil 4 
Other Derivatives
29.1 42.4 Fruit 4 Vegetables (3) (2 1 ) (152)
Others (29) (66) (299)
Beverage 4 Tobacco 1 5 77 106.0 %
Vegetable Animal Oils 42 59 137 22.0 %
Total 85.2 291.2 Total 1 1 1 . 0 391.0 1396.0 52.0 %
Note: 1- Up to 1970, Foreign Trade Statistics do not show the international classification for food stuffs.
In order to make such comparison possible, two different classifications have been used for the 1966-70 
and 1970-76 periods. The first period consists of major items of food imports which approximately 
accounts for 82 percent of food imports as shown in the second period.
2- Annual growth rate for 1966-70 is 1.7 per cent.
Source: SMI, Annual Reports, 1970-76
->j
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of political factors. It may ba true that the Iranian bureaucracy is very 
inefficient for which the intervention in an imperfect and fragmented market 
is a highly sophisticated duty, but, mainly the government has not been con­
cerned with the raising of farmers income and it should not be considered as 
an aim in the government price policy. In fact, the government intervention 
in the market mechanism arises from its intention to attract the support of 
urban areas and particularly the petty bourgeois fraction of the society. This 
is the political nature of the Iranian state which determine the aim of its 
economic policy. Since the peasantry has not politically been able to influence 
the state structure, his economic interests have been overshadowed by that of 
urban petty bougeoisie on which the state has relied on.
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Conclusion
With regard to the effects of the government spending in the agricul­
ture sector one can say that this sector usuallly suffers from the relative 
low productivity* But, in case of Iran, the growth rate of agricultural pro­
ducts has been low not only relative to those of other sectors but also 
relative to the population growth rate* This has been largely due to the 
distribution of land into under economic units and the lack of capital for­
mation*
To overcome the problem of financing and wall farming, the govern­
ment has triad to bring them under different organization* But it has followed 
a broad policy rather than a specific one through a development plan* This 
policy with the aim of higher output resulted in the concentration of the 
government funds in highly mechanized agricultural unita including agro-busi­
ness, farm corporation and the private large - seals unita. They have been 
in the position not only for using the large government credit but also to 
utilize the direct government investment in the agricultural development 
and the irrigation*
Thl. policy has left out the majority which is responsible for about 
85 percent of the total agricultural output with unsufficient funds. This 
majority still have to resort to the traditional source of finance and there­
by lose a large part of their economic productivity on interest payments.
The lack of capital formation, the baek-wardneee of their method of cultiva­
tion and under—economic size of farming of this majority have reduced the 
posaiblity of raising productivity in the agricultural seetor* And the 
government*s policy not only has not Improved their condition, .but with the 
concentration on the large scale units has deteriorated the competitive 
position of small farmers*
Overall, the agricultural sector has not received the deserving atten-
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tionj however, the large-scale agricultural units enjoyed the large share 
of the government assistance* Since these large units produce only a small 
portion of the total agricultural output, even if they had a good perfor­
mance, its effect on the total output would be insignificant* In this case, 
the government credit policy resulted in the change in factor propotion used 
end thereby a change in the employment situation and the distribution of 
income*
Uith regard to price and import policies, the effects have shown a 
complete failure in supporting the farmers but some success for consumer 
protection* Despite the announced objectives of the government policy, the 
intervention of the government in the price mechanism has been determined 
by the political nature of the state and has been eased by the availability 
of oil revenue* The government policy with regard to price control has 
aggravated the lack of incentive and the capital formation in the agricultural 
sector, whose performance has been poor by any criteria*
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Appendix A
Cost of Compensation of Landlord^
The cost of implementation of the land reform for the government is 
not clearly understood. The 1961 law granted the Ministry of Agriculture the 
right of aquisition of land from landlords by making payments in cash and 
instalments at the level worked out by the formula (a coefficient was deter­
mined accoring to the tax payments). The Agricultural Bank on behalf of the 
Ministry of Agriculture granted a 6 perecent on the order-payments which was 
due to pay in ten yearly instalments (in the second phase the yearly instal­
ment was extended to 15 years)^.
In the first phase of the land reform, it wa3 obvious that first the 
government had to pay the landlords the value of land and it could claim en 
equal amount from the peasants who received the land in fifteen yearly instal­
ments. Thus, theoretically, the only burden on the government was the pay­
ments of interest to the landlords. However, in practice, since there was a 
lag between outlay and income due to the different yearly instalments, the 
government had to bridge the gap. Moreover, the Agricultural Bank prefered 
to increase the cash payments when the interest rate on loan was low. Table 
(3-21) that the average cash payments was about 25.8 percent of the total 
purchased land values.
By 1977, the value of land purchased by the government under the first 
phase of the land reform legislation reached an amount of 13375 Million Rls., 
out of which 3456 Million Rls. was paid in cash. However, the figure for after 
1970, due to the correction made by the Ministry of Co-operative and Rural 
Affairs, is rather confusing and it is not possible to work out the exact 
amount payable. But, one thing is certain that the burden would be equal 
to the value of purchsed land plus the interest paid on the order payments 
when whole commitment was fulfilled. A rough estimate can be made which
Purchase Cost, Interest Repayments By 1977 
In the First Phase of .Lend Reform
Table (3-21) __________________________________________________________________ Million RialsI Cost Of „ Cash Payment Payment Interest Instalments Instalment
Year Properties As The First Orders Fallen Payment On Are To Be Paid Actually Paid
Instalment Due Payment Orders By Recipients
1 1 2 2 3
1962 3339 338 222 .6 18
1963 1716 223 333.33 19.99 337.0 78
1964 1178 426 439.99 46.39 415.5 89
1965 1795 1305 492.36 76.00 535.2 1 2 1
1966 1000 547 528.68 107.72 601.2 182
1967 231 73 561.03 141.39 617.3 —
1968 317 64 572.31 175.74 638.4 —
1969 292 60 590.38 2 1 1 . 1 1 657.8 —
1970 - 86 79 606.95 247.54 652.1 —
1971 - 158 - 1 1 606.95 283.95 641.6 —
1972 630 - 116 273.62 120.39 683.6 —
1973 96 139 273.62 136.81 690.0 —
1974 82 - 8 273.62 153.22 695.5 —
1975
1976 2943
336 273.62273.62
169.63
186.06 891.7
—
1977 - - 273.62 202.46 - -
Total 13375
4
3456 6830.03 2623.33 8280.2 488
' Notes; 1- The («») indicates the correction made by Ministry of Co-operatives and Rural Affairs.
2- The instalments are related to lands purchased ' ’ by 1970. The interest payments are related to the
lands purchased by. 1970.
3- The total indicates the instalment to be paid by 1970. The accumulated repayment by 1972, was equal to
5341.4 Rials.
4- On average, the cash payment account for 25.8 percent of total value of land .
Source : Bit I, Annual Reports , 1970 and 1971 ; Plan Organization, Statistical Year Book/ Denman, D.R., 
The King’s Vista, Table 17, P. 184.
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shows that the government has paid about 13,834 Million Rls. by the begi- 
ning of 1977 (table 3-21).
The up to date figure for the amount received by the government is not
available. However, according to Denman, the total repayment received by 1972
55wa9 around 500 Million Rls. while the government outflows was 6698 Million 
Rls. If the peasants who received lands had paid their commitment on due 
time they would have paid about 5341.1 Million Rls.(table 3-21). The gap 
between theory and practice is about 91 percent. It seems this has to be 
accepted as the national burden of the land reform^.
The government burden for the second and third phase* was not as serious 
ae the first phase since its commitment was limited to one third of the pur­
chase price of lands divided under these phases. An estimate shows that the 
debt for the second and third phase is about 19224 Million Rls. of which a
*57
substantial burden is carried by the government' .
The above shows only the financial effects of the reform and the cost 
of legitimate allienation of land from landlords to peasants. But its econo­
mic effects depend upon how it has affected the money supply and how it has 
been absorbed in the economy. As far as the former is concerned, since the 
land reform bonds were discountable, it had some effects on the money supply. 
But its final effect depends on the extent to which control of money supply 
matters to the government. If it does matter, then the only way the govern­
ment could find such a sum without printing money would be to do what it had
c;g -
habitually done when it needed money it did not have: divert the oil revenue. 
In either case the compensation of the landlords was made against the large 
existed possibilities for investment in the economy. At any rate, this compen­
sation could not be regarded economically useful unless it was invested in 
productive sectors.
Our knowledge about the absorption of the compensation monay is little. 
However, according to Denman about 5.5 percent of value of the land purchased
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was invested in the government-owned factories; and another 4,4 percent was
59
traded with the government to pay off taxes , Probably a high portion of 
the compensation money has been transferred to financing urban residential
development and family commercial enterprises; and a considerable proportion
60
has left the country for investment abroad .
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Appendix B
Estimation of Minmum Required Land and Credit
To estimate the minimum required credit, we can calculate the cost
of an unirrigated land under wheat cultivation as follows, assuming the
minimum cost is the minimum required credit. Data on the cost of hired
61
tractor and combine has been taken from A.H.Hekimi and Nehrir for the 
Province of Fars in 1968 which has been inflated according to the agricul­
tural inflatory index for 1972.
Cost of Production Per Hectare in Province of Fars
1968 1972
Cost of Ploughing 400 510
Cost of Disking 200 255
Cost of Harvesting 12 tO 15 percent of 
value of harvesed
533.2 (unirriga- 
ted land)
crop
The figure for output and cost of seed has been taken from Plan 
62
Organization for Province of Fars in 1972.
Cost of Seed and Per Hectare Output 
For Irrigated and unirrgated 
Land
Area Under Input Output Per Hectare Value at
Land Cultivation (Seed) (,000) Output Harvest
(,000) Hectares (000) Tons Tons (Kg) Price (ten 
Million Rls)
Irrigated 162 209 252 1549 . 148
Bnirrigated 150 100 99 664 53
From the above table ws would have the following costs for one hec­
tare unirrigated land:
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Cost of Seed 357.0 Rials 
Value of Production 3554.4 Rial9 
Cost of Harvest 533.2 Rials
Therefore,
Total Cost - 510 + 255 + 533.2 + 357.0 - 1655.2 Rials
Assuming the farmer receive his income in the form of profit, thus, 
ue would have:
Net Profit 
Per Hectare
Or
Net Profit 
Per Hectare
Value of Production 
Per Hectare
3554.4
Cost of Production 
Per Hectare
1655.2 1899.2 Rls.
If farming is his main job, the farmer will try to maximize his income by 
chosing the crop or any other work with lowest cost (assuming his credit 
worthiness is very poor) and the highest income. Thus, the maximum possible 
earnings would be two harvests.a year, assuming wheat product is his main 
cultivation then we would have:
Net Profit Per 
Hectare Per Year
Net Profit 
Per Hectare
Number of 
HarvestX n o i c b
» 1899.2 X 2 ■ 3798.4 Rls,
With the minimum consumption less than 2000 Rls. per month, on average 
1505.6 Rls., the farmer would spend 18067.7 Rls. yearly. Thus, the minimum
required land to cover its consumption would be:
Minimum Land
Consumption
18067.7/3798.4 • 4.8 Hectares
Net Profit Per Hec­
tare Per Year
In the absence of the data on the cost of irrigation, we assume the 
difference in the productivity of land (irrigated and unirrigated) can be 
attributed to higher capital in use for irrigation. Thus, the land produc­
tivity ratio would give us the output coefficient of irrigation that is 
Pl/Pu - Output Coefficient of Irrigation while Pj^  is the productivity per 
hectare for irrigated land and Py i9 that of unirrigated land. Here, we ha
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Pi/Pu ■ 1549/664 ■ 2.33. Although we could assume the marginal cost of
production is equal to the average cost of production, it is accurate to 
use the above coefficient only.as the output coefficient of irrigation, 
since the coefficient for non-irrigation capital can be worked out from 
the rate of return of unirrigated land.
To calculate the output coefficient of non-rirrigation capital (m1), 
we would have the value of output per hectare(Uu)is equal to the cost of 
cultivation of unirrigated land (Cu) multiply (m1) :
V - m' C u u Or m' - V /C Or m' ■ 3554.4/1655.2 “ 2.15u' u
Having the value of output for one hectare of irrigated land, the 
mathematics for the minimum land required would go as follow:
V, - m C. + m' C 
i i u
While is the value of output per hectare 
for irrigated land
m is the output coefficient of Irriga­
tion
is the cost of irrigation
Thus, 9097.3 - 2.15 x 2496.9 + 2.33 ^  Or 
Total cost » 1600.4 + 2496.9 - 4197.3 Rls.
CA - 1600.4 Rls.
Net Profit
9097.3 - 4197.3 - 4900.0 Rls.Per Hectare
with the given consumption, the minimum land would be 18067.7/4900 ■ 1.85 hec­
tare. Assuming the farmer has ho means of production (except land and labour) 
and savings, the minimum required credit (K) would be equal to the cost of 
production.
K ■ (Cost of Production x Minimum Land) Number of Harvest 
Per Hectare
Ku - (1655.2 x 4.8) 2 - 15889.5 Rls. While Ky is credit for unirrigated
land
■ ( 4197.3 x 1.85 ) 2 - 15530 Rls. While is credit for irrigated
land
Table (3-10) has been calculated as above for different groups of consumption.
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rate of inflation in the agricultural sector. Thus, the figures for farm 
corporation and agri-business in 1973 are 349 Million Rls. and 181 Million
Source Of Credit To Villaqe Families1
Table (3-22)
1968
Rials
Average Loan Obtained 
By Each Family 
(Rials)
Percentage From
Regions Co-operatives Agricultural
Banks
Other
Banks
Land Ouners Money
Lenders
Qasr-e-Shirin 15076 43 13 0.5 - 43.5
Sanandaj 12739 39 18 - 0.6 42.4
Golpayegan 23156 19 29 9.0 0.4 42.6
Garraasar 15474 37 3 1.5 - 58.5
Sari 19580 31 6 11.0 0.9 51.1
Hamadan 13238 45 4 7.0 0.1 43.9
Blrjand 7350 41 20 - 0.4 38.6
Notes 1- Money- 
Source : Denraass,
Lenders operate at rate 18 
D.R.. The King's Vista, P
to 30 percent.
• 201, Table 20.
Co-operatives operates at rats 6 percent.
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Annual Crops By.Size and Type in.. 1971
Table (3-23) (1000) Hactares
Less Jhan 
1 Hectare 1 to 2 2 to 5 5 to 10 - 10 to 50 50 to 100 100 and over Total
Irrigated (l) 12 20 48 56 92 14 50 294
Un-irrigated
(2)
3 11 62 128 288 22 36 551
Total 15 31 110 184 380 36 86 835
Ratio (1)/(2) 4 1.8 0.77 0.44 0.32 0.64 1.4 0.53
Source: Plan Organization, Agricultural Census, 1971, p.3.
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Chapter Four
4 Development of Industrial and Mining 
Sector in Iran
Introduction
Since 1959 the industrial sector has been the most dynamic sector 
of the economy; its share in the GDP increased from 19 percent to 3o,8 
percent in 1976 at constant prices (figureI1-1)• Also, a large share of 
the labour force has been absorbed by this sector* As mentioned earlier 
(tablejl— 5 ), the share of the Industrial sector in the total employed 
labour force has risen from 20*1 percent ió 1956 to 26*3 percent in 1976* 
However, there exists no comformity between the pattern of output and 
employment with regard to their share in the total output and employment* 
This non—comformity has created a change in the relative sectoral produc­
tivity of this sector in the sense that the productivity in this sector 
shows a higher rate of growth than that of the national average* This has 
been the consequence of the higher capital formation and the better utili­
zation of the exiting capacity* At the same time, this pattern indicates 
the structural change which the industrial sector ha9 undergone during the 
1959-76 period.
However, not all compnents of this sector contribute at the same 
rate to the growth of the Industry and Mining sector* The available data 
for 1972—76 shows that the share of the Minig sut>»sector in the total 
value added of this sector has never been more than 3*2 percent (table 4—1), 
This indicates that the industrial sub-sector has been responsible for the 
major contribution to the development of the Industry and Minig Sector. 
Therefore, it is the structure and the pattern of development of this sub­
sector which determined the performance of the Industry and Mining Sector*
The industrial sub-sector consists of manufacturing, construction
Distribution Of Value Added in Industry and Mining 
For Selected Years
Table(4-1) At Constant Prices Percentage
1959 1964 1968 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976
Manufacturing
and
Mining
68.2 68.3 69.1 69.9 72.1
(2.1)
70.6
(1.9)
68.6
(2.2)
64.0
(3.2)
Construction 29.4 24.8 21.8 18.9 16.0 17.7 20.2 23.2
Water & Electricity 2.4 6.9 9.1 11.2 11.9 11.7 11.2 • 11.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Share (1) in GDP 13.0 15.6 18.3 18.3 19.7 20.0 19.7 19.9
Source: 8MI, Annual Report, 1956-76 and National Income Of Iran, 1959-71
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and public utilities (water and electrcity). Around 88.2 percent of value ^ 
added in this sub-sector belongs to manufacturing and construction, and the 
public utilities account for 11.8 percent of the total in 1976. Considering 
the pattern of growth, the public utilities show an increasing contribution 
to the total growth of this sector} it registered an increase from 2.4 per­
cent in 1959 to 11.8 percent in 1976 (table 4-1). Although the growth rate 
of public utilities has been faster than other components, its contribution 
to the total growth rate of the industrial sector has been low due to its 
low share in the total value added. Here, we will examine the performance 
of each component ( public utilities, construction and manufacturing) of 
the industrial sub-sector, their relative importance, and the structural 
changes that have been brought about under the influence of the government's 
direct investment and credit policy.
4-1 Public Utilities
In this section we will analyse the financial performance of the 
nationalised water and electricity companies. The main question to be answered 
is whether the choice of channel of financing has been an appropriate one. 
Whether public money has been used or the self-financing channel«and how may 
these choices affect the distribution of welfare with regard to the govern­
ment expenditure?
in oreder to evaluate government policy with regard to the development 
of public utilities, one has to distinguish between government spending for 
the public good and spending which does not fall in that category. In the 
capitalist system, a private market economy is the "natural" condition of 
society and it is assumed that it will lead to maximization of value produced. 
However, there are some goods which are desired but will not be produced 
insufficient numbers by the private sector due to the technical difficulties 
and the social characteristics of demand. These would call for collective
193
production by tha state. Such a public good is defined as "...collective 
consumption goods (xa+<j>»»»»xn+jj) which all enjoy in common in the sense 
that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no substrac— 
tion from any other individual's consumption of that good* so that 
Xn+J ■ *n+j sinwltanousely for each and every ith individual and each co­
llective consumptive good."^ This "public good" bears three qualifications: 
externalities, indivisibilities and collectiveness. By which we mean} a) 
when one person is supplied with certain services, other people automati­
cally receive services; b) a service cannot be consumed "privatelyJ or a
factor of production used "privately'' in the diseconomy case; and c) it has
2
to be consumed "collectively".
There may be a few examples which fit the above mentioned qualifies-* 1 
tions such as defence and light houses ( so called polar cases). Even in 
these cases the conditions can be met only when the supply is sufficient 
to meet the demand at any time if the consumption of a product by consumer 
A is not to disturb consumer B. The limitation of supply or the "degree of 
coverage" may be an important factor when we deal with a "public good". 
However, most of the services normally provided by the state do not fit the 
qualifications of the "public good". Education and health are some examples. 
The provision of such services by the state is not a consequence of exter­
nalities or indivisibility as such. For example, education is a private
3
consumption good which can be parcelled out among different individuals •
In this case, the reason for the provision of such services by the govern­
ment sould sought in the social charactreistics of the demand for the ser­
vices. In general, it is the reflection of the political power of social 
classes and it is the outcome of a compromise between conflicting social
4
groups . Therefore, the necessity of the normally provided public services 
is not merely a consequence of the economic characteristic of such goods 
but it is also thB reflection of socio-political conflicts.
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While the provision of some public services is not fully subjet 
to the economic criteria, it raises a problem uith regard to the equal 
distribution of welfare stemming from government expenditure and the choice 
of financing channels. Wherever the indivisibility and externality exist, 
the decentralised pricing system for those public services may be techni­
cally difficult and a collective system of financing or generally taxation 
become appropriate. However, since not all services provided by the govern­
ment bear the qualification of public good, there is no reason why the 
government services should be totally financed through taxation. The degree 
that taxation can be used as a source of financing is largely dependent on 
the characteristics of the service whether it provided a fair distribution 
of welfare of the government expenditure or not. The larger the possibility 
of divisibility and the lower the "degree of coverage", the less appropraite 
will be the use of taxation as a source ot financing such a service. The 
public services ranges from Samualson's polar case (like defence) to public 
utilities (gas, electricity and water). Public utilities may have the least 
qualifications of the "public good". The consumers' demands are different 
in magnitude depending on the income group they belong to (for gas and elec­
tricity in particular). These goods can be parcelled out and the possibility 
of divisibility 1 3 large. These characteristics of demand for public utili­
ties may put them at the bottom of the list to be financed through taxation. 
Assuming the taxation system reflects the equal burden of taxation for 
each tax payer, the financing of public utilities through taxation discri­
minates against the lower income groups whose demand are lower. This die- 
crimantion will be accentuated in developing countires where the public ser­
vices have no nation-wide coverage. These reasons may suggest that the 
financing of public utlities should be based on the cost-price relationship 
rather than the using of tax payers money, although the structure of pro­
duction may validate these services being supplied by government monopoly
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rather than private sector»
The public utilities are mainly natural monopolies» that is» as 
physical distribution involves a link between suppliers and consumers» 
cometition is rarely possible and even cause waste of capital^» In this 
respect» the economic of scale may appear as an important factor in deter­
mining the right of monopoly» Moreover» all these services are essential 
to household welfare and enterprise needs. These characteristics of public 
utilities show the substantial social costs and benefits carried by these 
services which may suggest the direct intervention of the government in 
providing such services»
The social necessity of such production and its economic characteris­
tics were the main reason for the nationalization of electricity companies 
and the restriction imposed on the installation of private power generators 
in 1965 in Iran. Before then, the electricity in cities was provided by the 
municipalities and private power generator neither of which were able to 
produce sufficient electricity, and the lack of coordination among them 
made the efficient and full utilization of their capacity impossible. For 
instance, in Tehran around 36 power generators were in use in 1965^, Simi­
larly, the government has intervened in the exploitation of water resources 
social
in whichv'costs and benefits divert from those of the private sector, and 
the investment involved is too high to be handled by the private sector»
The government's investment in mdlti—purpose dams started suring the Second 
Plan and has continued throughout the Third, Fourth and Fifth Development 
Plans in order to raise the rate of exploitation of surface water resevoirs.
However, although both water and electricity are controlled by the 
government, the financial performance of these companies is some what 
different due to the structure of the markets» Here, we will examine the 
financail channels which have been used by these companies and their merits»
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Nationalised Water Companies
The plan disbursements for mater and irrigation in relative terms 
has declined from 23 percent of the total disbursement of the Second Plan 
to 5,6 percent of the Fifth Plan. This can largely be interpreted as the 
decreasing importance of the water sector relative to other sectors and 
particularly the manufacturing sector during 1963-78 period. Despite the 
decline in relative terms the large financial ability of the government 
during the Fourth.-and the Fifth Development Plans has allowed the govern­
ment to increase its financial allocation to the water sector in absolute 
terms i',e. a rise from 17,3 Billion Rls, during the Second Plan to 160 
Billion Rls, in the Fifth Plan (table 4-2).
Here, what we are going to question is not the government achieve­
ment in the exploitation of water resources, but mainly whether or not the 
financing channel which has been used is an appropriate one. To what extent 
water companies have used self-financing as their source of finance. Should 
public money be used for financing water companies?
In order to answer the above questions, first we look at the aggre­
gate financial performance of 10 regional water companies. As table (4-3) 
shows, the water companies have been running at an increasing loss during
1969-76 period. The loss consists of depreciation of capital and the net 
loss in their current accounts. These losses have been financed through the 
budgetary contributions which indicate the annual subsidies to the consumers. 
Also, the annual investment has been largely financed through the budgetary 
allocation which on average accounts for 06.5 percent of the annual invest­
ment. The above financial performance shows that not only have the water 
companies largely relied on the public money for their investment, they have 
also been entitled to receive an annual subsidy on their ordinary operations. 
This situation indicates that the water companies have supplied their pro­
ducts at a price lower than their average cost of production and far below
Disbursements Of Plan Organization For the Industry 
And Wining Sector During Various Development Plans
Table (4-2) Billion Rials
Second Plan Third Plan Fourth Plan Fifth Plan
Wanufacturing 8.7 16.5 111.2 352.0
(11.6) (8.1) (21.9) (12.4)
Wines 0.1 0.6 1.9 62.0
(0.1) (0.3) (0.4) (2.2)
Construction, Housing 4 
Urban Development
2
4.5 19.4 49.9 595.0
(6.0) (9.5) (9.8) (20.9)
Water 17.3 28.1 42.0 160.0
(23.0) (13.7) (8.3) (5.6)
Electricity 3.5 15.7 37.7 240.0
(4.3) (7.6) (7.4) (8.4)
Total Wanufacturing 4 
Wines 34.2 80.3
242.7 1409.0
(45.5) % (39.2) % (47.9) % (49.5
Total Plan 
Disbursements 75.2 204.6 506.8
2847.0
Note: 1- ( ) show percentage sharp'in total plans.1' disbursements.
2- Since a. similar classification to those of other plans is not available for the Second Plan, the 
figure indicates the urban development. The detail of the Second Plan shows that Housing and some 
government building are also included in the above itemr.
Source : Plan Organization, Final Report on the Second Development Planj The third Development Plan and the 
Fifth Development Plan; BWI, Annuel Report 1965, 1971 and 1976.
Losses , Expenditure And Financing Of Water Companies
Table (4-3) Million Rials
Year Losses
Financing Losses Total
Expenditure
Capital
Expenditure
Budget
ContributionBudgetContribution
Utilization 
Of Reserve And 
Provision
1969 166.5 86.1 80.4 9863.4 9538.7 5730.8
1970 204.1 126.5 77.6 12020.7 11525.4 9483.6
1971 256.0 123.2 132.8 11231.8 10647.0 9206.1
1972 482.6 88.3 394.3 14790.7 13890.7 11638.1
1973 1030.1 228.1 802.0 15118.1 14560.8 13913.5
1974 1801.9 458.4 1343.5 26665.4 26120.9 24136.8
1975 2431.7 392.5 2039.2 27591.4 27048.4 23873.5
1976 2744.7 741.5 2003.2 41980.4 41195.3 35725.2
Total 9117.6 2244.6 6873.0 159281.9 154527.2 133707.6
(86.5) 1
Note : 1- Percentage share in the capital expenditure.
Source î Budget Acts, 1970 - 76.
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the marginal cost.
Relying on public money or the tax payer money may be questioned 
on the grounds of equal distribution of welfare stemming from the govern­
ment expenditure in the case of water companies in Iran* Taking into 
account that the government service with regard to water distribution does 
not cover the whole of the country, one may argue that those who are not 
receiving such a service may ba at a disadvantage relative to those who 
benefit from the government's investment in water* As table (4-4) shows 
only 33 percent of water needed for cities, industries and agriculture was 
provided by the nationalised companies at the end of the Fourth Plan* It is 
estimated that by the end of the Fifth Plan at least 40 percent of water 
needed will be provided by the nationalised water companies* Not only does 
the water supply not cover the whole of country, more importantly, its dis­
tribution may further limit the beneficiaries of the government's invest­
ment* Although by the end of the Fifth Plan, all people in the cities and 
industry will be served by the nationalised water companies, the importance 
of these two groups in the total water needs is very insignificant* These 
groups account for only 7.8 percent of the water supplied by the public 
sector and 92*2 percent is to serve the agricultural sector* The agricul- . 
tural sector accounts for 97*6 percent of total needed water in the country, 
of which only 38 percent is provided by the public sector* As has been' 
explained in chapter (3), only a few large agricultural iinits have benefited 
from the water supplied by the public sector* The above shows that govern­
ment investment and subsidy have benefited a very small part of the popu­
lation«
Still one may argue that there should be an indirect effect of govern­
ment invetment and subsidy in the water sector to the whole of the country. 
The above government assistance may reduce the cost of production to agri­
cultural companies and lower the prices of necessary products. Considering
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Demand And Supply Of Water By Major Sectors
Table (4-4) Million Cube Meter
Sectors End of Fourth Plan End of Fifth Plan
Water Supplied By 
Public Sector 11558 ... 
(33.3)1
16015
(40.3)1
a- Cities & 
Industry
3b- Agricultural 
Sector
768 .. 
(6.6)2 
10790 - 
(93.4)2
1255
(7.8)2 
14760: • 
(92.2)2
Water Used By Cities 
and Industry 690 - ' 
(2.0)1
958 . 
(2.4)1
Water Needed For 
Irrigated Crops 34000 - 
(98.0)1
38800 . 
(97.6)1
Total Needed Water 34690 39758
Note : 1- ( ) indicate the Share in total needed water
2— ( ) indicate the share in water supplied by the public sector.
3- The share of public-supply of water in the total water 
needed for agricultural purposes is 31 percent at the end 
of Fourth Plan and 38 percent at the end of Fifth Plan*
Source : Plan and Budget Organization, Statistical Year Book, 1976,
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the very small share of large agricultural units in the total agricultural 
output, they are not able to affect the level of prices. This may only 
rdduce the cost of production and raise the profit of the agricultural 
companies. Therefore, the government subsidy would not be passed on to - 
the consumers of the agricultural products throughout the country.
While the above indicates that public money has benefited a feu pro­
fit earners in the agricultural sector, it should be considered whether 
the government could have chosen any other channel of financing. Since 
the source of finance of investment affects the distribution of welfare,in 
financing an approved project , either tax payers must find the funds or 
consumers must pay through higher prices. As have been argued, since the 
effects of the above investment tiave been in favour of a small minority, 
thB second channel of financing would have been appropriate with regard to 
the distribution of welfare of government investment. In this respect, the 
government could have chosen the right rate of return of capital and have 
transfeired the cost of the operation to the consumer through higher prices.
However, there may ba number of problems in the choicd of the rate 
of return of capital( this is not our concern. ) and the possibility of trans­
ferring the coat of production to the consumers. In the latter case, some 
factors in particular should be considered including the degree of competi­
tion and the alternative investment open to consumers. If there exists an 
active private sector, it can reduce the possibility of transferring the 
cost of production to the consumers; and the higher cost of production 
relative to that of the private sector may reflect the lower productivity 
in the public sector due to mismanagement. However, although not more than 
40 percent of water needed is provided by the public sector, the national­
ised water companies enjoy a fair degree of monopoly:
a) Water is an constraining factor in the Iranian economy. This scarcity
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would provida enough flexibility for the price to be determined with rela­
tion to the cost of production.
b) Surface water has been nationalised and the utilisation of such resources 
needs the government permission.
c) The high capital involved in the exploitation of surface water may limit 
such investment to the government.
d) Consumers may not have any choice where water is in short supply. Parti­
cularly) where the use of the product requires investment by the consumers) 
active choice is infrequent .
Although one may argue that under the above conditions it should be 
possible to pass on the cost of production to the consumers) there are other 
factors at work which may reduce the degree of monopoly of suppliers. Due 
to government policy with regard to restructuring of the agricultural sector) 
the nationalized water companies are9 to some extent) confronted with an 
oligopoly of consumers (large agricultural iiints) which may have been able 
to influence the price of water. The government fears that the rising of 
cost of water to the large agricultural units may reduce the incentive to 
invest to those companies snd affects the investment in the agricultural 
sector (see chapter 3 for the evaluation of the policy). This situation is 
also accentuated by the government's fear with regard to the control of 
prices of food stuffs, for instance) the government refused to accept the 
increase in prices of.agricultural products suggested by the Agri-businesses 
during 1973-76 . This reduces the possibility of exerting higher prices by 
the water companies. However) the government's fears in this respect may be 
groundless since the share of these companies in total agricultural products 
is very insignificant and they may not be able to influence the price level.
Another problem uhich nationalised water companies are confronted 
with is the non-existence of the developed capital market able to supply
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the necessary long-term loans. This also limits the tax-money as the major 
source of financing large projects. But; still, if the water companies had 
considered the marginal cost of production as the basis for pricing, the 
companies could have contributed to government revenue in the long run 
which could have compensated the losses in the early years. Therefore, 
using the tax-payers money cannot be justified on this ground in the long 
run.
The above structure of the market shows that to some extent the na­
tionalised industries have been affected by the government's agricultural 
policy and price controls. However, the price of water being lower than it 
should be (the cost of production) encourages wasteful use of the service 
in the more optional, luxury uses; and equipment will be badly designed. 
Particularly, in a country where water is a scarce resource, charging con­
sumers according to the marginal cost of production will help to maximize 
the utilization of water resources.
Having chosen financing through the tax revenue, the government has 
undermined the optimal utilization of scarce resources. However, whatever 
the reasons for and against financing public utilities through taxation 
are, the choice of channel of financing has been affected by the source of 
government revenue. Since a large share of government revenue is provided 
through oil money, it has given the state a degree of independence and tax­
payers opinion about the expenditure may have been less reflected in the 
choice of finance. However, the total reliance on public money reduces the 
financing of those services which are highly socially desirable and eco­
nomically bear the qualification of the "public good". Taking into account 
that the decentralised price system could have been efficiently used in 
the case of water, more reliance on self-financing may have been more appro­
priate.
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Nationalised Electricity Companies
In the case of electricity the situation is different both with 
regard to the degree of reliance on public money and the rate of return 
of capital« The aggregate financial performance of power companies is 
better than that of the water companies. They have produced profits which 
on average shows a return of 8 percent to capitàl invested during 1969—76 
(table 4—5). Since the period covering the profit may not conform with the 
investment period* it is more appropriate to calculate ths rate of return 
of capital with a lag of two or three years. Taking into account ths lag 
involved* the rate of return of capital moves up to 14.5 or 15 percent. 
Assuming the cost of capital to the government is equal to the interest 
paid on government bonds ( around 9 to 10 percent)* the price of electri­
city has been determined above the average cost of production. Nevertheless* 
this rate has been lower than;that prevailing in the manufacturing sector 
( between 20 to 30 percent).
Despite the successful operation of electricity companies* due to ' 
the lack of efficient capital market the large projects which have been 
launched since 1973 has rapidly raised the need for contributions from the 
budget. The share of budgetary contribution in capital expenditure has risen 
from 42.8 percent during 1969-72 period to 57.2 percent during 1973-76 
(table 4-2).
The above financial performance shows that the electricity companies 
have been able to operate profitably and have transferred the cost of pro­
duction to consumers. Therefore, contrary to the water companies* the con­
sumers have paid for: the service supplied by the public sector. Although 
in the short run public money has been used to finance the projects in eleo- 
tricity, the electricity companies would be able to contribute to govern­
ment revenue. It seems the main reason for using public money has been the
Table (4-5)
Profit , Expenditure and Financinq of Power Companies
Million Rials
Year Profit
Total
Expenditure
Capital
Expenditure
Budget
Contribution
Foreign
Loans
1969 1894.7 7469.6 7258.6 2696.7
1970 2445.8 10793.9 10556.2 3074.0 - ■
1971 2056.7 16754.7 16407.7 7386.0 1530.0
1972 2478.8 12915.5 10084.0 5819.2
(42.8) 1
1071.0
1973 3103.4 39417.8 36936.3 25363.1 1626.1
1974 2591.2 23771.4 15632.6 10645.4 4717.1
1975 1850.0 42447.0 34251.1 22781.0 9211.8
1976 2157.4 83907.6 80243.0 36824.0' _ 
(57.2) 2
32692.0
Total 18578.0 237477.5 211369.5 . 114589.4
(54.2;
50848.0 , 
(24.1) 3
Notes : 1— ( ) show the share of budget contribution to capital expenditure during 1969 - 72.
2- ( ) show the share of budget contribution to capital expenditure during 1973 - 76.
3- ( ) show the share of budget contribution and foreign loans relative to capital expenditure for 1973- 76.
Source: Budget Acts, 1970 — 77.
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non-existence of an efficient capital market* The electricity companies 
have also resorted to the international capital market; as table (4-5) 
shows, foreign loans account for 24*1 percent of the capital expenditure*
4— 2 Construction
As table (4-1) shows the share of construction in the total indus­
trial value added declined from 29*4 percent in 1959 to 16 percent in 1973 
when the rise in oil revenue allowed the rapid expansion of the construction 
sector; its share moved up to 23*2 percent by 1976* However, while in the 
early years the private sector wa3 the main one responsible for the growth 
of value added in this sub-sector, in the later years tha expansion of pub­
lic construction has been the main factor for the rising share of construe-t
tion sector*
Generally, the value added in this sub-sector is strongly affected 
by the pattern of investment with regard to allocation of investment into 
construction and machinery as well as the relative productivity of labour*
As far as the former is concerned, it can be argued that in the early stages 
of development with scarcity of capital, the investment has to be in the 
sector with the highest productivity in order to maximize the utility of 
the scarce resources* Therefore, investment in construction with a lower 
productivity has to be minimized in favour of higher investment in machinery* 
Nevertheless, there are some factors which impose limits to such maximiza­
tion of scarce resources*
Theoretically, the minimum feasible investment is determined by the 
needs of economic and social institutions* For example, the related build­
ings for manufacturing ara the necessary condition for carrying out a pro­
ject and construction in port and road projects can be recognieed as the 
complementary investment in economic institutions* The need for shelter,
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basic health and education would also call for a high investment in cons-: 
truction of social institutions*
However, in practice, the allocation of investment between construc­
tion and machinery is affected by market imperfection, uncertainty, on the 
part of the private sector's investment, and political structure of the so­
ciety when the public investment is considered* The market imperfection and 
uncerainty create a high potential risk in the undertaking of investment in 
industrial plants relative to the traditionally low-risk investment in hous­
ing*. In the early phase of industrialization, the lack of knowledge about 
investment in modern industries and their potential profitibility may raise 
the risk involved* However, along with the development of the manufacturing 
sector and the rising of the degree of market Integration,the risk would 
decline and a higher share of private investment would move towards machin­
ery* In this way, with economic development, the pattern of investment 
would have changed towards a higher investment in machinery if a greater 
weight has been given to construction in the early stages of development* 
Although, as was said above, the priority of Investment in construction may 
be plausible, the possibility of maximum utilization of the construction 
has to be considered as important; that is whether the investment is in the 
building of a hospital, school and cheap residential housing, or luxury 
houses and military bases* liiith the above argument we can explain the 
pattern of growth of construction in Iran*
As table (4-6) shows the relative share of investment allocated to 
construction has been declining, indincating a decrease from about 72 per­
cent in 1965 to 58.1 percent in 1976. This was one of the reasons for the 
decrease in the share of the total value added in this sector* The relative 
decline in investment was largely noticeable in the private investment in 
construction which shows a decline from 66 percent to 42*5 percent of the
Gross Fixed Capital Formation By Major Sectors 
For Selective Years, ftt Constant Prices
Table (4-6) ____________ ________________ _____________________________________!_________________Billion Rials
Yaer Construc­tion
(1)
Public
Machi­
nery
(2)
Total
(3)
u Private
Construe- Machi- 
tion nery 
(4) (5)
Total
(6)
Construc­
tion
(7)
Machi-
nexy
(8)
Total
<£)._
( D
(3)
%
U )
(6)
%
(7)
( 9 )
%
(1)
(7)
1965 31.7 8.8 40.5 29.1 15.0 44.1 60.8 23.8 84.6 78.3 66.0 71.9 52.1
1970 56.7 26.7 83.4 31.3 25.0 56.3 88.0 51.7 139.7 68.0 55.6 63.0 64.4
1973 91.9 39.4 131.3 51.1 57.5 108.6 143.0 96.9 239.9 70.0 47.0 59.6 64.1
1974 124.9 62.5 187.4 52.5 55.6 108.1 177.4 118.1 285.5 66.6 48.6 62.1 70.4
1975 189.5 67.1 256.6 69.6 134.9 204.5 259.1 202.0 461.1 73.8 34.0 56.2 73.1
1976 208.9 93.6 302.5 90.3 122.2 212.5 299.2 215.8 515.0 69.1 42.5 58.1 69.8
Source : Bill, Annual Report, 1970 - 76; and.National Income Of Iran, 1959 - 71.
K)oCD
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total private investment« In this respect, two factors are to be considered 
as important« first, the promising future in productive investment in the 
manufacturing sector after the recession of 1961-63 and the advent of the 
land reform may have caused a diversion in the pattern of investment on 
the part of private investors) a relative rise in the importance of the manu­
facturing sector relative to the housing sector« Secondly, although housing 
has been one of the most important activities of the private sector, a period 
of stagnation has appeared in this sector« In this respect, the possibility 
of speculation in land may have retarded the invesment in housing with a lower 
profitability. This situation was accentuated in 1975 when-the large govern­
ment investment.caused a temporary.shortage in building materials and the 
rising of wags levels further aggravated the condition«
As far as the public sector is concerned, although a decreasing ten­
dency in the share of public investment allocated to construction can be 
noticed, the trend is not as clear as in the case of the private sector (ta­
ble 4—6)« However, the public sector not only had a higher contribution in 
the total value added, but this contribution has also been increasing over 
the period. As table (4-6) indicates the share of public sector investment 
in construction has moved up from 52 percent of the total investment in cons­
truction in 1965 to 73.1 percent in 1975«
To what extent investmeht in construction has been economically use­
ful is hard to say« As far as housing is concerned, the private sector has 
been active. Alarge part of the private investment in construction (about 
80 to 90 percent) has been in residential building) however, it is almost 
impossible to distinguish between cheap and luxury buildings. But, here, 
an attempt has been made to show the overall trend of residential building in 
Iran. Table (4-7) shows the distribution of households by number of rooms
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Distribution of Urban Households By Number of 
Rooms Occupied in 1966 and 1972’
Table (4-7) Percentage
Number of 
Rooms 196601/"
1972
%
1 Room 40.1 27.2
2 Rooms 29.8 35.6
3 " 13.8 19.3
4 " 8.4 10.7
5 " 3.8 3.8
6 and over 4.1 2.3
Not Explained - 1.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Source : For 1966, Statistical Year Book of Iran, 1972, p. 125, Table 7$ 
For 1972, Results of Urban Household Budget Survey 1972, Bureau 
of Statistics, Plan Organization.
Housing Units' Financed By the Housing Organization * 
By Number of Room’s Upto 1973
Table (4-8)
1 and 2 
Rooms
3 Rooms 
and More
Number of 
Rooms Not 
Reported
Total
Housing Units
Number of 
Projects 
% Share
7403 
■ — 71.1
1861
-______ 17.9
1143
11.0
10407
100.0
Source : Plan Organization, Statistical Year Book of Iran, Bureau
of Statistics, 1972.
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occupied in 1966 and 1972 for urban areas, indicating an increase of 13*5 
percent in occupation-group of 2 to 4 rooms* flora importantly, the percen­
tage of occupation in group of six rooms and more shows a decrease from 4*1 
percent in 1966 to 2.3 percent in 1972. It implies that there has been a 
tendency toward relatively cheaper houses. However, this has to be considered 
with caution since it does not show the eost of construction.
In this respect, government activities in residential building during 
1968-73 concentrated on relatively cheap houses. As table (4-8) shows in 
the case of houses built by the Housing Organisation, around 70 percent of 
housing units consisted of one and two rooms. However, as table (4—9) illus­
trates in total 19564 housing units were constructed under the public sector 
allocation for housing in the Fourth Planj but, this hardly reached 6.3 per­
cent of housing units built during 1968-72. If the allocation of the govern­
ment agencies, not included in the plan, is taken into account, the share 
of public sector in housing would reach 7.4 percent of the total housing 
units.
However Rousing has never been the main interest of the government in 
the allocation of public expenditure} and it has been left to the private 
sector since traditionally the private sector has been active in housing 
due to the low risk involved. Table (4-10) shows that allocation of the 
Third and Fourth Plans for housing hardly reached 1,8 and 2.1 percent of 
total public construction respectively. However, the Fifth Plan recognised 
the situation in the housing sector as critical ( it had been created by 
the large migration from rural to urban areas) and therefore rose the alloc- 
tion of the plan for housing up to 13 percent of the total public construc­
tion.
Iiitih regard to the distribution of the public housing one may say 
that it has been unequal. Around 95 percent of the plan's disbursement for
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Number of Housing Units Constructed By Public
and Private Sectors During 1963 - 72 
(in Urban Areas)
Table (4-9)
Number of 
Housing Units
Percentage 
Of Total
Private 290000 92.6
Public
Plan Allocation 19564
6.3
Public 
Other Than 
Plan Allocation
3427 1.1
Total 312991 100.0
Source : Plan Organization, Breau of Statistics, Statistical 
Year Book of Iran, 1972.
Direct Government Investment and Direct Government 
Assistance to the Private Sector In Housing
Table (4-10)
1963-67 1968-70 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Housing (1) 2.4 0.6 1.6 4.4 13.2 32.5 51.2 62.0
Credit to (2) 
Private Sector 1.1 0.5
0.4 0.5 - 1.4 1.3 1.2
Total (3) 3.5 1.1 2.0 4.9 13.2 33.9 52.5 63.2
Ratio (-J)/ 
Public Construc­
tion1
%
1.8 0.3 1.9 4.1 9.2 14.2 12.5 10.6
Ratio (2)/(3)^j 31.4 45.4 20.0 10.2 - 4.1 2.5 1.9
Note : 1- For the Public Construction see Table (4-6)
Source : Plan and Budget Organization, Final Report of Third Plan} 
Statistical Year Book, 1972 — 76.
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housing uas allocated to worker and particularly staff housing in the pub^ 
lie sector* Table (4—11) shows the detail of allocation for housing in the 
Fourth Plan; only 16 percent of total allocation Can be used by the private 
workers and employees and about 58 percent by police and genedermarie forces* 
However, although some defficiency can be seen in the distribution of houses, 
on economic grounds the low cost housing has to be considered as useful 
and desirable*
Government direct assistance to the private sector is almost negli­
gible* As table (4-10) shows it accounts for only 1*9 percent of the total 
allocation for housing in 1976,
Problems will arise when public construction other than housing is 
considered. Since it is not possible to show public expenditure in construc­
tion item by item, it must be accepeted that all the government's expendi* 
ture in port and road construction, public utilities, education, health 
and regional development was economically viable or socially desirable* In 
this way, a distinction can be made between the above and the government 
expenditure in defence, internal security.and civil administration the 
importance of which is determined by the political structure of the society, 
While the first group of investment would lead to a higher productivity in 
one way or another, for example investment in road construction would lead to 
release the economic bottleneck existing in the process of market integra­
tion, and health and education can be recognised as investment in human 
capital which would materialise in the long run, the second group of invest­
ment hot only would not result in higher productivity but can also be con­
sidered as a waste of natural and human resources*
With the above argument , a rational economic system has to keep the 
investment for construction in defence and security forces at the minimum 
that is feasible. If revenue constraint is considered as the major deter­
minant of public investment, the trade-off existing between the components
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Government Allocation for Housing 
By Type of Use During fhs 
Fourth Plan
Table (4-11)
Housing By 
Use
Plan Disburse­
ment
Million Rls.
Percentage
Staff Housing: 3360 84.1
Borders' Areas ( 536 ) (13.4)
Areas Not Attrr- 
active to Pri— - 
vate Sector
( 510 ) (12.8)
Gendarmeries ( 516 ) (12.9)
Poice Force (1798 ) (45.0)
Cheap Housing: 633 15.9
Poor Areas in 
Tehran ( 633 ) (15.9)
Total 3993 100.0
Source* Plan and Budget Organization, Fourth Devalopinent Plan
Share of Government Investment in 
Buildings in the Total Public
Table (4-12)
Construction
Billion Rls.(Cur. Prices)
1963-67 1968-70 1971 1972 1973 .1974. 1975 1976
Government (1) 
builiding
8.7 13.3
CM•CO 12.6 31.6 45.1 68.7 66.9
Total Public(2) 
construction
135.1 181.0 85.6 108.2 145.9 228.1 410.9 583.0
Ratio of(l)/(2) 
Percentage
6.5 7.3 9.5 11.2 21.6 19.8 16.7 11.5
Source: BMI, Annual Reports 1970-76; and see tables
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of government expenditure has to shift the expenditure toward the first 
group of investment which are highly desirable when the allocation of
investment is based on economic rationality»
Table (4-12) shows public investment in government buildings and 
it3 ratio to the total public capital formation in construction. It indi­
cates that the ratio of government expenditure realtive to total public 
investment in construction has moves up from 6.5’percent during 1963-67 to 
21.6 percent in 1973. While it shows that the revenue constraint during
1970-71 did not reduce government investment in this sector, an increase 
in the government foreign exchange earnings for 19 73 caused a great ,Jump 
in the investment in government building from 11.2 percent in 1972 to 21^ 6, 
percent in 1973«, This explains that economic rationality has been over shad­
owed by the political structure of the society. The lion's share of the 
allocation has gone to defence and security forces} and civil administration 
accounts for15 percent of the total allocation. This percentage is even . . 
lower for the 1973-76 period that is 4 percent on average ( table 2-11).
Labour productivity in the construction sector has largely been 
dependent on two changes with regard to the structure of the labour market 
and the capital in use. Typically, the supply of labour in this sector origi- 
nates in the agricultural sector} most of the workers have no skill and are 
mainly engaged in part time jobs. Road construction, by its nature, has been 
the main source of demand for the unskilled labourers from the rural areas. 
However, gradually these workers move to urban areas after they become 
familiar with the conditions in the labour market and become involved in 
building construction. To some extent, road construction is a transitional 
stage in which the unskilled rural labourers become familiar with the basic 
skill of construction and urban working conditions • During the period 
under study, road construction activity has expanded less rapidly than that 
of building construction. As a consequence, there has been a higher demand
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for semi-skilled labour in this sector.
Along with the above changes, the capital in use in the construction 
sector has rapidly increased which ha3 resulted in a higher output per 
worker. Nevertheless, the construction sector in the Iranian economy is 
relatively labour intensive; and the above change has only a marginal effect. 
For indtence, although the construction sector is responsible for about 4 
percent of GDP, its share of the total employed population is around 7 per­
cent. Since the construction sector absorbs the unskilled labourers, parti­
cularly, from the rural areas, naturally , the productivity is lower than 
that of the manufacturing sector. As appears in table (3- 3) the rate of 
growth of labour productivity in construction was about 6.2 percent for 
1966-72 compared with 12.1 percent for the whole of the industrial sector.
Altogether, the government's policy with regard to the construc­
tion sector has been affected by the expansion of the government defence 
activity which is determined by the political structure of the society. Due 
to the importance of political determinants, the revenue constraint has 
not affected construction in the public sector but rather has discriminated 
against productive investment in other sectors. Also, because of the nature 
of construction in defence, the investment in public construction has been 
the most unproductive and undesirable. However, although, in the short-run, 
it has created a flow of income to low income-groups and has raised the 
employment level, in the long-run, the pattern of construction in the public 
sector may indicate nothing but waste of financial resources. In short, the 
political determinants and short-run considerations have overshadowed the 
long-run economic rationality.
4-3 Manufacturing Sector
Introduction
Rapid industrialisation as the main objective of developing countries
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is accompanied by a change in the output, employment and the structure of 
the manufacturing sector. Industrialisation, as it is taking place in con­
temporary capitalist countires, emphasises the growth of output rather than 
employment. This pattern of industrial development is both the consequence 
of the natural path of development and the inevitable outcome of government 
development policy and the historical setting of developing countries.today. 
The natural path of development follows the pattern of demand along with 
changes in the growth of income and the factor endowments of the nation.
As far as the former is concerned, changes in demand patterns are affected 
not only by growth as such, but by changes in tastes, in relative prices 
and in other economic factors. Although these factors differs considerably 
from one country to another, when changes in the pattern of demand are com­
pared in countries at different stages of economic development, some general
10
pattern can be discerned. The important featurs are :
a) In the early phase of industrialisation, in the relatively low income 
nations, a large share of demand is devoted to food, textiles and other 
basic necessities. Moreover, at the low income level, a rise in income may 
generate a more rapid expansion in demand for the essentials of life —  food 
and clothing.
b) After a certain stags of development is reached, with the rise in real 
income, demand for durable consumer goods, chemical and capital goods rapidly 
rises, while the expansion of demand for food, beverages and textiles slow 
down.
Changes in demand pattern are not the sole influence on change in 
the pattern of output. The ability of an economy to produce different commo­
dities also depends on the resource endowments both natural and human. If 
the natural resource endowment of a coutry is suitable for the production 
of particular commodities the local population can usually adapt in time to 
the needs of economic growth. This adaptation involves the aquisition of i-'
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new skills and implies a fall in the relative cost of skilled labour in 
the more rapidly growing sectors* Thus* changes in the relative costs which 
occur as a result of the aquisition of new skills will tend to reinforce 
the changes in demand*
However, in the early phase of industrialisation, the levels of 
skill and organisational ability set limits to the type of industrial pro­
cess that can profitably be undertaken. Generally speaking, this means that 
the simpler forms of manufacturing, which are typical of consumer goods 
industries, tend to be developed before the more complex processes involved 
in capital and intermediate industries. The large light industries such as 
textile and food develop as a conglomeration of small-scale units which 
supply the necessary skill and capital* Noreover, since the optimum size of
plant is much lower in the light industries than for the heavy industries,
11the development of large light industries will be eased •
On the other hand, ih the ealry stage of development, the size of the 
market tends to be too small to justify the establishment of optimum size 
paints in more complex industries such chemicals and capital goods* But, 
these limitations on the supply side tend to be relaxed as industrializa­
tion develops, beacuse new industrial skills and organisational abilities 
emerge and the wider market allows new industries to be profitably estab­
lished*
However, in case of contemporary capitalist countries, the natural 
path of development has not been smooth* Being late -comers, industrializa­
tion in these countries is affected by the pattern of international trade 
of industrial products and the technological gap* Both factors cause a 
distortion on the pattern of the natural path of industrialization* Due to 
the lag of development of the capitalist sectors in the lata -comers and 
developed coutries, the development of indigenous technology in the former 
may be hampered when the domestic producers come into competition with the
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latter* Since the technological gap may retard the development of the indus­
trial sector in developing countries, the governments of developing countries 
have taken the necessary measures in order to foster and encourage the devel­
opment of indutrail sector. The government policy consists of protection 
of tha domestic market, financial and technical assistance to the private 
sector and direct investment in the basic industries* All government poli­
cies aim at bridging the technological gap and raising labour productivity.
While the indigenous technology which owned by the small-scale indus­
tries is not capable of raising productivity rapidly in order to reduce the 
cost of production and make the industry comeptitive in the international 
market, government policy encourages large-scale industries with modern 
techniques of production* Modernization of industries is mainly based on 
imported technology in which the factor proportion is largely different from 
those existing in developing countries. By its nature, the imported techno­
logy is largely capital intensive even in those industries in which labour 
intensive techniques can be efficient^* Therefore, in the contemporary 
capitalist countries, the large scale industries are no longer the conglo­
meration of small-scale industries, but they rather operate on the capital 
intensive technique extraneous to the industrial structure of these societies.
The creation of this dualistic pattern of technology produces a dual- 
istic condition in the pattern of development of the manufacturing sector 
in developing countries in two ways; First, along with the rapid develop­
ment of new large industries the traditional small-scale industries are . 
able to Survive. While the process of development would ultimately lead to 
the dominance of the modern large industries in the output of industrial 
products, the small-scale industries may remain as important sources of 
demand for the labour due to the labour intensive nature of their techno­
logy. Secondly, after a certain stage of industrial development is reached, 
the choice of technique in practice become rigid and a tendency towards
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techniques with a higher capital ratio will develop# This particularly 
occurs when the growth of consumer industries relative to heavy ones slows 
down# This pattern would widen the gap between the growth of output and the 
absorbption of man power in the manufacturing sector.
Government intervention in the process of industrialisation can only 
accelerate or slow down the rate of change# The effects of such interven­
tion depends on the government's economic policies by which a labour versus 
capital intensive can be encouraged# The problem of choice of technique has 
an important implication with regard to policy making# The problem is what
-f
the appropriate technology in a developing country should be and whether 
such appropriateness can be reached in practice# This is the policy objec­
tive which determines government policy instruments» the relative impor­
tance of different means in the hands of government and the direction of 
such policies. Whether a government is going to pursue a set of policies 
to encourage output and productivity in the manufacturing sector or a higher 
absorption of labour by this sector would determine the direction of the 
economic policies. However, in practice, government policy is to pursue 
neither objective at the expense of the other and also the choice of tech­
nique is not infinite# Nevertheless, government policy may be biased to one 
objective rather than the other.
Theoretically speaking, in a country where labour is abundant and 
capital is scarce, a government with the aim of maximum utilization of 
economic factors should choose the labour intensive technique in the pro­
duction method. This means that given a production function for a parti­
cular product expressing output as a function of labour (L) and capital (K), 
the technique with a higher L/K ratio should be chosen in order to maximise 
the utilization of economic factors. Therefore, the government's policy 
should be tailored to encourage the undertaking of labour intensive tech­
niques by the private sector and the public sectors#
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However, the capital—labour ratio as a criterion for the making of 
economic policy ha3 been criticized by some economists including Calenson 
and Leibentein13. It is true that the choice of a labour intensive tech­
nique would maximise output and employment, it may not produce the desir­
able results in the long-run. Instead, they suggested that the aim should 
be growth of output and employment. The creation of less employment and 
output now may lead to more employment and output at a future date, if a-.w. 
capital intensive technique is chosen. In this way, it is possible to maxi­
mise the reinvestible surplus by minimising the wage-bill. It is true that 
the capital intensive techniques generate a high output per worker and 
therefore, for a given wage rate, a high surplus. But, there ere three 
points which may reduce the importace of the reinvestable surplus approach:
a) It is assumed that all the surplus is reinvested, the profits are the 
source of investment funds and that no saving take place out of wages. Al­
though the profit earners have a higher marginal propensity to save, it 
does not mean either that the profit will not contribute to their consump­
tion, or that a higher profit may be the same as the higher investment. In 
this respect, the effects on the pattern of consumption, the interest rates 
and the rate of return of capital may reduce the reinvestable surplus.
b) By reinvesting the generated surplus in different capital intensive 
industries, the rate of growth of output may not be the same as the rate of 
growth of employment. Therefore, in the long run, a large gap may develop 
between these two patterns.
c) The surplus maximising technique is not necessarily the most capital- 
intensive one. The surplus maximising depends on the slope of the function 
relating output to inputs and the wage rate,A high wage rate will dictate 
a capital intensive technique but a,low wage rate will mean that a rela­
tively labour intensive technique will maximise the surplus • The lower 
the wage rate, the nearer is the surplus maximising technique to the
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labour intensity and the same as the output maximising technique* Contrary, 
a higher wage rate will shift the point of surplus maximisation to the cap­
ital intensive technique*
Following the last point which has been put forward by Dobb and Sen^”*, 
one may deduce that in a developing coutry where the wage rate is usually 
low, the surplus maximising point should be nearer¡to the labour intensive 
technique and therefore there may not be any contradiction between maximi­
sing the present output and employment and those of the future, if the 
available technology allows such a choice. In parctice, as was mentioned 
earlier, the choice of technique will be limited to what has been developed 
in advanced economies with a high capital-labour ratio, if an economy is 
not able to develop its appropriate method of production* Nevertheless, the 
governments of developing countries should pursue a set of policies by which 
they ensure the growth of output and employment as well as the development 
of indigenous technology. Taking into account, the possiblity with regard 
to the choice of technique and the practical importance of the transfor­
mation of technolgical know-how, the government policy should encourage 
labour intensive techniques or maximising surplus when labour intensity is 
appropriate* However, with the maximising of surplus, one should be aware 
of its effects on the redistribution of income} by increasing the share of 
profit, it may worsen the income distribution. Should such techniques be 
used, other government ploicies should take care of redistribution problems. 
Overall, government policy should encourage small-scale and large labour 
intensive industries if the maximum utilisation of. economic factors is to 
be reached in a developing country*
Another effect of technological dualism and the diversion from the 
natural path of development in the developing countires is that the link­
ages among different sectors of the economy and within the manufacturing 
sector will loosen. This divergence in the economy creates a strong link
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between the rapidly growing modern industries and the metropolitan count­
ries from which the technology is imported. The lack of sufficient link­
ages, not only will reduce the multiplier effects of investment, but,also, 
in the long run would retard the development of the indigenous technology. 
Government policy should pursue higher back-ward and forward linkages among 
economic sectors and within manufacturing.
Here, we will examine the pattern of the Iranian manufacturing 
sector since 1959 and the effectiveness of government policy and its direc­
tion. Following the above theoretical explanation, first, we will analyse 
the pattern of industrialization with regard to the importance of demand 
and factor endowments. In this respect, the change in the pattern of tra­
ditional and heavy as well as rural and urban,and large and small indust­
ries will be examined. Secondly, the extent to which government policy has 
affected the pattern of development of the manufacturing sector will be 
explained. We are mainly concerned with the effects of direct government 
investment and government credit policy. Nevertheless, a brief examination 
of other government policies such as protection and direct intervention 
will be necessary in order to complete the picture.
4-3-1 Pattern of Development of Manufaturihg 
Sector During the 1959-76 
Period
In Iran^government intervention in the maufacturing sector goes 
back to the early 1920's when Reza Shah embarked on the establishment of 
the sugar industry. However, it was after World War II and particularly 
in the late 1950's, with the restoration of oil production that the govern­
ment realised the necessity of intervention in the field of manufacturing 
where the private sector was not able to stand on its own feet. This is 
not to say that the private sector has played no role in the development 
of the industrial sector. But,.-direct government investment and assistance
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in and to tha modern industries had encouraged privats investment in the 
manufacturing sector. The government tariff policies with regard to dis­
couragement of imported consumer goods, later in the 1960's, to some extent 
the discouragement of intermediate goods have completed the government poli­
cies of import—substitution ( or industrialisation) in the same way as its 
counterparts in other developing countries. All these have provided the 
necessary conditions for tha development of the manufacturing sector during 
1960-76 ( see pp253-88 for the government policies during this period).
Some structural changes have occured in the pattern of development 
of the manufacturing sector. These changes can be considered on two grounds* 
a) the changing pattern of the manufacturing sector with reagrd to the share 
of different Industries in output and employment, b )  The changing pattern 
of this sector regarding the size of establishments. Hera, we will look at 
such changes in the pattern of the munfacturing sector in Iran during 1959— 
76.
4-3-1-1 Pattern of Development of Manufacturing 
Sector B¥ Type of Industry
Under the government policies, the pattern of the manufacturing sec­
tor has undergone a considerable change with regard to production and employ­
ment. The values added in the manufacturing sector has enjoyed a rapid 
growth during 1960-76} the growth rate has been higher than that of the 
GDP and the share of manufacturing in the GDP has moved up from ‘13.0 per­
cent in 1959 to 19.9 percentj.n 1976 ( tiJble 4-1 ). While the share of manu­
facturing in the GDP has risen during this period, its share in the total 
employment has remained more or less unchanged. This implies that the change 
in the relative share in the GDP has been due to the increase in labour 
productivity raltive to other sectors. As table (3-3) shows during 1966-76 
the annual growth rate of productivity In the manufacturing sector has been
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higher than that of the whole of the country ( 11.0 percent compared with 
9.2 percent).
To a large extent, the pattern of development of the manufacturing 
sector has followed the change in the pattern of demand. With the rising 
of income per capita, not only has demand for industrial products grown, 
but also, a change has occured in the pattern of output of manufacturing 
products. In the absence of data on the aggregate demand for industrial 
goods, one may assume that the pattern of output is a proxy measure for 
the pattern of demand. However, taking such a proxy measure one has to be 
cautious because some part of the rising of domestic output is due to the 
replacement of domestic products for imported goods. Therefore, the signifi­
cance of such proxy measure may be reduced. Nevertheless, it would show 
whether the pattern of industrial output has changed along with the rising 
of income or not. As table (4-13) shows the income elasticity of industrial 
output has been greater than one (1.30) which indicates that along with 
the rising of income, the per head output has risen faster.
However, not all industrial products enjoy a similar income elasti­
city. As has been explained, for certain necessities, the income elasticity 
of demand will decline after a certain stage of development. If we classify 
different industries into two groups, traditional and modern (for defini­
tion , see below), the pattern shows the declining importance of the former 
and the rising of the latter. With the rising of income, the share of tra^ » 
ditional industries in the total industrial output has declined from 79.2 
percent to 66.9 percent. The change is particularly important where the 
economy passed the boundry of 15000 Rls.(approximately, / 200) (figure 4-1). 
The income elasticity of output, for the income level above 16000 'Rls., is 
well below unity in the case of traditional industries (0.60) and slightly 
above unity in the case of modern industries (table 4-13). However, there 
exists a considerable difference among industries in both groupfi with regard
Figure 4-1
P a t t e r n  o f  Growth in  M a n u fa c tu r in g  I n d u s t r i e s
P e r c e n t  o f  T o t a l* . M a n u f a c t u r in gP r o d u c t io n
1
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Income elasticity of Demand For 
Industrial Products By Major 
Industrial Sectors During 
1959-73
Table (4-13)
1959-73 Period 1 1965
1
-73 Period
e ..T-Val. R2 e TfVal. R2
Total Traditional 1.12 -7.2. 0.795 0.60 -7.2 0.883
Food, Beverage 
and tobacco 1.24 -6.6 0.772 0.57 -5.8 0.827
Textile 0.91 -8.1 0.834 0.55 -7.0 0.875
Apparel 1.82 -5.9 0.720 0.67 -11.3 0.948
Other Tradi­
tional 1.16 -8.9 0.859 0.79 -7.1 0.879
Total Modern 1.56 »8 *8 0.857 1.06 -6.8 0.869
Chemical 1.79 -8.3 0.843 1.24 -6.2 0.847
Non-Metallic 
and Mineral 1.11 -9.5 0.875 0.79 -18.3 0.980
Basic Metal 2.60 -8.9 0.860 1.65 -7.1 0.879
Metal Products 1.12 -8.1 0.834 0.80 -5.1 0.818
Capital goods 
and Transport 0.30 -6.4 0.761 1.28 -6.8 0.869
Total Industry 1.30 -7.0 0.788 0.73 -7.3 0.884
Note 1 - This period covers income levels above 16000 Rls. 
Source: See Background Table 18
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to income elasticity and the possibility of expansion of production as a 
result of appropriateness of factor endowments* In order to examine the 
pattern of growth of different industries, we will analyse the change with­
in each of the abov/e mentioned groups*
Traditional Sector
When the manufaturing sector is divided into traditional and modern, 
the change in the relative productivity can be attributed to the latter 
while the former has the major contribution to employment. As table (4-14) 
shows the modern industries have had a higher rate of growth of production 
than that of the traditional sector* While the share of the traditional 
sector in the value added of manufacturing sector declined from 66*5 percent 
in 1967 to 56.3 percent in 1972, its share in employment declined only from 
78*4 percent to 73*9 percent* This implies that the traditional sector may 
lose its share in the manufacturing output, but would remain as the major 
provider of employment* However, although the trend of changes in the 
manufacturing sector is clear, the traditional sector still accounts for 
a large share of manufacturing products; and the modern industries have far 
to go to appear as the dominant sector of manfacturing and,thus, a greater 
change would be expected in the future.
The traditional sector consists of food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, 
wood and wood products, paper and printing, and leather* Although the estab­
lishment of these industries goes back some decades, in some of them the 
method of production has been modernised* Food, textiles and apparel account 
for 80 percent of value added and 90 percent of the employment in the tra­
ditional sector. The early expansion of this sector can be attributed not 
only to the pattern of demand, but also, to the factor endowments of the 
nation* The traditional sector is largely labour intensive and in some 
industries there exists domination of ¿mail scale establishments which re­
present the domestic skill and the iodigsnity of technology in this sector.
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Value Added and Persons Engaged in 
the Industrial Sector By Type 
.of Activities -
Table (4-14)__________  ________Percentage
Type of 
Activities
.1967 .,1967 • 1972 1972
Value
added
Value
added
Employ­
ment
Value
added
Employ­
ment
Value
added
Traditional
Sector 100.0 66.5 78.4 56.3 73.9 100.0
Food 31.3 20.8 10.0 15.5 10.6 27.5
Beverage 1.3 0.9 0.2 1.5 0.3 2.7
Tobacco 10.4 6.9 0.3 4.6 0.3 8.2
Textile 31.0 21.6 46.4 17.3 41.7 30.7
Apparel 18.2 10.0 13.3 11.4 13.1 20.2
Wood 4.4 2.9 6.4 2.8 5.4 5.0
Paper 1.3 0.9 0.3 1.5 0.5 2.7
Printing 1.7 1.1 0.7 1.5 0.9 2.7
Leather 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.3 1.2 0.5
Modern 5ector 100.0 33.5 21.6 43.7 26.1 100.0
Rubber 5.7 1.9 0.6 • 1.7 0.8 3.9
Chemicals 12.5 4.2 1.0 6.8 2.2 15.6
Petroleum
products 1.8 0.6 2.8 0.7 2.2 1.6
Non-metallic 
and Minerals 25.7 8.6 4.0 8.4 4.2 19.2
Basic Metal 5.4 1.8 0.4 5.3 1.8 12.1
Metal Pro­
ducts 16.4 5.5 5.1 5.5 6.3 12.6
Non-electric- 
al Machinery 2.1 0.7 0.7 1 »3 0.9 3.0
Electrical
Machinery 10.1 3.4 1.0 4.1 2.0 9.4
Transport 17.0 5.7 4.3 8.9 4.4 20.4
Miscellaneous 0.3 0.1 1.5 8.6 1.3 19.7
Total — 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 — -
Source: See Background Table 18
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However, along with the rising of income, a relative change in the pattern 
of the traditional sector can be expected. In this respect, as figure (4-2) 
shows there is a tendency toward producing those goods with a higher income 
elasticity. Two groups of traditional industries which have been able to 
keep their share in the total output, apparel and leather, wood and paper 
industries (other traditional) enjoy a higher income elasticity than those 
of food and textiles (see table 4-13 for elasticities). In particular, the 
share of the two main industries, food, beverages and tobacco, and textiles 
have been affected by the declining of income elasticity of demand. The 
share of first group in the total value added declined from 28.6 percent in 
1967 to 21 £5 percent in 1972. Similarly the second group declined from 21.6 
percent to 17.3 percent.
Modern Sector
The modern sector consists of rubber and plastic, chemicals, coal and 
oil products, nonmetalic and mineral products, basic metal, non-electrical 
tools and machines, electrical tools and machines and vehicles. While the 
former three can be classified as oil complementary industries, the latter 
are the import-substitution industries. As has been mentioned, the growth 
of modern manufacturing products has been of significance due to the great - 
attention received by the public and private sectors during 1960's.
Along with the rising of income and particularly above 16000 Rls.
( $ 200 ) per capita, the pattern of development in the modern sector shows 
a change towards relatively ■ more complex products. The development of modern 
industries which starts from production with simple technology appropraite 
to the existing pattern of demand at a certain stage of development, will 
move to the production of morB complex manufacturing products with a 
longer process of production when the change in the pattern of demand, gra­
dual' acquisition of skill and adoption of new technology make it possible.
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Figure 4 -2
Pattern of Growth In Traditional Manufacturing
P e r c e n t Total— ,ynr- roduction
Source: See Background Table ( 18 )
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However, since most of the industries in the modern sector start from the 
last stage of assembling, there exists a large gap between the value of - 
output and domestic value added which will be narrowed alnog with the 
development of complementary industries and the deepening process of pro­
duction.
With such a pattern of development, it is not surprising to see that 
the share of metal products and non-metalic and mineral products in the 
total industrial output has declined (figure 4-3). As table (4-13) shows 
both industries suffer from low income elasticity of demand at the level 
above $200 per capital.Except these two industries, other-industries in 
the modern sector have enjoyed a high income elasticity of demand during 
this period. In particular, machinery and transport which includes consumer 
durable goods such as radios, TV/, refrigerators, cars and so on has shown 
a high income elasticity.
Although there is a large gap between the pattern of output and value 
added due to the assembling nature of moder industries in Iran, the pattern 
of value added shows a similar pattern to that of-the output as the scatt-. 
ered data in table (4-14) illustrates. The share of metal products and non- 
metallic and mineral products has declined. The metal products, mainly simplai 
household durable goods ( such as stoves, cooking stoves, non-electrical 
water heaters and gas lamps and so on), and non-metallic and minerals'are the 
first to be produced due to their ready market and the simplicity of their 
production process as was explained above. With the change toward more com­
plex durable goods, the necessary demand would be created for the develop­
ment of intermediate industries such as basic metal and capital goods indus­
tries such as transport equipments, tools and machine products. As table 
(4-14) shows there is a clear tendency toward producing basic metal , trans­
port equipments and machine and tool industries. The share of former has 
moved up from 5,4 percent in the modern industries in 1967 to 12,1 percent
r*Trs «• vA l
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Figure 4-3
Pattern of Growth In Modern Manufacturing
Percent of Total 
Manufacturing 
Production
Source s See Background Table (18 )
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in 1972J and that of tha latter has increased from 29*2 to 32*8 percent in the 
same period* The above pattern of development shows that the Iranian manu­
facturing sector has followed the pattern of demand and in a short period 
of time has passed the early phase of development* This has largely been 
due to rising of income as a consequence of oil production which has opened 
the possibility of expansion and diversification of production in the early 
stage of development* These changes in the pattern of production have also 
been accompanied by changes in the size od establishments which in general 
grow along with the introduction of new modern industries and the necessity 
of mass production*
4-3-1-2 Pattern of Development of Manufacturing 
Sector By Size of Establishments
Whan the pattern of the manufacturing sector by the size of estab­
lishment is considered, the above picture become clearer* The growth of 
modern industries shows that the large establishment is becoming more and 
mors important in respect of output* The technological complexities related 
to the modern industries and the need for mass production would lead to the 
domination of the large establishment in the modern sector of manufacturing* 
However, this doss not mean that tho small industries havo totally lost their 
importance as we will sso later!in this section*
Table (4-15) shows the distribution of value added by tha alia of 
establishments and industries* Here, we could make a distinction between 
rural and urban 'establishments, the latter has bean divided into Mall and 
large establishments* The Mall establishment is defined as any establish­
ment with fewer than ten workers, while the large establishment employs mors 
16than ten workers * Since the *large establishment* covers a large range 
of establishment, it is not possible to show clearly the pattern of develop­
ment of the manufacturing sector*
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Rural Industries
Rural industries are entirely small scale industries with the ave­
rage being two workers or less* As table (4-15) shows the share of rural 
industries has moved up from 6 percent of total value added in the manufac­
turing sector in 1962 to 18 percent in 1372 and 14.4 percent in 1973. Here, 
one may question whether the empirical evidence shows the true picture of 
development of the manufacturing sector in Iran. Knowing the Iranian govern­
ment has encouraged the modern establishment, the above pattern may ..be plaus­
ible. There is enough evidence to question the above pattern of development 
of rural manufacturing. The data on rural manufacturing is based on guess 
estimation and there is no regular official sampling from rural establish­
ments. it seems that in the early years (1962-65), the value added for rural 
manufacturing had been uderestimated. Therefore, the estimation in the later 
years has raised the growth rate which was due to underestimation in the 
early years rather than the real growth of rural manufacturing. In order 
to provide a more reasonable picture of the pattern of industrial produo»1, 
tion in the rural areas, us should considers the factors involved in the 
calculation of value added in the industrial sector. Generally speaking, 
in this regard, there are two factors to be considered, the growth of number 
of employed workers and the growth of labour productivity.
Thus,the growth of rural manufacturing is subject to the growth of 
employed population and the growth of productivity in rural manufacturing. 
Table (4-16) shows that the growth of employment for rural manufacturing 
has been about 4.2 pereent annually which is lower than that of the urban 
areas (7,6}percent)».during 1963-73. But, a careful examination of table 
(4-15) would reveal that the share of rural manufacturing in total value 
added in manufacturing sector has jumped from 7.0 percent in 1964 to 18.6 
percent in 1969 and has remained stable there until 1973 when it declined 
to 14,4 percent. For the period 1964—69, the .growth rate of employment
Distribution of Value Added By Size 
of Establishment During 1962-75
Table (4-15) ________________________^ ___________________  Billion Rls. (current Prices)
Type of Establish­
ment 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Rural 2.3 2.5 3.4 4.4 7.0 9.8 15.3 20.0 21.9 23.7 25.5 28.9
(6.3) (5.9) (7.0) (7.8) (10.7) (12.3) (16.5) (18.6) (18.2) (17.2) (16.4) (14.4)
Urban: 34.0 39.9 45.4 52.0 58.6
%' (93.7) (94.1) (93.0) (92.2) (89.3)
Small . 24.8 26.6 31.2 35.0 42.6 46.0 50.4
% (31.1) (28.6) (29.1) (29.0) (30.9) (29.6) (25.1)
Large 45.1 51.0 56.1 63.6 71.7 83.8 121.7
% (56.6) (54.9) (52.3) (52.8) (51.9) (54.0) (60.5)
: Total 36.3 42.4 48.8 56.4 65.6 79.7 92.9 107.3 120.5 138.1 155.3 201.0
%. .100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Ministry of Economy, Iranian Industrial Statistics, 1968—73
N0 4o\
Distribution of Employed Labour Force In the Manufacturing 
Sector By Rural and Urban Classifications
Table (4—16)____________________________________________________  _____________________________________Thousand Persons
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Annual Growth Rates 
Percentaqe
1963-73 1964-68 , 1968-73
Rural 615 568 581 631 662 713 711 739 725 779 926 4.2 5.8 5.4
Cities 455 534 589 521 673 685 757 804 855 936 947 7.6 6*.4 6.7
Total 1070 1103 1170 1252 1335 1398 1468 1543 1580 1715 1873 5.6 6.1 6.0
Source: Ministry of Economy, Iranian Industrial Statistics 1969-73.
N>U-g
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in rural manufacturing was around 5.8 percent which in comparison with 6 
percent for citiles is not low ( table 4-16).
Therefore, since the growth rate of employment in rural manufac­
turing has not been greater than that of the urban, it cannot be the 
factor responsible for the growth of value added in the rural industries.
This indicates that the relative change in the productivity^Should be the 
responsible factor. But, the growth of rural labout productivity must have 
been very slow due to the type of products and the backward method of pro­
duction. Taking into account that the major share of production of rural 
manufacturing belongs to the carpet industries in which the hand-made 
nature of production has limited the technical improvement, in the absence 
of the necessary organizational assistance from the government the growth 
of labour productivity is bound to be very slow* Similarly, in the case of 
other art-craft industries, there has been a limited success in raising 
productivity. Indeed, one estimation shows that with the best government 
assistance, the productivity of art-craft industries in Iran could only 
have been raised by 2 to 5 percent annually which still would have been 
well below that of urban productivity in manufacturing sector during 1967-
71 (9.9 percent annaully). However, with the noticeable lack of such assis-
17tance, the improvement in the labour productivity was minimal •
However, since the value added presented in table (4-15) is at curr­
ent prices, productivity does not necessairily reflect real labour produc­
tivity. As the value added is at current prices, the relative change in 
the prices may be an important cause of the relative change in the pattern 
of development of the manfacturing sector. In this respect, the most impor­
tant factor is the type.of activities of rural industires which have allowed 
them to continue their contribution to the manufacturing sector. Rural 
manufacturing is mainly food, textiles and apparelj the latter two account for
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60 percent of the total rural production. The share of textiles and apparel 
has increased by 5 percent during 1967—71» As appears in table (4—12), tex­
tiles have made large contribution to the growth of rural manfacturing; 
their share has moved up from 32 percent in 1967 to 42 percent in 1971,
Around 90 percent of rural textiles consists of knotted carpets and the 
growth of rural manufacturing is largely related to the growth of value 
added in this industry.
However, if the change in prices is to affect rural manufacturing, 
this effect should be e result of change in the pattern of demand and 
supply for carpets. On the one hand, demand for carpets is highly income 
elastic; and as a consequence of rapid rise in the per capita income because 
of increasing oil revenue, a higher demand for carpets is expected. On the 
other hand, the supply of carpets is largely dependent on the growth of 
employment rather than the rising of labour productivity. Because of the 
nature of a hand knotted carpet, the growth of productivity is insignificant. 
These factors make the supply of carpets fairly inelastic relative to the 
rising of demand,•With the above pattern of supply and demand for carpets, 
one may expect the price of carptes to rise along with the rising of income. 
As table (4-18) shows the price index for carpets was the lowest index in 
1963 and it reached the level of the general index by 1969, This implies an 
annual rate of increase of 6,4 percent in the case of the price of carpts 
and 1,9 percent for the general price index. The above shows that the value 
added in rural manufacturing could have been above that of urban manufac^v 
turing only by the difference in the growth rate of price increase i.e.
4,5 perecnt.at the greatest. Therefore, one has to accept that the high 
rate of growth of the value added in the rural industries during 1963-69 
is largely inaccurate and due to underestimation of value added iri the 
early years. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that the pattern of demand 
and supply of carpets have an important effect on the growth of value added
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Price Index and Annual Rate of Inflation
For Carpeta and the General Index
Table (4-18) _________  1969 * 100.0
Price Index 1963 1964. 1965* -1966, -1967 1968 1969 1970. 1971 1972 1973 1974. 1975 Annual Rate of InflalationPercentaqe
1963-9 1969—72 ;1972—3 1973-5
Housing Furni­
shings 81.8 81 ¿9 84.2 '87.0 ,87.7- 94.2 100.0 102.0, 103.1 113.3 144.0 171.3 204.2 3.4 4.2 27.1 19.0
Carpet 68.8 72.8 81.6 85.2 85.2 89.9 100.0 96.9 95.0 112.4 161.3 - 6.4 4.0 43.5
General Index 89.4 93.3 93.5 94.3 95.1 96.6 100.0 101.5 107.1 113.8 126.5 146.1 160.5 1.9 4.4 11.1 12.6
Source: BFII, Revised Price Index for Whole— sale in Iran , 1974j Annual Reports 1971-76.
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at current prices* Based on the price changes, one can expect that the lou 
growth of productivity in the rural areat, to some extent, will be compensated 
for by the increase in prices} therefore, rural manufacturing industries may 
be able to continue their contribution to the total industrial products and 
may more or less maintain their share in tha value added* As table (4-18) 
shows the rise in the price of carpets during 1972-76 is far above that of the 
general index*
However, even if we consider that some improvement in the line of pro­
duction of carpet industries has happened in the recent years, it would not 
have been considerable in comparison with that of real productivity in urban 
areas} and still the relative significance of rural manufacturing would be 
dependent on the significance of the income elasticity and degree of substitu- 
tibility for carpets* As far as the former is concerned, like any art craft 
product, the carpet is highly income elastic, but at the same time it is not 
considered as a luxury product so far as domestic demand is concerned* Thus, 
the rigidity of demand for knotted carpet would reduce the degree of substi- 
tutibility for carpets and it is unlikely that the machine made rug can be­
come competitive in the foreseenable future*
Thanks to the high income elasticity for the art craft, the rural 
industries can survive while a change can be seen in other rural industries*
For Instance, in food industries, the share of rural value added has decreased 
due to an increase in the undertaking of some of the traditional rural activi­
ties, such as processing agricultural products, by capital intensive plants in 
urban areas* However, the minor activities such as manufacturing of parts of 
farm equipment and tractors, bicycles etc*, has increased due to the relatively 
increased use of modern agricultural techniques in farming*
Urban Industries
The urban industries can be classified into small scale with fewer 
than ten employees and the large scele with ten and over employees* Although
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this classification is not clear in the case of large scale establishments 
due to the range of covering, it is the only classification for which de­
tailed industrial statistics are available«
The pattern of development of urban industries can be divided into 
two short periods. First, 1967-71 period when the small-scale industries 
were able to maintain their share of value added. Second, 1971-73 period 
when the share of small scale declined by 6.6 percent during two years 
(i.'e. from 35.9 percent in 1971 to 29.3 percent in 1973) (table 4-19),
Table (4-19) shows that the share of small scale manufacturing in 
the urban value added has remained stable during 1967-71 period. Despite 
the fact that the method of production is primitive and the per worker 
value added is low, small scale manufacturing was able to maintain its share 
in the total urban value added. While the per worker value added in small 
scale manufacturing is well below than that of the large scale, the annual 
growth of labour productivity seems to be higher than that of large scale 
for 1967-71 period (table 4-20)
There are two factors which may be responsible for the survival of 
small scale manufaturing. First, the growth of value added in small scale 
is largely dependent on the,-, rate of growth of employment in small establish­
ments. As table (4-21) shows the annual growth of employment in the small 
scale establishment was faster than that of the large scale during 1967-71. 
The discrepancy in the growth rate of employment is not only insignificant, 
but also the fluctuation of the annual growth rate is very high - a fact 
which makes it impossible to draw any conclusion based on the differential 
growth rate. However, the share of small scale in the total employment of 
urban manufaturing has been as high as 68 percent and was stable during 
1963-71.
The second factor is the growth of labour productivity. Although, 
theoretically, it may be argued that the growth of labour productivity in
Distribution of Value added By Large, Small, Traditional and
1
Modern Classifications During 1967-73
T a b l e  (4— 19)
Value in Billion Rls.
< 1967 < 1971 * 1973 i
Classi fi* Tradi- Modern Total Tradi- Modern Total Tradi- Modern Total
cation tional tional tional
% (69.0) (31.0) (100.0) (57.9) (42.1) (100.0) (66.1) (33.9) (100.0)
Small 17.1 7.7 24.8 23.8 17.3 41.1 33.4 17.1 50.0
% (38.3) (30.4) (35.5) (38.0) (33.5) (35.9) (36.8) (21.0) (29.3)
% (61.0) (39.0) (100.0) (53.1) (46.9) (100.0) (47.1) (52.9) (100.0)
Large 27.5 17.5 45.1 38.9 34.4 73.3 57.4 64.4 121.8
tsf/o (61.7) (69.6) (64.5) (62.0) (57.9) (64.1) (63.2) (79.0) (70.7)
% (63.8) (36.2) (100.0) (54.8) (45.2) (100.0) (52.7) (47.3) (100.0)
Total 44.6 25.3 69.9 62.7 51.7 114.4 90.8 81.5 172.3
% (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Note 1 - Figures in ( ) indicate the share •of different sectors in the total value added. The upper ( ) show
the share by small and large classifications while the lower ones illustrate the share by traditional 
and modern sectors«
Source: See table (4. 1 7 )
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Growth of Labour Productivity in Urban 
Small and large Establishments
Table (4-20) Value in Thousand Rls.
Average Output 
Par Worker
*
1964 1967 1971 1973
Annual Growth Rates 
Percentage
1964-67 1967-71 1971-73
Small . 140 132 178 222 -2.0 7.7 11.7
Large 386 557 699 894 13.0 5.8 13.1
Total 222 267 390 479 6.3 9.9 10.8
Source: For 1964-67, see Looney,R., Economic Development of Iran; for 1971 and 1973 see.Ministry of 
Economy, Iranian Industrial Statistics, 1971 and 1973.
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Distribution and Growth of 
Urban Employment
Table (4-21)___________________________ ________________Thousand persons
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Annual.Growth Rate 
Perenetane
1967-71 1971-73
Small 456 449 500 540 481 633 585 6.2 0.7
Large 217 245 257 264 274 . 303 362 6.0 14.9
Total 673 685 757 804 855 936 947 6.1 5.2
----_ --------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Ministry of Economy, Iranian Industrial Statistics, 1968-73.
Distribtion of Value added By 
Size of Establishment
Table (4-22) ____ _______ Billion Rls.
Size of 
Establish­
ment
1967 1968 1971 1973
Rural 9.8 15.3 23.7 28.9
% (12.3) (16.5) (17.2) (14.4)
Urban:
Small
(less than 24.8 26.6 41.1 50.4
ten) % (31.1) (28.6) (30.0) (25.1)
Medium 15.9 20.0 23.2 2
(10-50) % (19.9) (21.5) (16.8) 121.7
Large 29.2 31.0 50.0£ (60.5)
(Over 50) % (36.6) (33.4) (36.2)
Total 79.7 92.9 138.1 2Q1.0
% (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Note: 1 - ( ) Indicate the share in total
2 - Estimât
Source: See table (4-15)
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large scale establishments should be higher thant that of small scale due 
to their advanced technology and learning of ’know-how', it may not be ref­
lected in the per worker value added at current prices in which the elasti­
city of demand plays the main role in determining the sold value of output. 
If small scale manufacturing faces a different pattern of demand from that 
of large scale, it may enjoy a higher growth rate of labour productivity at 
current prices, provided its products are highly income elastic and are not 
in competition with those of large scale manufacturing.
Actually, the type of activity of small scale manufacturinf has been 
the main ensurance of its survival. On the one hand, the differnce between 
the products produced by the small sclae from those of the large has kept 
them safe from the strong competition imposed on the market by large manufac­
turing, On the other hand, a backward linkage with the large has created 
new activities in the modern sector. Table (4-19) shows the share of small 
manufacturing by type of industries. As it appears in this table, the small 
scale accounts for about 33,3 percent of the value added in the urban tra­
ditional sector in 1967, They make a large contribution in food, textiles, 
apparel and wood products ( table 4-17), Their types of products are diffe­
rent in each industries from those of the large. For instance, backeries, 
grain milling, non-mechanised.dairy factories are the main activities of 
the small scale establishments in food industries. Although the demand for 
the above mentioned industries are not income elastic, the small scale 
industries are faced with a fairly income elastic demand in clothing, car,- 
pets and hand made shoes. However, they could maintain their position 
during 1967-71; and their share of value added remained at 38 percent of total 
value added in the urban traditional sector in 1971( table 4-19),'
However, starting the new activities in the modern sector is the 
main reason for the maintenance of the share of small scale in the total 
urban velue added. As it appears in table (4-19), the share of small scale
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industry in the modern sector has even slightly improved* It implies that 
the rate of growth for small scale in the modern industries was faster than 
that of large industires* The strong backward linkages within the vehicle 
industry has been the most impotant* The share of the small scale in the 
vehicle industry has moved up from 7.5 percent in 1967 tp 28.7 percent in 
1971. The small scale activities in the vehicle industry are largely car 
repairing and psoducing simple spare parts. In this respect, some improve­
ment in the metal products have also made a sontribution to the growth of 
small scale industries (table 4-17).
Thus, on the one hand, as the above pattern shows the growth rate of 
labour productivity in small scale industry has been high, and on the other 
hand, the growth of labour productivity in the large establishment may have 
slowed down duB to the limitation on the growth of the domestic market for
mass production. This has been noticed by some of observers of the Iranian
18economy . This particularly has been the case for some of the consumer 
durable goods. The decline of the growth of labour productivity in large 
manufacturing can be clearly seen from table 4-20 which shows that the 
growth of per worker output in large scale industries declined from 13 
percent annually during 1964-67 to 5.8 percent during 1967-71.
However, a further break down of the establishment by number of emplo­
yees shows that the medium sized industries (with 10 to 50 employees) 
account for 19.9 percent of urban value added while thst^of the large 
(over 50 workers) accounts for 36.6 percent in 1967 (table 4-22). Although 
there is no data available for the later years, an estimate can be made 
for the growth of employment in the large establishment. Table (4-23) shows 
the number of establishments by size in 1967 and 1972. If we assume no In­
crease in the average number of workers per establishment, the growth of 
employed workers would be subject to the growth of the number of estab—
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Classification of Laroe Industrial 
Establishments By Number of Workers
Table (4-23)
Number of Workers 
(Persons):
Number of Establishments
1967 1972
Total:. 4386 5850
10-49 3800 5230
50-99 T 282
100-499 \ 586 243
500-999 ( 61
1000 and Over ) 34
Source : Looney, R., Economic Development of Iran, 
also Table (4—15)«
p. , Table 41; see
Distribution Of Employment 
By Size Of Establishment
Table (4-24)
• Size Of Establishment 1967 1971 - '• ’
Small-Scale
Fewer Than 10 Workers
%
456
(67.7)
633
(67.7)
10 — 49 Workers 60 83
% (8.9) (8.8)
Over 50 Workers 157 220
(23.4) (23.5)
Total 673 936
% (100.0) (100.0)
Source : see Table (4-23)
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lsihments* As is shown in table (4-24) no change in the pattern of employ­
ment can be discerned.
With the above pattern of employment, any change in the pattern of 
value added has to come from the difference in the growth of labour produ- 
tivity. Since the growth of labour productivity in the medium-size estab­
lishment may not be higher than that of the small scale industries, it can 
be assumed to be the same. Table (4-22) shows the estimate for distribua, 
tion of value added by the size of establishment in the manufactring sector 
for 1971, It seems the large establishment has taken over the share of 
medium-size industries.by 2 percent. However, this estimation is very ten­
tative and has to be interpreted with caution. It shows a tendency rather 
than a declining trend although it can be explained by saying that govern­
ment policy has discouraged the development of medium-size establishments.
However, during the second period, a substantial change has occured 
in the Iranian manufacturing sector. Nevertheless there exist some simila­
rities between the two periods. On .the one hand, the general pattern of 
development with regard to the decreasing share of the traditional sector 
in the total industrial value added continued; the share of this sector 
declined by another two percent from 54.8 percent to 52.7 percent.(table 
4-19). Still, the traditional sector accounts for the large share' of value 
added as.-well as employment. With regard to the share of small scale indus­
tries in the total traditional sector, a slight decrease (1.2 percent) can 
be discerned which indicates that the traditional sector is still the main 
area of activity of small scale industries, particularly appauel and food.
On the other hand, a decline of 12.5 percent can be seen in the re­
lative share of the small scale in the modern sector. A sudden decline 
during this period and specially after the expansionary period of 1967-71 
is plausible. There are two main reasons for the declining share of small 
scale industries. First, in 1972 and 1973 numbers of government factories
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in chemical; basic metal and capital goods industries came to operation» As 
it appears these thres groups grew up at an annual rate of 27,7, 67.2 and 
53*7 respectively (table 4*17)« They have largely contributed to the rapid 
growth'of the modern sector* Also, the rapid expansion of the large industries 
can be seen from the high annual rate of growth of employment in this sector . 
i*e* 14*9 percent (table 4-21)*
Secondly , during 1971-3 the growth rate of value of net output in the 
modern small scale industries was almost zero (table 4-19)* Although they have 
been able to diversify their activities along with the expansion of new indus­
tries; they have lost a part of their share of value added in the older rooted 
industries like metal products; chemical; non-metallic and mineral and basic 
metal industries* Table (4-17) shows that the value of net output of the above 
industries which are of small scale; in absolute terms; has declined* for ins­
tance; during 1971-3; metal products declined from 4*2 to 2*4 Billion Rls*, 
chemicals from 2*3 to 1*8 Billion Rls*; and non-metalic and minerals from 4*9 
to 2*7 Billion Rls* and so on (table 4-17)*
This pattern indicates that the small scale industries are losing their 
share on those industries in which they have been producing final products« 
while they are expanding their activities toward the backward-linkage inuds-.. 
tries and mainly back service for modern products* A few example msy make the 
pattern clearer* The small scale establishments have been producing soaps and 
washing poweders for a long time which now have gradually been replaced by new 
brands from large industries* Similarly; there is no longer a demand for old 
type of tin products« old stoves and oil-lamps and so on* These products have 
been replaced by new brands or superior substitutes which are produced by large 
mass producing industries*
The change has been largely toward higher capital intensity in the small 
scale which necessarily develop along with the expansion of modern industries* 
Consequently« the rste of absorption of manpower by small scale establishments
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has been affected* As can be seen from table (4-21), the number of employed 
workers remained unchanged during this period* This leaves the growth of small 
ecale industries to the growth of productivity in this sector which does not 
shows a significant difference from that of the large industries (11*7 percent 
compared with 13*1 percent, table 4—20)* This growth should largely be attri­
buted to the rising of wages and prices(particularly in apparel and food indus­
tries) rather than real productivity in small scale industries*
The pattern of development of the manufacturing sector has shown that the 
rural and small-urban establishments have played an Important role in the deve­
lopment of the industrial sector* Their share in the value added and particu­
larly in employment have been significant* Moreover, the rural industries espe­
cially carpet and handi-craft industries provide the most important non-oil ex­
port which enjoys a bright future* Also, the urban-small industries have shown 
their ability in adapting their production to the needs of the economy and have 
expanded their activities along and in connection with the change in the large 
modern industries* However, the pattern of the manufacturing sector also indi­
cates that the reason for the very survival and even expansion of these indus­
tries has been the nature of their production and their ability to respond to 
the pattern of demand along with the rising of income and changes in the pattern 
of manufacturing products* In other words, as we will see later on, government 
policy has played no significant role in encouraging these industries* Taking 
into account that a government in developing country should try to encourage 
the development of indigenous technology and labour intensity, one would expect 
to see the Iranian government pursue such policy if the maximum utilization 
of scarce resources is the main objective of government economic policy*
4-3-2 Government Policy For Development of the 
Manufacturing Sector
In order to examine how the government's policies have affected the 
above pattern of development of the manufacturing sector, we can divide 
these policies into two main groups*
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a) Government Direct Investment (GDI)
b) Government Direct and Indirect Assistance (GDIA)
The latter group consists of Government Credit Policy (GCP), Govern­
ment Tax Policy (GTP) and Protection Policy. However, since in our study, 
we are not concerned with the protection policy, we will only touch this 
topic very briefly despite its importance.
The main questions to be answered with regard to the effects of 
government policies are: a)— Whether the GDI has been in competition with 
that of investment in the private sector or complementary to it. b)- How 
the GDIjGCP and GTP have affected the capital per worker. Have they been 
in favour of large or small industrial establishments? What has been the 
importance of employment creation in the making of government policies? 
c- How government policies have affected the efficiency, maximum utiliza­
tion of scarce resouces and the market integration.
4-3-2-1 Government Direct Investment
Due to the lack of data on the disaggregated level for public and 
private value added (we have been able to estimate the share of the public 
sector for 1972-74, see p259 ), it is hard to explainhow the pattern of 
development in the manufacturing sector has been affected by government 
intervention. However, since the pattern of output is affected by the 
pattern of investment in regard to the allocation of resources between 
the modern and traditional sectors of manufacturing, it is possible to 
explain the change in the pattern of value added by the relative change 
in the allocation of investment.
The general government's policy in regard to industrialization has 
been to take the initiative in modernizing the method of production in 
the traditional sector and undertaking new activities in the modern sector 
of manufacturing. As far 83 the traditional sector is concerned, by taking
254
the initiative the government could assure the private investors of a ready 
market for their products and encourage them in modernizing the method of 
production. This modernization happened largely in the textile industries 
after World War II. The government's initiative in sugar and canning and 
particularly the abolition of the government monopoly in sugar production, 
new investment opportunities were introduced to the private sector.
The above explanation shows that the private sector has been ready
to undertake investment opportunities whenever its market is ensured by
the government initiative both through GDI and through the tariff policy.
The high share of GDI in the light industries during the Second Development
Plan (particulary in textile and sugar industries) can be interpreted as
a complementary to the government import substitution policy. This may be
so, because in the early stages of development, domestic private investors
are not familiar with industrial activity at a mass production level and
19they . arB hot assured of the profitibility of such investment . 
Although the government protection policies may increase the price level 
and create an incentive for domestic private investors, it is not suffi­
cient to reduce the degree of uncertainty and the potential risk raised by 
foreign competitors whom are believed to produce a high quality product.
In this circumstance, government initiative may make the private sector 
assured of the domestic market by accepting the primary risks and by •. 
changing (gradually) the consumers' tastes from the foreign goods toward 
domestic products. To this extent, that government investment can be regar­
ded complementary which reduces the degree of market risk for private 
investors. With the above explanation, one can say that the pattern of 
government investment has been affected by the private sector's under­
standing of the readiness of the market and the undertaking of necessary 
investment in the following of the government initiative in particular 
industries. In this respect, the government investment policy has changed
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Prom activities which are understood by the private sector to be assured 
to new activities which are not yet fully realized by private investors*
In other words, the pattern of investment has changed gradually from tra­
ditional to modern industries* *
Table (4-25) shows the allocation of government investment to the 
traditional and the modern sectors of manufacturing since 1955* A radical 
change appears between the three development plans; while the traditional 
manufacturing absorbed around 72 percent of the GDI in the manufacturing 
sector during 1955-62, its share declined to 10*8 percent during the Third 
Plan and about 6 percent for 1968—71* This implies that the government has 
left the traditional sector to the private investors. Particularly, if it 
is considered that the share of public investment in the total investment 
in the manufacturing has increased from 29*2 percent in the Third Plan to 
40*8 percent in the Fourth Plan, one can clearly see that the government 
policy has been the leading of the private sector to new*activities both 
in the traditional and modern sectors (table 4-26)*
As table (4-26) shows the investment in the traditionel sector 
accounts for 66*5 percent of total investment in the manufacturing sector 
during the Third Plan While its Share in the Fourth Plan is not more 
than 34*2 percent* The share of GDI in the traditional sector was very 
low during 1962-72 i*e* around 6 percent on average.Realizing the high 
share of the GDI allocated to the traditional sector during 1955-62, its 
share relative to the total investment in the traditional manufacturing 
has been far higher during this period.
The above pattern shows that there is a clear tendency toward 
investment in modern manfacturing both on the part of the private and 
public sector* In'this respect the GDI has played the leading role*
When the type of activities in the private and the public sector is 
considered, a relative different can be observed* This would reduce the
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Direct Government Investment In 
Manufacturing By Activity Since 1955
Table (4-25)___________________________________ ___________ Billion Rials
Second Plan 
1955 - 62
Third Plan 
1963 - 67
Fourth Plan 
1968 - 72
1973 - 76
Modern 2.1 16.6 94.6 160.7
(28.0) (89.2) (94.1) (85.6)
Traditional 5.4 2.0 5.9 27.1
(72.0) (10.8) (5.9) (14.4)
Total 7.5 18.6 100.5 187.8
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Note : 1- ( ) indicate percentage share in total*
Source : BMI, Annual Reports, 1965 - 76j Plan Organization, Final Reports 
of Second and Third Plans*
Distribution Of Investment In Manufacturing 
Sector By Sectors and Activities
Table (4-26) _________________________________ Billion Rials
Sector
Third Plan 
1963 - 67
Fourth Plan 
1968 - 72 1973-76
Modern Traditional Total Modern Traditional Total Total
(89.2) (10.8) (100.0) (94.2) (5.8) (100.0) ' —
Public 16.5 2.0 18.5 94.6 5.9 100,5 302.0
(78.6) (4.8) (29.4) (57.7) (6.9) (40.3) (46.8)
(10.2) (89,B) (100.0) (46.5) (53.5) (100.0) SM
Private 4.5 39.8 44.3 69.2 79.4 148.6 343.1
(21.4) (95.2) (70.6) (42.3) (93.1) (59.7) (53.2)
Total
(33.4)
21.0
(100.0)
(66.6)
41.8
(100.0)
(100.0)
62.8
(100.0)
(65.8)
163.8
(100.0)
(34.2)
85.3
(100.0)
(100.0)
249.1
(100.0)
mm
645.1
(100.0)
Note s 1- ( ) indicate the percentage share in total sector activity. The 
upper ( ) show the share in total public or private sector. The 
lower ( ) show the share in modern or traditional sector.
Source i BMI, Annual Reports, 1965 - 76j Plan Organization, Final Report 
of Third Plan.
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possibility of competition between the private and the public sector as 
far as the market absoroption is concerned. Although at the begining of 
the industrialization the GDI in the manufacturing was mainly allocated 
to the traditional sector, government activities were limited to the tex­
tile and sugar industries which accounted for 98.6 percent of the GDI in
the traditional sector. In modern manufacturing, cement industries accounted
20for 75 percent of the total GDI in the modern sector .
During the Third Plan, a clear change can be observed on the part 
of modern industries while the expansion and development of the existing 
manufacturing in the traditional sectorsmade no change in the pattern of 
activities. Government activities in the modern sector shows a clear ten­
dency toward capital intensive industries which can be classified into oil- 
oriented industries,that is chemical and petro-chemical industries, and 
heavy industries mainly basic metal. This pattern has continued during the 
Fourth Plan.
However, in addition to the expansion of the above industries, new 
investment in the machine and tool industries can be observed. As table 
(4-27) shows while the government has major contribution to the three 
sectors of manufacturing that is chemical, basic metal and mechanical and 
electrical machine and tool industries, other industries are left entirely 
to the private sector. The GDI in chemical and machine and tool industries 
accounts for 71 percent of thevtotal investment in these sectors while the 
GDI in basic metal is as large as 99.4 percent.of the total investment in 
this sector. On the one hand, the GDI policy would result in a monopolistic con-, 
ditionsin these particular modern industries, on the other hand, it would 
keep other industries out of competition with the government.
However, due to the time lag between the investment and output, ' 
especially in the government capital intensive industries, because of the 
long gestation period the pattern of value added has not reflected the same
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Distribution Of Investment In Modern Manufacturing 
By Major Sector During Fourth Plan
Table (4-27)_____________ ___________________________  Million Rials
Type Of Activities Public (1) Private Total (2) * < U
Modern Sectors
Rubber 4 Rubber Products • - 6902 . 6902 -
Chemicals 24269 9840 34109 71.1
Oil Products - 2372 2372 - -
Non-metallic Mineral - 13604 13604 -
Basic Metal 59515 265 59880 99.4
Metal Products - 14108 14108 -
Non-electrical Machinery 
Electrical Machinery jl0779 ^ 4280
9685
5374 ^  71.6
Transport Equipment - 16578 16578 -
Miscellaneous 1298 1298 -
Total 94563 69247 163810 57.7
Source s Ministry Of.Economy, Industrial Statistics Of Iran, 1972 ; and 
BMI, Annual Report, 1972.
Distribution Of Value Added By Major Sector
Table (4-28)
In Manufacturing 4 Mining 
(at Current Prices) Billion Rials
1972 1973 1974
(1) Private 160.5 215.1 284.7
(2) Large-Scale 
Establishment(plus
o•€0€0O (121.6) (175.7)
(3) Public2 11.0 16.8 28.0
(4) Total 171.5 231.9 312.7
Percentage (3)/(4) 6.4 7.3 9.0
Percentage (3)/(2) 12.5 13.8 15.9
Notes 1- Total Large-Scale including public and private.
2- For calculation see appendix (A).
Source : BMI, Annual Report, 1974J Ministry Of Economy, Iranian Industrial 
Statistics, 1974.
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pattern as that of pattern of investment up to 1972« Most of government 
manufacturing ' reached 'the first stage of production in 1972 and thus 
table (4-19) does not show the full share of government industries in the 
modern sector. As table (4-28) indicates the share of public sector in the 
total mining and manufacturing value added has increased from 6.4 percent 
in 1972 to 9 percent in 1974. With the above pattern of investment a growing 
share by the public sector in the total value added would be expected in 
the near future.
Although the pattern of the GDI has remained the same during the ; 
fourth and the fifth Plan, a clear emphasis on the arms industries can be 
seen in the projection of the fifth Plan. Around 42.4 percent of the GDI 
in the chemical and petro-chemical,'mechanical and automative industries 
has been allocated for military industries while on the non-military indust­
ries no change can be seen and the government has limited its activities
to the expansion of the existing factories that is Tabriz and Arak Machine
21and Tool factories and Arak Tractor factory. •
With the above change in the pattern of investment, the government 
is moving away from the industries it has dominated and is leaving more 
room for the private sector in the non-military industries. Private sector 
investment would be dependent upon the market capacity for the tool and 
machine products. The«effects of the above change will be seen in the long 
run, if the time lag between investment and production is considered.
However, the pattern of investment as pictured above shows that the 
modern industries would produce a large share of the value added in the 
future. With the increasing share of the public factories in the total 
value added,’ the government would have the leading role in the relative 
change. The relative change in the pattern of value added and the pattern 
of investment should also show the relative change toward large establish­
ments coming with the development of the modern sector and the moderniza—
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tion of traditional manfacturing.
Ths GDI has been totally in large scale establishments due to fac­
tors mentioned earlier. In 1972, about 72 government factories were in
operation and all of them had over 50 employees. 10 out of 35 factories
22with over 1000 workers are publicly owned. . The share of government 
employees in the large manufacturing sector is around 41 precent of large 
scale manufacturing or 30 percent of the establishments with over ten 
workers (tables 4-23 and 4-31). This shows that the potential share of the 
public sector in the large scale establishment is large and their development 
is dependent upon the government pattern of investment with regard to the 
manufacturing sector.
However, the high share of public employment should not be inter- 
prted as labour intensity of public manufacturing in Iran. The above pattern 
largely can be attributed to the rapid expasion of the public sector which 
accounts for 40 percent of the total investment in the manufacturing sector 
during 1968-72. On the contrary, public manufacturings are highly capital 
intensive. As table (4-29) shows the capital per worker in the public manu­
facturing is as high as 3346.7 thousand' Rls. in comparison with 655.8 
thousand ■ Rls. at national level (510 percent higher). Even in comparison 
with the large private establishments (over 50 workers), the public sector 
is highly capital intensive i.e. the capital per worker in the latter is 
186 percent higher than that of the former.More importantly, due to the , 
high share of government investment in total industrial investment, the 
high capital intensity in the public sector has considerably increased the 
capital pre worker at national average( the capital per worker in the 
private sector is around 425.2 thousand . Rls. which is well below the 
national level). Also, the available data in table (4-30) indicates that 
capital intensity has rapidly risen along with the expansion of the modern 
industries during 1962-72 i.e. the capital per worker rose from 215.7
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Distribution of Neu) Investment, New 
Employment and Capital Per Worker By 
Size of Establishment During 1968-72
Table (4-29)
Neu Investment 
Billion Rials
Neu Employment 
(,000) Persons
Capital Per Worker 
Thousand Rials
1
Public Sector 100.4 30.0 3346.7
Private Large 
(10 Plus)
79.0 56.0 1410.7
Total Country 249.2 380.0 655.8
Note- 1- New employment in the public manufacturing 
is 39500 persons« Here, 30,000 is estimated
sector during 
for 1968-72.
1967-72
Source: Plan and Budget Organization, Statistical Year Book of Iran 1346 
(1967) and 1351 (1972); Ministry of Economy, Iranian Industrial 
Statistics, 1968-72.
Neu Investment, Neu Employment and
Capital Per Worker in the Manufac-
turinq Sector Durinq 1962-72
Table (4-30)
Periods Neu Investment 
Billion Rials
Neu Employment 
(,000) Persons
Capital Per 
Thousand
Worker
Rials
1962-67 70.0 324.5 215.7
1968-72 249.2 380.0 655.8
1962-72 319.2 704.5 453.1
Source: Ministry of Economy, Iranian Industrial Statistics, 1968-72.
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thousands Rls. during 1962-67 to 655.8 thousands Rls. during 1968-72. This 
increase was mainly due to government investment in the capital intensive 
industries.
Despite the high capital intensive nature of public investment in 
the manufacturing sector, it has appeared to have an insignificant contri­
bution to the value added at the national level. For instance, the value 
added of public manufacturing accounted for only 6.4 percent of the total 
value added in the manufacturing sector or 12.5 percent of the large estab­
lishments (10 plus). Comparing the per worker output in the public and the 
large (over 50) private establishment, it appears that the latter produce 
a higher per worker output than the former i.e. 377,4 thousands Rls. in 
comparison with 115.8 thousands Rls. (table 4-31). There are a number of 
reasons for such a low output and value added in public manufacturing:
a) - Host of the government investment has been in projects with a long ges­
tation period, mainly in capital goods and intermediate industries. There­
fore, there is a long gap between the investment and output. Some of these 
projects started their . production in 1971-2, consequently, it may not be 
surprising to see some under-utilization of capital in the early years of 
operation. As table (4-28) shows the share of public manufacturing in the 
total industrial value added has risen from 6.4 percent in 1972 to 9 per­
cent in 1974 ( or from 12.5 percent of the large industries to 15.9 percent) 
which indicates a better utilization of the capacity.
b) - Apart from the under-utilization of capital due to the lag factor, there 
exists an under-utilization due to mismangement. If we use the profitibility 
as a criterion for efficiency, some of the government industrial companies, 
both in the traditional and modern sectors, nay not fulfill the criterion. 
Although the matter needs thorough micro-economic analysis, here, it is 
sufficient to state some examples as appear in table (4-32). Apart from
the tobacco company which enjoys the monopoly of tobacco production, the
263
Per Worker Valus added in Large Establish­
ment (Over 50 Workers) By Major Sectors in
1972( at Current Prices)
Table (4-31)______________________________________________
Sectors Private Public Total
Value Added(Bil. Rls.) 48,8 10.5 59.3
Number of Workers 129.3 90.7 220.0
(,000) Persons
Per Worker Value- 
added (jOOO)Rls.
377.4 115.8 265.5
Source: See tables
Profit:; and (Losses)^of Selected Major
Government Industriel Companies during 
1972-5
Table (4-32) Million Rials
1972 1973 1974 1975
Mazandarn Textile 
Company ^
179.7 174.0 192.8 251.3
Textile Companies (69.7) (35.4) - -
Tobacco Company 5993.0 5721.4 6223.1 6486.1
Varamin Sugar (31.2) (52.9) (90.6) (8.2)
Company
Ray Cement Company (59.3) (66.8) (65.3) (114.5)
Steel Company (5078.1) (4164.3) — ? —
Arak Machine 4 .Tool (238.9) (382.9) (288.9) (549.9)
Company
Aluminium Company (53.9) (603.0) 63.3 (401.9)
Tractor Company 27.8 265.5 295.2 314.4
Tabrize Machine 4 (121.3) (360.5) (423.3) (317.7)
Tool Company
Petro-chemical (151.2) (34.7) 63.2 660.4
Company
Note- 1- Figures in ( ) indicate losses
2- This item includes 13 public'textile compariies.whose'
financial performance came under a supervisory company. There­
fore, their separate financial performances do not come in Budget. 
Source: Budget Acts for 1353 to 1356 (1974-1977).
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others either have produced substantial losses or have operated at a 
marginal profit.
c)- Some of the government capital goods industries have suffered from 
under-utilization of capacity in the early years of operation. In so far 
as this under-utilization is due to market limitation, it may remain as 
an important factor causing the high cost of production in these indus­
tries. In other words, the lack of sufficient demand for such products 
may reduce the possibility of using an economic of scale. In this respect, 
there are two factors to be considered:
1- The expansion of capital goods industires is largely dependent on the 
expansion of the consumer goods and particularly consumer durable goods 
industries. Without any change in the pattern of distribution of income, 
the Iranian economy may have reached the limits imposed by the income- 
elasticity of demand for consumer goodsj this would reduce the demand for 
intermediate and capital goods. Apparently, this has been the case with 
the failure of the engineering firm in Iran during 1972-77. Tor Instance, 
the Tractor Company which produces final products has been able to improve 
its operation while Arak and Tabriz Machine and Tool Companies are still 
producing annual losses after six years of operation (table 4-32). Moreover, 
the possibility of export for capital goods is very low and the domestic 
market has to be considered as the only demand. On the contrary, the develop­
ment of petro-chemical industries is largely dependent on the international 
market as they had originally been considered as export oriented industries 
(see also chapter 8).
2- There exists a technological problem with regard to adaptation of East­
ern European technology to Western technology. The government capital , . 
goods industries are based on Eastern European technology while those 
consumer goods industries in the prit/ate sector from which the demand for 
capital goods should come are based on Western technology. Not only may the
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linkage between the Iranian private sector and the western countries be 
strong enough not to accept a switch towards the Eastern European techno­
logy, but also, the difference in technology may make such adaptation 
difficult and may hamper the deepening of the process of production. This 
would reduce the possibility of bridging the existing gap within the 
manufacturing sector and strengthening the linkages within this sector.
4-3-2-2 Government Direct and Indirect Assistance 
Provision of Credit (GCP)
While all the GDI has been in the capital intensive industries, the 
government assistance and credit have encouraged capital intensity in the 
private sector. The government assistance either directly through the Plan 
Organization or indirectly through the industrial banks has been allocated 
to the large establishments.
The government assistance through the Plan Organization was around 
5 percent of the total private investment during 1952-72, It moved up to 
15 percent during 1973-76 along with the rapid increase in government 
revenue(table'4-33)* However, government assistance through the Plan Organ­
ization has not been the only government credit provided for the encourage­
ment of industrial activity in the private sector. The main credit has been 
provided through the banking system and particularly the industrial banks 
which act on the part of the government. The distribution of loans through 
the industrial banks by the different industries and by the size of estab­
lishment would show to what extent the government has encouraged capital 
intensity in the manufacturing sector.
There are four sources of fi nancing for the industrial sector, the 
Bazaar, the commerial banks, foreing investors and industrial banks. Table 
(4-34) shows the total private investment in manufacturing and mining and
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the share of different sources of finance during 1962-76. It indicates that 
at least around 18.8 to 20.3 percent of the needed funds in the industrial 
sector have corae from the traditional non-bank sources (mainly the Bazaar). 
During this period a relative change can.be seen in the relative importance 
of commercial and industrial banks. While the share of the former has dec­
lined from 54,6 percent during 1962-72 to 42.7 percent during 1973-76, the 
share of the latter has risen from 20.5 percent to 32.7 percent. This re­
lative change has an important implication with regard to the appropriate­
ness of the credit for industrial activities. Here, we will briefly examine 
the nature of the first two sources and a detailed examination of the indus­
trial banks1 activities.will ensue.
The Dazaar which is an unorganised traditional money market provides
short-term loans with a maturity of 3 to 9 month for financing trade, real
estates and building,and a part of industry's working capital. Since no
specific item of collateral is needed and the process of transaction is
informal as well as familiar to both lenders and borrowers, the Bazaar has
remained as the main source of fund to small scale indudtries, despite the
high rate of interest charged on loans (usually 200 percent higher than
23that of commercial banks .)•
Commercial banks are largely engaged in a similar activity to that 
of the Bazaar and supply short-term funds with a maturity of less than a 
year at a moderate rate of interest usually around 12 to 14 percent. Cont­
rary to the Bazaar, commercial banks require a high collateral usually 
about double the amount of the loan. Due to the high collateral needed for 
the acquisition of a loan, even the large industrial units find themselves 
unable to provide such collateral if more than one or two loans are needed. 
The.small scale industries are not able by a long way to fulfill the nece­
ssary conditions. This and the low credit worthiness of small scale indus­
tries make them unattractive to the commerial banks. Therefore, one can
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Disbursement of Plan Organization For 
Industry and Wines During The Third and 
Fpurth Plans and 1973-76
Table (4-33) Billion Rls.
Third Plan Fourth Plan 1973-76
Direct Govern- 19.6 104.5 240.8
ment Investment % (81.7) (92.4) (74.5)
Assistance to the 4.4 8.6 61.4
Private Sector (1)?S (18.3) (7.6) (25.5)
Total 24.0 113.1 302.2
% (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Ratio of V  Pri- . .  •- . ..
Vate Investment 5.0 15.0
Source: BMI* Annual Report, 1965-76J Plan Organization , Final Report of
Third Plan,
Sources of Finance For Prlvate Investment
Durino 1962-76
Table (4-34) Billion Rls.
. 1962-72 1973-76
Total Privale Investment 220.3 404.3 ,
% (100.0) .(100.0)
Finanacing:
Industrial Banks 45.3 132.3
% '(20.5) (32.7)
Commercial Banks 120.5 172.8
ort/o (54.6) (42.7)
Foreign Investment 13.5 17.2
• % (6.1) (4.2)
Non-Bank Sources 41.5 82.0
tsf (18.8) (20.4)
7
and Fourth Plans.
Share of Different Industrial Banks in Total 
Credit
Table (4-35)
1962-72 1973-76
Value • 
in Billion Rls.
Percen­
tage
Value. , .. 
Billion Rls.
Percen­
tage
IPIDBI 32.7 74.0 80.9 60.9
ICB 9.6 21.7 42.2 31.7
IGF 1.9 4.3 9.8 7.4
Total 44.2 100.0 132.9 100.0
. . . .
Source: See Table (3-34).
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assume that the limited funds supplied by the commercial banks benefit 
large ¡scale manufacturing ( the main commercial bank which supplies 
industrial loans is Bank flelli Iran, the government owned bank),
presumably, the industrial banks provide the most suitable type of 
credit. These banks supply medium and long term loans which are the most 
appropriate for the industrial sector, therefore, their role is very impor­
tant in the execution of government credit policy. There are three main 
different industrial banks, Industrial Guarantee Fund ( IGF, later it was 
transferred to Qmran Bank, government commercial bank), Industrial Credit 
Bank (ICB) and Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran (IMDBI).
The IGF was founded in 1962 with the object of serving small indust­
ries, The maximum loan was determined at a level of 5 Million Rials per 
borrower which was later raised in order to serve the medium sized loans. 
IGF has received some loans from the Plan Organization which has been lent 
at an interest rate of 2,5 percent. However, Omran Bank has followed a 
general commercial bank policy for its allocation of credit to industrial 
units i.e. requiring a substantial collateral, about 200 percent, Also, 
its poor service and bureaucratic procedure (the number of barnches are 
limited and the loans must be approved by the Head office in Tehran) has 
made the utilization of such fund by small scale industries very difficult. 
Particularly, the IGF fund is less than sufficient; it accounted for 4,6 
percent of the total credit provided by the industrial banks, during 1962- 
72, However, more attention has been paid to the IGF during 1973-76 when 
the government has been able to allocate a large sum of money to this fund; 
its share has risen to 7,4 percent ( table 4-35),
The rural industries are in an even worse position with regard to 
government financial assistance. The IGF has concentrated its activities 
in the urban areas. Apart from the allocation of the Plan Organization for 
the centralization of the carpt industries which is very insignificant,
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the rquired credit has been provided through the unorganized money maket. 
However, a small amount has been made available through rural co-opratives 
for the rural industries. In 1972 one Million Rls was allocated to handi­
crafts and carpet weaving which was less than 0.0001 percent of total co-
25oprative credit and well below the required credit • Similar to the urban
small scale industries, the rural industries have to pay a high interest
rate on loans, although the interest charge may be hidden due to advanced
sales in most cases. Lack of cheap loans and an organized money market has
reduced the share of rural families in the increaded value added in rural
manufacturing. As the consequence, the handi-craft producers and carpet
weavers are in the weak bargaining position. An estimate for 1967-72 reckons
that carpet prices rose at the rate of 12 to 20 percent annually while
26wages in the carpet industries rose by only 5 percent .
While the government has not provided the necessary credit for the 
development of the urban-small and rural industries, the IMDBI and ICB !.■ 
have concentrated on large projects and have provided medium and long term 
loans. Both banks follow more or less the same policy with regred to eva­
luation of projects and charge a similar rate of interest around 9 to 1o 
percent. The only difference which can be seen between the above two indus­
trial banks is that the IMDBI's minimum loan: is higher than the ICB's ( 5 
Millions Rls. compared with 3 Million Rls.) and the credit granted by the 
former is more diversified. The ICB has concentrated on two main indust­
ries, food and textiles which account for 90 percent of its credit. These 
two banks account for around 95 percent of the total credit granted by the 
industrial banks, of which the IMDBI has the largest share i.e. 70 percent 
( table 4-35), Therefore, it is the IMDBI policy which determined the 
government'8 credit policy.
The IMDBI's objectives as declared by the bank have been to stimu­
late industrial development by assisting in the creation, expansion and
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modernization of private firms by encouraging and sponsoring participa-
27
tion of private capital, local and foreign, in such firms • The bank has 
pursued its objectives with different degrees of emphasis» It has largely 
provided long and medium term loans while its participation in the share 
capital of companies has occupied a second place and sponsoring and under 
writing have had a marginal effect.
In its policy, the IMDBI has clearly financed the large scale estab­
lishments. The minimum amount of credit is determined at a level of 5 Mill­
ion Rls. which has ruled out the accessibility of the IMDBI's fund to small 
and even medium scale establishments. A large share of application for 
loans have been rejected on this ground. As table (4-36) shows during 1959- - 
75, only 1.5 percent of signed loans have*been allocated to the under 15 
Million Rls. bracket while the group over 150 Million Rls. accounts for 
70.9 percent of the total signed loans. Not only has the share of the 
lowest bracket been low, but there also exists a clear and significant ten­
dency toward financing highly capital intensive projects. The share of the 
lowest bracket has declined from 6.3 percent during 1959-70 to almost zero 
in 1975, while the share of the highest bracket has increased from 33.6 
perecent to 91.9 percent. More importantly, the average loan in absolute 
terms in the highest group has risen from 218.2 Million in 1959-70 to 736.9 
Million Rls. in 1975( table 4-36). The above shows that the IMDBI not only 
has been financing the large capital intensive industries, but it has also 
responded sharply and has accelerated the process by reducing the share 
of smaller loans in the total credit.
The financing of capital intensive projects has not been limited 
to a special industry, but as appears in table (4-37) these projects 
have spread across the board in whatever industry that the pattern of 
protection and the potential profitlbility has been favourable. Uhile in 
the early years of development of IMDBI (1961-2) financial constraint had
IMOBI's Classification of Signed 
Loans Bv Size
Table (4—36) ______ ____________________________________________ _________ Million Ris»
Size of 
Million 
From
Loan
Rls.
Up to
1959-70 1975-76 1959-76
Averane Loan 
1959-70 1975-76
15 1182.8 11.8 - 1450*5j 9.6 5.9
% (6.3) (-) (1.5)
15 25 1275.4 104.5 1977.7; 20.9 17.4
% (6.7) (0.3) (2.1)
25 45 2275.1 711.7 4451.1 34.0 33.9
% (12.0) (2.1) (4.7)
45 75 2918.6 566.1 6371.8 56.1 56.6
% (15.4) (1.7) (6.7)
75 150 4914.8 1341.8 13374.7 104.6 103.2
% (26.0) (4.0) (14.1)
150 and Over 6326.5 30949.0 ‘ 67164.9 ' 218.2 736.9
% (33.6) (91.9) (70.9)
Total 18893.2 33684.9 94790.7 49.9 358.3
Sourceî IMDBI, Annual Report, 1971 and 1975-6.
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Classification of IMDBI's Financial
Rv Activity Durinq 1959-76
Table (4-37)
Type of Activity Value of Loans 
Million Rials
Percentage
Comnsumer Godds 28889.8 36.5
Food 9658.2 12.2
Textiles 17498.9 22.1
Wood 1152.6 1.5
Leather 580.1 0.7
Intermediate Goods 32120.9 40.6
Paper 4 Printing 3101.1 3.9
Rubber 1719.2 2.2
Chemicals 2144.6 2.7
Petroleum Products
■
Non-metallic &  Mineral
590.7 0.8
13578;? 17.1
Pletal Products 10986.6 13.9
Basic Metal - -
Capital Goods 18167.9 22.9
Industrial Machinery 506.2 0.6
Electrical Machinery , 7519.1 9.5
Transport Equipment
t
8868.6 11.2
"■* Miscellaneous 1274.0 1.6
Total 79178.6 100.0
Source: IMDBI, Annual Report, 1971 and 1975-6.
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limited industrial loans to the main existing industries, textiles and
28
food, which accounted for 50 percent of the assigned loans , the bank > 
has rapidly expanded its loans to other industries during 1959-75, During 
this period, on average, around 36,5 percent of the total loans allocated 
to the manufacturing sector have been in the consumer goods industries,
40,6 percent in the intermediate industries and 22,9 percent in the capital 
goods industries. In comparison to the pattern of protection( see the 
section of protection policy pp285 , table4-39 ), the IflDBI loans to 
diffierent industries show a similar pattern, .âlthough not solely affected 
by the protection policy. In early 1960's when consumer goods industries 
received around 82 percent of the tariff protection, this group also 
accounted for the largest share of industrial credits (50 percent for tex­
tiles and food). With the increase in the protection of other groups, for 
example intermediate industries (from 11,8 percent in 1965 to 21,6 percent 
in 1970, see pp 285 ), the share of IPlDBI's credit to this group increased 
rapidly (see table 4-37), Although the loan has been spread across the 
board, the relative stress on various food processing activities ranging 
from vegetable oil to fruit canning, textile fabrics for more expensive
goods types of products or for synthetic yarns, and consumer durable goods
29like radios, refrigerators, TV and so on , indicates that there has been 
a strong tendency toward financing those industries which are oriented 
toward resource availibility and import substitution. It is also notice­
able that the only industries which havo received relatively small share 
of the credit are either those with substantial government investment 
like the basic metal, petro-chemical and machine and tools industries, or 
those with a large traditional component in which the small scale estab­
lishments play a dominant role.
Although the above pattern of credit shows that the INDBI's credit 
policy has, to some extent, followed the pattern of protection, it has also
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been affected by the profitibility consideration and the government social
cost benefit criteria. On the one hand, the IMDBI which is a private bank
and working according to world bank policy has to consider the Internal
Rate of Return (IRR) as the method of evaluation of projects. In this way,
the IMDBI ensures the profitibiltiy of the projects and minimizes the risk
on its loans. On the other hand, the government,which provided 63 percent
of the total share capital at the begining of IMDBIls opration and has also
30accounted for around 40 percent of the total IMDBI'S fund; ,can influence 
the process of evaluation through its licensing system. In order to apply 
for a loan from the IMDBI, entrepreneurs have to obtain a "commencement 
licence" from the Ministry of Economy. In this way, the Ministry of Economy 
can determine the initial eligibility of an entrepreneur and a project 
before application can be made for a 'subsidized'loan. Therefore, it is 
assumed that the social cost-benefit. ' of projects will be taken care of 
by the Ministry of Economy before projects are submitted for a loan to the 
IMDBI. The extent to which the government can affect the pattern of credit 
in the manufacturing sector depends on the degree of effectiveness of the 
government licensing system. In practice, not only has the licensing sys­
tem no effect on the direction of the pattern of credit as will be explaind 
below, but also, since there are a large number of choices for the IMDBI, 
the most socially desirable projects can be easily rejected on private 
profitibility basis and the degree of effectiveness of the licensing sys­
tem will be limited by the adverse judging of the IMDBI. Practically, it 
is the IMDBI which from time to time suggests a package of promotional 
projects to the Ministry of Economy the feasibility of which is already 
assured, Therefore, the licensing system, in this respect, may have little 
practical use for ensuring or exerting the general objectives of govern­
ment policy.
However, the effectiveness of the licensing system, which is assumed
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to take care of the social cost -benefit consideration, is largely depen­
dent on the efficiency of the administration in using the social cost-bene­
fit criteria. Theoretically, the government is able to control the minium 
size of establishment, type of activities and the location of industries 
and encourage the integration of the domestic market through its licensing 
system. Although there is no legal requirement, any entrepreneur who wants 
to benefit from government promotional policies with regard to an increased 
protection against competing foreign goods, tax and tariff exemption, import 
permits and subsidized loans must obtain a license or 'commencement permit' 
issued by the Ministry of Economy. Wot only has this system of licensing 
little parctical effects on the control and the direction of the pattern 
of credit, employmnet and production, but it may also create reverse and 
undesirable effect on these patterns because of the following reasons:
a)- The licensing system has pursued too many objectives,too broad and 
sometimes cotradictory whitout specific criteria. Up to 1970, the evalua­
tion of projects was more or less arbitrary. It is only since 1970 that 
the government has introduced some basic criteria to ensure a deepening 
industrial process and to promote industrial employment. First, a minimum 
value added requirement at a level of 35 percent of the value of output 
has been set up. Second, a 65 percent ratio has been determined for the 
minimum domestic content of any newly licensed products. In other words, 
the import content must not exceed) 35 percent of the value of the products • 
The first condition is to serve its function for encouraging employment, 
but this condition could well be an incentive to increase the relative 
share of profit in the total value added. This is likely to be the case 
when the capital has been undervalued due to the subsidized loans avail­
able to large ecale establishments and it may wali encourage capital inten­
sity • Realizing this problem, the government has modified the critria 
by specifying the non-profit component of value .add at a rate of 20 percent
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of ex-factory price. Still, not only the over-valuation of the non-profit
component is a common practice in order to avoid tax on profit, taking into
account that the average non-profit component of value added in the large
32
industries in 1972 was around 20 percent of output, the above criterion 
can only ensure the maintenance of the existing level of employment and it 
may not encourage labour intensity in the industrial sector. As far as the 
second criterion, which is to encourage the deepening, of the process of 
production, is concerned, it does not consider the import component of 
domestic inputs and it may only have a marginal effect rather than deter­
mining the direction of development of the industrial sector. Altogether, 
the licensing system, in practice, has ended into a book of selected pro­
jects. As one observer of Iranian economy has concluded " ..., the paradox
is that recoures to the book implies discrimination against all projects
33or all activities which do not fit the book,"
b) - Since the licensing system grants financial and economic privilege to 
those who are able to obtain it and it is not a requirement for commencing 
industrial activities, it may discriminate against the small scale estab­
lishment. Taking into account that the administrative procedure is complex, 
time consuming and difficult, one may assume this privilege will be limited 
to particular industrialists familiar with the procedure and especially 
available to large establishments which are able to deal with the bureauc­
ratic system.
c) — It is assumed that the licensing system would reduce the unnecssary 
competition which may result in over production and lowering the minimum 
economic size of establishment below what is considered optimal for the 
utilization of the economic of scale. Therefore, the number of projects
in each industry is determined by the Ministry of Economy. If several pros­
pective investors apply for licensing in excess of the capacity considered
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desirable, the question of investor selection will arise. The more profit­
able a license, the keener will be thB competition. In these cases, "the 
general tendency has been to favour those investors who have capital of 
their own, adequate to take up a reasonable share of the financing required, 
whose technical knou^-how and managerial capablity are already established,
or who can be counted upon to provide these through their relation with
34foreign investors," In this way, by obtaining licenses in a particular 
field of industry, prominent industrialists would protect their position 
by preventing new comers to the field. This would result in a monopolistic 
or oligopolistic situation and concentration of economic power within the 
industrial structure, particulrly, in those fields in which the number of 
licenses has been limited due to the minimum economic size.consideration.
The above analysis of the licensing system indicates that not only 
has the government not been able to correct the distortion created by the 
profit consideration of the IP1DBI, but'it has also reinforced the process 
by more distortion with regard to the creation of a monopolistic situation 
and discrimination against small scale establishments. Also, .it was shown 
that the licensing system has not been able to use cost-benefit criteria 
and has undermined the employment creation. The expansion of small and 
medium size establishments has suffered from a relative lack of capital 
at the prefferential rates both due to the ICB and IPIDBI credit policies 
and the government lincensing system. Overall, the government has changed 
the relative factor proportion by cheapening capital relative to labour 
and has encouraged the capital intensive industries against small scale 
and labour intensive industries.
Government Tax Policy (GTP)
Taking into account the effect of oil revenue on the structure of 
the Iranian tax system ( see chapters 6 and 8), the government of Iran more 
than any other developing country has been able to grant enormous tax incen—
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tives for investment in newly established and expanding industries as well 
as for promotion of exports. However, there is no comprehensive analysis 
to measure the degree of effectiveness of such tax incentives. While the 
structure of the tax incentive in Iran may indicate that it would have no 
significant effect on the reallocation of resources and directing invest­
ment towards a particular planned field of the economy, it is a financial 
loss to the government.
Generally, tax incentives are granted in the form of a tax hbliday 
for 5 to 10 years to all newly established productive industries as defined 
by the Ministry of Economy* The published industrial table, which indicates 
those industries which do not enjoy the tax holiday, covers only a few 
industries including alcoholic beverages, chewing-gum and ice-cream fac­
tories, cosmetics and few others (see chapter 6). Therefore, all industries 
receive a 100 percent tax holidayJlf they operate outside a 120 Kilometers 
radius of Tehran( they receive 50 percent tax holiday if they are located 
inside 50 Kilometers of Isfahan) (see chapter 6). The tax incentive as such 
may be considered as desirable for the geographical distribution of invest­
ment. But, since the prerequisite to a tax holiday is an operation license, 
the government can exert its policy through licensing which has prohibited 
certain areas for new industrial plants or even expansion of established 
plants (including the Tehran zone). Thus a tax incentive is neither nece­
ssary nor practical when the geographical distribution is controlled through 
direct measures.
However, tax holiday by its nature has a limited effect on the sti­
mulation of industrial development. In the early years of a plant's opera­
tion, profit are very low and very often losses may incurred which reduce 
the incentive effect of a tax holiday. Particularly, since the losses can 
be carried forward for only three years, the losses during the first two 
years of a company's operation cannot be used as an offset against profit
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earned after the five years tax holiday* While the incentive effects of 
the tax holiday to each individual firm may be insignificant, it will in­
crease the rate of return of capital if the tax holiday is granted to a 
large number of firms in different industries as in the case of Iran ,
This would be an incentive to increase the tendency toward capital inten­
sive industries. This, planned or unplanned, objective has been pursued 
also by other forms of tax incentives:
1) - Profit reinvested in new factories is exempted from income taxation 
provided the amount exceeds 5 percent of theplant's fixed assets (see 
chapter 6).
2) -If a company’s capital is divided exclusively into registered shares, 
held by no less than 100 shareholders, none of whom hold more than 10 
percent of equity, the company is exempt from the basic 10 percent cor­
porate income tax. In addition, 15 percent of taxable profits is exempted 
if a company's share is quoted on the stock exchange (see chapter 6). 
3^-Tncome derived from interest paid on deposits with the banking system 
and the interest paid on the government bills and bonds is exempted from 
income tax (see chapter 6).
4)-Income derived from the export share of a business is entirely exempted 
from income tax. Also, imported materials and components entering into 
these exported products are eligible for drawbacks on the import duties 
paid (see chapter 6).
The first three can encourage the capital intensity in different 
ways. By granting tax incentive to profit without considering tax incentive 
for a'number of employed workers, the tax incentive may discriminate against 
labour intensive industries. Tax incentive has also been used for the 
improvement of the capital market which ultimately will lead to cheapen­
ing the capital and therefore encourage capital intensity. Obviously, 
capital intensity is a sign of the development of large industries which
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has also been promoted through encouraging the corporate form of organiza­
tion. Therefore, the government policy has largely been in favour of the 
development of large scale and particularly capital intensive industries.
The fourth indicates that the government of Iran like any other 
country has encouraged exports of any kind through tax incentives. However, 
the degree of effectiveness of such policy depends on the structure of the 
protection policy and the structure of the domestic market. It is true that 
the exemption of exports from corporation tax may remove some of the bias 
against exports created by the protection policy. This tax incentive will 
be effective as export promotion only when corporations are not able to 
pass on the tax burden (which the corporation is subject to pay against 
its domestic share of sale) to the dometic consumers. The tax burden can 
not be passed on to the consumer only if two conditions are fulfilled at 
the same time. First, the price of the product in the domestic market 
should be determined in the full competition in which the price is equal 
to the average cost of production. Second, this price should be equal to 
the c.i.f. price of the same product plus the tariff protection. Under 
these conditions an equilibrium can be created between domestic and inter­
national markets in which any incrase in price from the domestic producer 
will result in losing a share of the market to foreign competitors provided 
the protection rate is not changed. However, if the price is already estab­
lished and a tariff redundancy exists, the tax exemption for export may 
not be effective. This can operate only when the tariff redundancy is re­
moved and an increase in the tax rate is to come. This may force the domes­
tic producers to look for a marginal increase in their profit by reducing 
the tax liabilities through expansion of their exports. Still, one should 
consider that the tax incentive cannot make an industry competitive in 
the international market, if its cost of production is higher than that 
prevailing in the world market. As far as the effect of tax incentives on
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exports in Iran is concerned, one.may say that none of the above conditions 
exists; tariff protection is redundant and the market is highly imperfect, 
dominated by monopolies and oligopolies. This means that corporations will 
largely concenrate their activities on the domestic market and the tax 
incentives for exports will be less effective.
Protection Policy
The present protection policy with some modification came to exist 
in 1958 and particularly has been used since 1961-62. It is a complex 
system that consists of a) tariff protection, b) quantitative measure, 
c) compulsory deposit and e) registration fees ( for detailed examination 
of the tariff system see chapter 6).
a) - Tariff protection consists of two patts, custom duties and commercial 
benefit tax. The former which is a duty imposed on imports must be ratified 
by the Majles (House of Commons). The rates levied on imports have remained 
more or less unchanged in order to prevent fluctuation in the government 
revenue from custom duties. Nevertheless, whenever the tariff protection 
for the whole of the economy is to be raised, custom duties have been pushed 
up. Therefore, it has little effect on the relative change in the import 
tance of different industries. The latter is an indirect tax levied on 
imports similar to custom duties. Rates of duties are soley determined by 
the government administration and therefore enjoy a great flexibility and 
effectiveness relative to custom duties (for detail of change in rates see 
chapter 6).
b) Quantitative Restrictions- Importation of certain commodities have been 
prohibited because the domestic production of such goods i9 sufficient to 
meet the domestic demand. In 1971,this category accounted for 20 percent 
of total imports # Also, importation of certain commodities is subject
to special licenses. This involves goods which are regarded as important 
for general health, security and agricultural growth.
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c) - Compulsory Deposit- Importers are obliged to deposit a certain propor­
tion of the value of their imports with the central bank. Different rates 
have been used to discriminate against the importation of goods according
to the government protection policy ranging between zero percent for capital 
goods to 100 percent for luxury consumer goods. Since, in this way, substan­
tial capital can be tied up for a period of three months to one year, it 
can be considered as a supplementary tool for the promotion of certain 
industries, however these effects are marginal.
d) - Registration fees- The registration fee is a small percentage of the 
value of imports which importers are obliged to pay at the time when import 
orders are placed. The rates charged on imports were between one to 5.5 
percent until it wa3 lifted in 1974 ( see chapter 6). Since it has been 
used more or less indiscriminately for the whole range of commodities, it 
has little effect on the structure of the manufacturing sector. Neverthe­
less, it has provided general protection for the whole of the domestic market.
The above showed the structure of the protection policy. How effec­
tively it has been used and what has been its impact on the structure of 
the manufacturing sector is hard to say in the absence of the necessary 
data on the nominal and effective tariff and a thorough examination of such 
effects. Here, we only try to show the pattern very briefly, based on the 
scattered data and some other studies.
The nominal protection for the economy as a whole can be seen from 
table (4-38) which shows the percentage of the custom revenue relative t0 
imports. While the nominal protection ratio has remained stable at some 20 
percent during the 1960's, it rose to 24 percent during 1970-73 and then 
suddenly declined to around 14 percent by 1976. The decline in the rate of 
protection in the last years has been a consequence of the government's 
liberal policy in order to reduce inflationary pressures ( see chapters 
6 and 7). This has been largely due to the reduction of the rate of commer-
Nominal Tariff Protection For the
Whole Economy During 1964-76
Table (4-38)
1964 1967 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976
Custom Revenue'(l) 
Billion Rials
11.2 18.2 26.9 60.7 63.6 92.6 121.6
Value of Imports (2) 
Billion Rials
56.8 90.5 128.3 253.2 448.1 800.8 860.4 .
Ratio 1/2 
Percentage
19.7 20.1 20.9 24.0 14.2 11.6 14.1
Source: 8MI, Annual Report, 1965-76; Plan and Budget Organization, Statistical Year 
Book 1972-76.
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cial benefit tax for some necessities and lifting the registration fees. 
However, the above picture is incomplete and underestimates the real pro­
tection enjoyed by the manufacturing sector during this period for the 
following reasons:
First, it covers the economy as a whole therefore it includes those goods 
which are not classiifed as manufactured.products.
Second, it does not take into account the relative importane of protection 
based on the domestic value added and output.
Third, it does not show the importance of the different industries.
Fourth,since a lerge range of domestic production is protected by quanti­
tative restrictions, the simple nominal rate of tariff protection does not 
show the importance of the quantitative restrictions.
Although us will try to complete the picture by dropping some of 
the above restrictions, we will not carry on our analysis beyond the effect 
of average and nominal rates of protection. Nevertheless, an attempt will 
be made to show the effect of the quantitative measures. When the average 
nominal tariff for the manufacturing sector alone is considered, contrary 
to the economy as a whole, it shows a four fold increase during the 1960's. 
This gave the manufaturing sector a nominal rate of tariff protection of 
around 120.7 percent in 1970 (table 4-39)-which is around 600 percent 
higher than that of the economy as a whole. More importantly, a comparison 
between 1965 and 1970 shows that the aggregate protection for the manufac­
turing sector rose at a lower rate during 1965-70 than in the first half 
of the 1960's. One reason for this lowsr increase in the rate of protect 
tion is that the major consumer industries, which accounted for a large 
share of domestic products, by 1965 had received a high enough rate of pro­
tection to compete against foreign suppliers. Also, they have received pro­
tection through quantitative restriction which is not reflected in the
above nominal ratio
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Average Nominal Protection By 
Industries In 1965 and 1970
Table (4-39)
Type of Industry Average Nominal 
Protection
Percentage Share of 
Protection
1965 1970 1965 1970
Consumer Goods 131.4 138.8 82.6 71.1
Food 121.0 65.0
Beverages 351.8 485.0
Tobacco 239.0 264.0
Textiles 90.1 94.0
Apparel 144.1 236.0
Wood Products 126.5 195.0
Leather 179.3 253.0
Intermediate Goods 59.0 97.9 11.8 21.6
Paper 4 Printing 11.7 56.0
Rubber 55.4 66.0
Chemicals 58.1 116.0
Basic Metals 18.7 87.0
Metal Products 42.6 55.0
Non-metallic 4 81.8 137.0
Minerals
Capital Goods 55.1 84.4 4.4 7.2
Machinery 30.4 59.0
Trasport Equipment 70.7 104.0
Other Industries 69.8 12.0 1.2 0.1
Total 108.3 120.7 100.0 100.0
Source: United Nations, ECAFE, Effective Protection and inter-regional 
trade, Vol., II, 1972; Ministry of Economy, Iranian Industrial 
Statistics 1970-71; General Import-Export Regulations 1970-71; 
Ministry of Finance, Foreign'.Trade Statistics of Iran, 1960-61 
and 1969-70; Plan Organization, Statistial Year Book 1967,
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Along with the rising of the average nominal protection, an import­
ant change can be seen in the structure of protection. As table (4-39) shows, 
while the average nominal tariff protection on the consumer goods group 
remained more or less unchanged during 1965-70, it rose rapidly in the 
case of intermediate and capital goods industries. But the rate of pro­
tection is 8till higher for consumer goods than for other groups. Taking 
into account that most of the consumer goods industries started in the 1950's 
or early 1960's, it may be possible to argue that, as we said above, by the 
mid 1960's they had reached a degree of efficiency which could compete 
against foreign producers under the existing tariff shelter, Uhen we. look 
at the group of consumer goods, it appears that the average nominal tariff 
for two of the most important traditional industries, food and textiles, 
either were reduced or remained more or less unchanged, while for other 
manufacturing industries in this group, the average nominal tariff rates 
rose. Although the rising of efficiency may have been an important factor, 
it must be recognised that the consumer goods industries , which are able 
to produce sufficiently to meet the domestic demand, are also protected 
through quantitative restrictions.
However, the average rate of tariff for each manufacturing group 
hides a considerable variation which exists among individual tariff rates 
imposed on the different products within the same manufacturing group. For 
example, in chemical industries, the tariff rate varied from zero on DDT 
and fertiliser to 300 percent on cosmetics and related products. Similarly,
in the transport equipment sector there is a range from zero for boats to
37300 percent on luxury cars , These examples illustrate the general pattern 
of tariff rates, typically very low on essential consumer and capital goods, 
and very high on luxury and non-essential items. Another shortcoming of 
the average nominal tariff is that it includes those commodities which 
are not produced domestically but enter into international trade. Although
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it can be argued that this may distort tha pattern of protection, it should be
understood that it still can encourage investment in those field which have
been protected and produce the same effects on the reallocation of resources*
The above shows only one side of the protection policy* On the other
side, we can see the change in the pattern arid importance of the quantitative
restriction. Between 25 to 35 percent of imports were sheltered through the
quantitative restrictions. Taking into account that the share of these groups
in the total domestic value added is high, it indicates the importance of the
quantitative restriction in the structure of protection; it is estimated that
around 3/4 of maufacturing products were protected through quantitative
restriction in 1970* Depending on the sufficiency of products to meat the
domestic demand, the degree of protection granted to different groups of
industries and to different industries in each group is different* The non»
durable consumer goods and transport equipment received the heaviest protec»
tion followed by intermediate goods* For the consumer goods group, the rate
varies between 100 percent for beverages to 13*5 percent for leather* In the
intermediate group, rubber with 100 percent protection was at the top of
the group and paper with zerp was in the bottom of the group* In the capital
goods industries, transport received 94*3 percent protection through the
38quantitative restriction while machinery enjoyed 68*1 percent *
The above pattern of quantitative restrictions indicates that those 
industries which have reached the stage of mass production and produce 
sufficiently to meet the domestic demand are entirely protected through the 
quantitative restrictions* One consequence of such a highly protected eco» 
nomy is the creation of a monopoly in certain industries which means higher 
prices to consumers and misallocation of resources* However, if there 
exists keen comeptition within the domestic market, it will, to some 
extent,,correct the created distortion* As we have explained, the govern» 
ment policy with regard to credit and direct control have reinforced the
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process of creation of a monopolistic condition. If such a situation exists, 
it is hard to believe that domestic competition can be so effective.
However, since 1973, the Iranian economy has undergone s substantial 
change with regard to protection policy. Although the change have bsen 
brought about to combat'inflationary pressures, they have affected the 
degree of protection of the manufacturing sector. In the absence of data 
for 1970 onward, we may rely on the estimation for the economy as a whole 
which shows a sharp decline in the protection rates. The tariff reduction 
and the loosening of the quantitative restriction have reduced the protec­
tion of the consumer goods industries. Also, the registration fees have 
been lifted which can indiscriminately affect the manufacturing sector as 
a whole. Therefore, it is likely that the tariff redundancy in some manufac­
turing products should have been diminished by 1976( also see chapter 6).
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Conclusion
With regard to the development of public utilities, the distribution 
effects of gevernment*.e)q>enditure have been undermined» Only a small frao- 
tion of the society has benefited from government expenditure» The govern­
ment policy, in this respect also, has encouraged Wasteful use of the services 
in the more optional and luxury uses and has undermined the optimal utiliza­
tion of scarce resources» The government policy with regard to the public 
utilities has been affected by the government agricultural policy and the 
choice of channel of finance i»e» taxation» The latter has been affefeted by 
the source of government revenue» Since a large share of government revenue 
is provided through oil money, it has given the state a degree of independence 
and the tax payer opinion'about the expenditure may have bean lass reflected in 
the choice of finance»
Similarly, the government’s policy with regard to the construction 
sector has been affected by the political structure of the society which 
has allowed the expansion of the government defence activity«, Due to the 
importance of political determinants, the revenue constraint has not affected 
construction in the public sector but rather has discrimantad against pro­
ductive investment in other sectors» Also, because of tha nature of construc­
tion in defence, tha investment in public construction has been the most 
unproductive and undesirable» However, although, in the short-run, it has 
created a flow of income to low income-groups and has raised tha employ­
ment level, in the long-run, the pattern of construction in the public sector 
may indicate nothing but waste of financial and human resources» In short, 
the political determinants» and short-run considerations have overshadowed 
the long-run economic rationality»
The government intervention in the manufacturing sector has also 
reflected the irrationality of the system» While both the GDI and GDIA have
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concentrated on the development of capital intensive industries, the small 
scale industries.have been silently ignored* With the emphasis on the 
capital Intensive industries, the government has supported the output maxi­
mization policy in the existing dualistlc condition* In this way, employment 
would follow the pattern of production rather than being coneidered as a 
specific policy*
Although the manufacturing sector could Increase its share in the 
total employed population during the mid 1960s (that is the boom of the 
private large manufaturing), its share has remained stable since the late 
1960*8« However, the large share of small scale industries in the employ­
ment of the manufacturing sector has been the main reason for the large 
share of employment of the manufacturing sector in the total employed popula­
tion*
Despite enormous government assistance to the private capital inten­
sive industries, the limited absorbent capacity of the Iranian small market 
has decreased the rate of growth of output in this sector in the late 1960s*
The lower growth of output in the large scale industries, on the one hand, 
and the diversity of production in the email scale industries which also 
enjoy a high income elasticity of demand, on the other hand, have been the 
major causes for the survival of the small scale establishment* However, the 
further imporovement in the share of the small scale in the total value added 
would be dependent on the income elasticity and the degree of substitutibility*
The share of the public sector in the total value added in manufac­
turing waa low in the late 1960s due to the long gestation period of the 
public capital intensive projects and the accompanying under-utilization 
of capacity at the begining of production* However, aince 1972, with the 
better utilization of capacity, the share of the government in the total 
value added has increased* Since the new public manufacturings are in the
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capital and intermediate industries, their growth is subject to demand 
from the consumer industries which are dominated by the private sector.
With the decreasing tendency in the growth of output of the large scale 
establishments, public manufacturing would reach its limitation sooner or 
later, unless the market for consumer goods can be enlarged. Still, the 
rural market can be utilized if the effective demand can be created through 
a better dietribution of income either by an imporvement in the trade 
balance between rural and urban areas or by higher government assistance 
to the rural sector.
However, the pattern of investment does not show any tendency toward 
the expansion of the domestic market, although it does show a clear change 
in the pattern of industries. The government has switched toward military 
Industries, the expansion of which will be dependent on the expansion of 
the army and the defence budget. Thie eleerly shows the political importance 
of the army àin&e the late 1960s which has influenced the pattern of invest­
ment in the manufacturing sector. Thie irrationality of the government 
investment with regard to the development of capital intensive industries 
and the misallocation of resources has been accentuated by the government 
'protection and credit policy.
Seme degree of capital intensity has been the inevitable eonaequenoe 
of the development of the Iranian manufacturing sector toward producing 
intermediate and capital goods. In this respect, the government protection 
policy which has been teilored for such changes hee created the necessary 
protection for the establishment of modern Industries in the intermediate 
and capital goods groups.
Government credit policy has also reinforced the pattern of industrial 
development toward capital intensity. First, the share of urban small-scale 
and rural manufacturing in the total government credit has remained insig-
292
nificant. Consequently, theta Industriel establishments have to resort 
to the unorganized money markets which by their nature require a substan­
tially higher rate of interest than that prevailing in the organized money 
market. Second, the industriaü.banks have entirely concentrated on capital 
intensive projects. By using the IRR method of evaluation, credit has been 
made to the moat profitable branches of industry wherever protection 
policy has allowed it to do so. The government licensing system has been 
ineffective and distorting. The bureaucratic nature of the system has limited 
the privilege of such a system to a handful of industrialists. The criteria 
used for the evaluation has been too simple to deal with the comlsx objec­
tives of the licensing system and has practically ended up is a book of 
selected projects which have usually been suggested by the Industrial banks. 
By their nature, they have been more concerned about the profitability of 
of projects rather than the social cost-benefit consideration. In this way, 
the licensing system has created and protected the monopoly of some indus­
tries for prominent industrialists. They have benefited from the cheap loans, 
changes in the protection policy and so on. These factors,iteo, have acce­
lerated the process of capital intensity in the industrial sector. In parti­
cular, the small-scale and large labour intensive industries have been under­
mined. Similarly, the tax incetive has been in favour of largo industrial 
establishments ; and has reinforced capital intensity.
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Appendix A
The following table shows the share of different economic factors In 
the total value added in manufacturing and mines by the sectors* To calcu­
late the share of the public sector in the manufacturing sector* mathema­
tical relations go as follow:
U - U ♦ U n p g
"n ’ Vp < V  * vg (“b >
Vn ■ Vp + "g
U ■ (V - v ) w  ♦ V w 
Ln ' n O P 9 9
U ■ V wn n n
V w ■ ( V — V } w + V w n n ' n g ? p g g
V ■ (w - w /w - w J9 n p7 g p 7 n
Ubila U is share of wage In total value n
added in absolute terms) U is the share
P
of wage in the vilue added of the private
sector) U is the share of wage in the 
9
value added of the public sector) w^, w^
and wg show the respective coefficients
for the above* V . V and V Show the n* p g
ealue added in the country* private sec­
tor and public sector respectively*
Distribution of Value Added in Manufacturing and 
Wines by Productive Factors
Table (4-40)_________________ *■____________________________________ Percentage
1972 1973 1974
Pri­
vate
Pub­
lic
Total Pri­
vate
Pub-'
lie
Total Pri­
vate
Pub­
lic
Total
Wage 28.2 61.0 30.3 22.3 59.5 25.0 28.5 49.7 30.4
Rent 20.4 2.4 19.3 20.7 0.9 .19,3 •24.4 0.9 22.3
Interest *3.3 3.9 3.3 3.4 5.0 3.5 3.7 5.9 3.9
Deprecia­
tion 16.9 30.3 17.7 14.6 27.6 15.5 14.1 23.1 14.9
Profit 31.2 2.4 29.4 39.0 7.0 36.7 29.3 20.3 28.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: BWI, Annual Report* 1353 (1974)* P* 24.
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Chapter Five
5 Development of Service Sector
Introduction
Since 1960* the eervlce eector In Iran has accounted for an Import­
ant share of GDP* Its fehare has Increased from 41 precent In 1959 to 51 
percent In 1975« Despite the very high share ef service sector In GDP* Its 
share In total employed labour force has Increased only by 2*5 percent 
during 1959-76« This pattern of development poses two questions. Firstly* 
why should the share of the service sector in the early etage of develop­
ment be so high and secondly what are the effects of this relatively large 
sector on the total productivity* employment and consumption!«
In the earisr chapters where we dealt with the sectoral changes in 
an economy* the relative rise and decline of the manufacturing and agri* 
cultural sectors was explained by the difference in the labour productivity 
and income elasticity of demand« In contrast to the development of the ; 
manufacturing sector* the development of the service sector cannot be attri­
buted to the difference in the productivity and income elasticity for the 
following reasonst
a- Theoretically speaking* there is a significant problem in explaining 
how the development of service sector can affect the total productivity.
The problem arises from the heterogenity of components of the service sector« 
On the one hand* some services may indirectly increase the aggregate pro­
ductivity« For instance* transport* trade and banking as well as education 
and health services may contribute to the growth of labour productivity 
while defence and domestic services may not only make no contribution to 
the growth of labour productivity* but miy^also cause waste of natural and 
human resources« The first group which develop along with the capitalist 
path of development* in one way or another* will help the expansion of the
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productive sector of both agriculture and industry* The expansion of trans­
port nay reduce the cost of production and smooth away dificultleslin cap­
turing of new markets thereby make the mass production* with its economic, 
of scale* possible* Similarly* the expansion of trade may facilitate the 
expansion of à market for industrial products* The expansion of banking 
services may reduce the cost of capital and accelerate the process of the 
accumulation of capital thereby contributing in the development of the indus­
trial sector* Indirectly* also* education* through training of manpower* 
and health* by improving physical conditions of human resources* may raise 
the labour productivity* The total effect oftha service sector on labour 
productivity depends on the bhara of different services and their merits 
in a certain stage of development. Over-expansion of services* in particular* 
defence may do more harm than good to the society from the productivity 
point of view (see the relevant sections in this chapter)* 
b- In practice* one cannot give any meaning to the "productivity" in this 
sector* For example* the high relative productivity of the ëervlce sector 
in Iran (table 3-3 )reveals only higher wages and profitibility and nothing 
can be said about the relative sectoral productivity in phyéical terms* 
c- Although most of the components of the service sector produce non-traded 
gooda and therefore enjoy a natural protection against foreign competitors* 
not all indicate a strong income-elasticity of demand and* thus* the 
development of the service sector as a whole may not show a clear rising 
trend in different etages of development due to the heterogenous nature of 
its components* Not all services develop parallel ». to. meet» other* In certain 
stages of development* some services develop faster than others with ■: 
stronger income-demand relationship* some develop with no clear relation 
to the rising of income and stage of development and some others may be 
replaced by new ones* If one wants to classify different sertices to more 
homogenous groups and with regard to income-elasticity of demand, thera
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will be three main groups, the old services, complementary services end 
new services2:
1- Old Services- Old services ere related to the remaining feudalist!c
structure of the society which may remain for a long period until they
competely disappear in the structure of new society« Domestic services,
in particular servants to private families, shoeshiners, petty traders,
stable-keepers and so on are some examples« These are highly income-demand
inelkstic, demand for which will not increase along with the rising of
income per capita; and along with the expansion of the industrial sector,
they will be replaced by new services such as restaurant services, garages,
3
urban transports and so on « The survival of the old services, despite its 
declining trend, can largely be attributed,von*the one hand, to demand
4
for the traditional services due to the veryllow wage paid for such services 
and on the other hand, to the surplus of labour, very low income and urban 
poverty that create the conditions under which some workers are willing 
to accept the very low wage in order to supplement the family income, 
perhaps during a period of temporary unemployment^« However, by the expan­
sion of the industrial sector and the appearance of new services which 
will push up the wage-level, the traditional services will gradually dis­
appear«
2- Complimentary Services- This category consists of trade, transports and 
banking which expand along with industrialization and as comlimentary to 
the development of the industrial eecotr« However, even within this group, 
the growth cète may be different for different components in different i 
stages if development« For instance, trade and transport may grow faster 
in the early years of industrialization when the market for industrial 
products is rapidly expanding while the banking may appear to have a higher 
growth rate in the leter stages of development when the degree of monetiza­
tion and capitalization has substantially risen«
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Î- New Services- This group nay consist of allocation, medical services 
and entertainments( including holiday resorts, hotels, restaurants, cinemas 
and so on) which have • stronger relationship with the rising of income* 
Here, too, the determinants and the degree of significance of the income- 
demand relationship are different for diffèrent components of the new 
services* It may be said that some services , which are directly received 
by individuals, such as leisure services may be highly income-demand elas­
tic, demand for which increases once the *baiic* need for food and manufao- 
turing products are satisfied6, some others like education and healths are 
affected not only by the rising of income, but more importantly, by the 
socio-political structure of the society as well as the international 
•demonstration effect*•• Also, other government services in particular 
defence may have no direct connection with the rising of incomes and 
have largely affected by the political structure of the society and inter­
national ideological conflicts ( see chapters one and two for detailed dis­
cussion about the determinants of government expenditure)* The latter three 
services (education, health and defence) in particular call for a higher 
share of state expenditure in developing countries today than that of 
developed countries when they were in a similar stage of development* In 
the case of Iran, as appears in table (5-1) the public services shows the 
highest rate of growth during thtt.1960!s* Its share in the total services 
at current prices increased from 27*8 percent in 1959 to approximately 
40 percent in 1971* These could be the reasons why the service sector in 
developing countries accouts for a large share of national income which 
proportionaly is not far from those in developed countries with higher 
per capita income ( here we have been brief about the determinant of diffe­
rent- government aervices since we have discussed them in chapters one and 
two)*
Although the determinants of the share of the service sector in r-
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Distribution of Value ftdded In the Service 
Sector Bv Pulic and Private Sectors 
(at Currant Prices)
Tabi» (5-1)
Percentage
Secotrs 1959 -.1965 1971 1974
Public Sector 27.8 35.4 40.0 36.3
Private Sector 71.7 64.3 59.4 >63.7
Others Not Classi- 0.5 
fled
0.3 0.6 -
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: BMI, Annual Report, 1974; National Income of Iran 1959-71.
Distribution of Value Added in the Service 
Sector Bv Major Economic Sectors fat 
Constant Prices)
Table (9-2) /_______________________________________________ Percentage
Economic Sectors 1959 1965 1971 1975
Economic Services 51.8 47.2 45.6 46.1
Transport (25.5) (21.0) (15.5) (16.8)
Banking (5.2) (6.4) (11.7) (14.4)
Home Trade (21.1) (19.8) (18.4) (14.4)
Other Services 48.2 52.8 54.4 53.9
Home Rent (14.5) (15.0) (12.2) (20.4)
Public Services (21.6) (26.4) (30.2) (23.6)
Private Services (12.1) (11.4) (12.0) (9.9)
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: BMI, Annual Report, 1975j National Income of Iran 1959-71,
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the national income may or may not be economical, its effects on the eco­
nomy is subject to the same economic criterialas any time when the maxi­
mum utilization of human and natural resources are considered. For example, 
while the determinants of defence expenditure and expansion of military 
forces are political, its effects on the financial resources end labour ' 
force may reduce the possibility of the expansion of the productive sectors, 
whilst the effects of educational services may be recognized as useful and 
desirable to raise the labour productivity. Thus, to illustrate the econo­
mic effects of differnt services, a carefullexamination of these serivces 
at a disaggregated level is neceaaary. Since, here, we are concerned only 
with the public sector, it is best to avoid discussion on the private 
sector. Services are divided into public economic and social aspects.
5-1 Economic Services
Those services which have been recognized essential totthe develop­
ment of capitalism can be brought under this category. In other wordv those
services which are created or expanded along with industrialization. Trans-
« * \ * 
port, communication, banking, Insurance and trade come under the economic
services. As it appears in table (5-2), the growth of economic services 
was lower than the other component and consequently its 'share in. the total 
services* declined from Æ1.8 percent in 1959 to 46.1 percent in 197S.'^owever, a 
structural change can be seen both in the sectoral composition of economic 
services and also in regard to the responsible bodies. As far as the former 
is concerned, the relative increase of the banking contribution and falling 
of other eceeemi«*services is plausible; the latter shows a higher rate of 
growth fob the government's economic services. Hera we are concerned with 
the government services; and sectoral changes will be explained by consider­
ing the public sector's contribution.
The government's share in the total economic services has Increased
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from 11.2 percent in 1959 to 20.5 percent in 1971 (at current •.-.prices)* This 
higher rats of growth has been accompanied by the relative change in the 
composition of the economic services* It shows a declining share in trans­
portation and increasing share in banking, the only two government economic 
services ( since we have fclready discussed the rele of public banking in 
the industrial end agricultural sectors, we will confine our anlysis to the 
transport sector.(table 5- 3).
5-1-1 Transportation
Pattern of Development
Here, we are net ?concerned - with the•economies * of transportation ’•> - 
and its related issues such as pricing, cost-benefit analysis and so on. We 
will try to throw light on the problem of transportation services and its
i
development in growing economy where the opportunity Tor investment is 
high ’^and the lack of investment is serious.
The growth rate of transportation has ben low both in the public and 
private sectors. Its share in total services has declined from 25 percent 
in 1959 to 16*8 percent in 1975 (at constant prices). This slower frate of 
growth can be explained either by a slower rate of growth of demand for 
transport relative to other services or by the possibility that supply could 
not be adjusted to the demand due to the peculiarity of. transport services.
As far as demand is cencerned, the volume of passengers is determined 
by the location of individuals* activities, and the volum of goods trans­
ported may be determined by the location of industrial, agricultural and
8
commercial centres • In Iran, due to the economic structure of the society 
the demand for tronsport is relatively low. A large percentage of the popu­
lation are involved in agricultural activities, their farms are their homes 
and their demand is not for regular commuter transport. Also, the subsis­
tence agriculture may have reduced the demand for transported commodetles.
Distribution of Value Added in Economic Services
By Major Sectors (at Current Prices)
Tabla (5-3)_____________________________________________________________________________Percentage
.. . __ 1959 1965 1971
Sectors Public Private Total-Public Private Total Public Private Total
Transport of/° 14.2 86.B 100.0 18.9 81.1 100.0 24.2 75.8 100.0
Banking % 52.9 47.1 100.0 52.7 47.3 100.0 52.8 47.2 100.0
Total Economic 
Services
% 11.9 88.1 100.0 15.3 84.7 100.0 20.2 79.8 100.0
Source: BMI, National Income of’Iran 1959-71.
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Thus» the demand for transportais limited to the growing towns and particu­
larly large cities* Realizing the economic structure of the society that 
is made up of a subsistance agricultural sector and a small modern indus- 
triàl sector which is highly market-orientated» the volume of demand for 
transport is reflected in the volume of trade* In turn» the growth rate of 
trade has been slow due to the following factors*
In Iran» trade has traditionally been important since the emergence 
of mercantile capitalism* The certsinty of the traditional trade activités 
and high rate of return of capital would have been the main reasons for 
slaggieh movement of capital from trade to Industry* But.a relative shift 
from home trade to international trade can be expected ( port services 
are particularly related to this shift)» especially in a wealthy country 
like Iran* Thus» the large base of home trade before industrialization 
is the reason why trade activities have not expanded as quickly as the 
industrial sector* The share of home trade has declined from 21 precent 
in19S9 to14*4 percent in 197S (at constant prices)* This decreasing share 
of trade has imposed a limitation on the demand for transport services* 
However» while the demand for transport can be an incentive to the supply» 
an easy supply that is faster and cheaper can créât its ewn demand*
In the economics of transport» supply is highly important* In the 
long-run» the problem of supply usually leaves demand unsatisfied and this
Q
is reflected in queuing» rationing and regulations * Ultimately» this is 
the problem of supply which explains the pattern of development and deter­
mines the public investment in transport services*
The major problem of supply arisàs from the nature of the transport 
infrastructure which is extremely costly» exceptionally long-lasting» seve­
rely indivisible and has few alternative uses10« While all these charac­
teristics are responsible for the slow growth of supply when the demand
i
sharply increases» they also explain the huge excess capacity when a new
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road, a rail way, an airport or a port la built* In a growing economy, once 
a certain infra-structural Investment In transport Is achieved, the basic 
transport services can be Introduced* So considering that a large percentage 
of the transport infra-structur In Iran was constructed during the Second 
Development Plan ( the share of transport in the total plan disbursement 
has declined from 39*8 percent during the Second to 17*4 percent during the 
Fifth Plan, see table 5-4), it is not surprising that transport services 
account for 25 percent of total serivces in 1959 (table 5-2)* However, further 
expansion of such services would be limited to the Introduction of better 
services with lower costs or opening new markets which are largely dependent 
on the demand for transport*
Up to a certain level the expansion of trade and thereby the demand 
for transport would result in the full utilization of existing capacity in 
the trasport infra-structure* However, as it has been explained above, the 
volume of traddhas not increased as fast as the other services* This has 
bsen so, because most of the cities' markets have been captured for a long 
period, long enough to be recognized as established markets and there is no 
need to expand transport services as fast as is required for opening a new 
market* Thus, the further growth of this serviee depends on the capturing 
of rural markets which are both email and costly* It is small due to the 
low level of income and the low degree of monetization* These have reduced 
the possibility of the expansion of a market for industrial products which 
is expected to be the main factor for the expansion of trade activities* It 
is costly, because the infra-structure in rural roads construction has been 
low enough to raise the cost of transportation*
Public Transportation
Although the growth rate in the transport has bsen lower than the- 
other services, public transport hss enjoyed a higher rata of growth than 
that of the private sector* This has been largely due to the type of services
Plan’s Disbursement For Transportation And Communication
Tabla (5-4)_________ .____________________ ._________________________________ Billion Rials
Plan Second Third Fourth Fifth
Disbursement Plan Plan Plan Plan
Transport 4 
Communication
29.9 53.8 71.4 495.0
% (39.8) (26.3) (14.1) (17.4)
Total Plan 75.2 204.6 506.8 2847.0
Source : Plan Organization, Second Plan, 1963 j Plan and Budget Organization , Third 
Plan, 1967 and Fifth Plan, 1973 j BUI, Annual Report, 1972.
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in which the public sector is involoved* The high infra-structural invest­
ment in rail way., airport: and portrconstruction has given monopoly rights 
to the public sector* All these services are income elastic, demand for which 
rises with an increase in income* This also makes it more competitive (with 
the exception of shipping) with road transport in which a number of private 
agencies are involved* However, a large country with a scattered population 
like Iran increase the cost of rail way and air transport* 'This-has made the 
expansion of such services limited to the major large cities and particulaly 
transport connections between the major ports and large consumption marksts 
and industrial centres* Despite the faster growth rate, public transport has 
remained as a small fraction of the total transport services, its share 
hardly reached 24 percent by 1971 (table- 5-3),
As it has been explained, the further expansion of public transport 
with regard to rail ways’and ports is facing the serious problem of lack of 
infra-structure* The only 'one rail-way-track' of the state rail way trans­
port has increased the time of travel and therefore the cost-of^rail’way 
transport* Despite the lack of a minimum feasible infra-structure in rail 
ways, the monopoly position of the government has made the operation of this 
services possible, through rationing and the price system* The further expan­
sion of the existing main rail way tracks could reduce the time of Joumies 
and thus make it more competitive with road transport* However, the best exam­
ple of the case of lack of infra-structure is the ports which have been 
handling around 90 percent of the total imports and exports in 197511,
The lack of infra-structure in the ports has increased the average 
'service time' for all ports from 79 hours in 1966 to 205 hours in 1975* The 
inflexibility of supply can clearly be seen from the sharp increase in the 
'service time'* The increase in the 'service time' shows largely the defi­
ciency of port management. This is particularly shown in table (5-5) for 
1969 to 1971* Although the percentage of capacity in use is not more than
Commodities Loaded and Unloaded at Ports, Service and Queuing Time
And Percentaqe Of Used Capacity 1
Table (5-5)
Year
Commodities
Unloaded
(1000 Tons)
Commodities
Loaded
(1000 Tons)
Total
total Ports 
Capacity
Percentage 
Capacity Used
Average
Service
Time
(Hours)
Ayeraaa/
Queuing
Time
(Hours)
.Average of 
Service and 
Queuing Time 
(Hours)
1966 2003 596 .2599 - - 79.0 . — —
1969 2362 707 3069 5200 59.0 102.0 20.8 122.8
1970 2500 1079 3579 5200 68.8 101.0 32.7 133.7
1971 4107 974 5081 5200 79.7 141.0 77.3 218.3
1972 4145 1187 5332 5200 102.5 138.0 70.6 208.6
1973 5517 1320 . 6837 5200 131.5 157.0 57.0 214.0
1974 8529 1249 9773 5200 164.0 159.0 108.6 267.6
1975 10964 968 11932 5200 210.0 205.0 592.2 797.2
Khormshahr 239.0 1388.0 1627.0
Note : 1— Average service time for commercial vessels is 110 hours and 36 hours for oil tankers 
Source ï Bank Flarkazi Iran (BNI), 1975 j Port and Shipping Organization, 1974.
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59 percent* still an average * queuing time* of 20*8 hours is noticeable* This 
may have been due to the unequal distribution of shipping between different 
ports; while one port was under utilized another mas over utilized* The 1971 
cass shows that the ports have been in full utilization; but the high 'service 
time* ( 141 hours compared with 110 hours accepted as the normal time by the 
Port Organization) indicates that the ports' manegment could not use the 
current capital ( loading and unloading facilities) to the maximum capacity*
In this year9 also; the increasing average 'queuing time* is alarming* The 
'quftuing time' is an indicator of the disability of management to offer the 
service heeded; either due to the lack of infra-structure or because of mis­
management of current capital* While the latter.is the cass for before 1971; 
the former is certainly the case from 1972 onwards. Due to the over utiliza­
tion of port capacity; the average 'service time' has increased to 205 hours 
in 1975 which is neatly twice as much as the normal time* Although the ports 
have been over utilized; the average 'queuing time' has shot up to 592*2 
hours in 1975 compared with 20*8 hours in 1969. Uhen a particular port like 
Khormshahr is considered the average ' queuing time' of 1388 hours far higher 
even than that of the total*
This state of affairs shows that the serious lack of infra-structure 
in ports has been felt since 1971* But; the problem is whether or not this 
increasing trend of importing through ports is a temporary pressure due to 
the sharp increase in the oil revenue during 1973-74* The 1974 volume of 
imports may have been exceptionally high;.but the permanent trend of approxi­
mately 22 percent annual growth of imports and exports handled through ports 
clearly shows that the existing capacity of ports had been exhausted before 
1972* The sharp increase of oil revenue has only accentuated the problem* 
However; this ie either a result of short-sighted planning or the high social 
benefit of other projects which has pushed out investment in port projects* 
What is certain is that the investment in transport infra-structure is very
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costly and it is not easy* even through different mathematical models, to 
maximize the social benefits of the chosen social and economic projects, due 
to the lack of commonly accepted criteria by the majority of economists. But, 
if it is recognized that the determinants of defence expenditure in a develop­
ing country ere political { see pp 349 )as long as any project is rejected 
in order to finance the military expenditure, this can be an economic sac­
rifice which a country has to pay for its political existence under the 
dominant political structure. However, to quantify the economic sacrifice in 
this case, it should be considered that during 1973-75 about 1.2 Billion 
dollars yearly has been paid by the government as the 'surcharge' for the 
delay to shipping companies? .
5-2 Social Services
The share of economic services in the total government services has 
not been more than • 22 percent. While this share remained stable during the 
1960's, it declined to 17 percent in 1974. This was largely due to the rapid 
growth of public social services which accounts for 83 percent of the total 
public services.
However, the disaggregated data on the value added for the public 
services in Iran consists of a contribution from different ministries and 
municipalities. Since the data is not useful?for the analysis of the effecte 
of government expenditure, we will discuss the effects according to the 
major services provided by the government i.e. education, health and defence. 
As we have seen in chapter two, the government has emphasised the expansion 
of defence while education and health have been undermined in the allocation 
of government expenditure. Despite the sharp increase in oil revenue in 1973- 
74, the share of the latter two, relative to GDP, has remained more or less 
unchanged which Indicates that the relaxation of revenue constraints has not 
affected the relative importance of these services. Nevertheless, they have
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shown rapid expansion in absolute terms which one may expect to see some 
changes with respect to sufficiency of such services and their effects on 
the economy.
5-2-1 Education
Introduction
The government expenditure on education services has remained more 
or less unchanged during 1960-76, declining from 3.9 percent of the GOP in 
1966 to 2.9 percent in 1974 and then rising to 3.9 percent in 1976 (table 5-6). 
Although the relative importance of educational expenditure has been under­
mined, the growth of government expenditure in absolute terms has been rapid 
and far above that of the f>opulation( annual rate of growth of 14 percent 
at constant prices in comparison with 2.4 percent growth rate of population). 
Uith the rapid expansion of government expenditure,the government has become 
the main supplier of educational services. Therefore, its policy with regard 
to the supply of education and to the distribution and effectiveness of 
educational serivces are the main determinants of the aggregate performance 
of such services.
The 1976 sampling census shows that about 56.7 percent of the popula­
tion is still illiterate. When only the rural areas are considering the per­
centage of illiteracy is as high as 74.3 percent, the corresponding percen­
tage for urban areas is about 36.0 percent. However, the high percentage 
of illiteracy is noticeable, but, the situation in 1976 is far better than 
it was in 1966. Although the government's* campaign against illiteracy shows some 
success both irt the rural and urban arees(table 5-7,) ., the increase in the num­
ber of illiterates ifi absolute terms indicates that illiteracy is not __,
limited to the adults but that it also affects childern between the ages 
6 to 14 years. One implication of the above pattern is that government expen­
diture in education has not been sufficient to provide an effective and
Budgetary Allocation For Education and Health 
At Current Prices
1
Tabla (5-6)_______________________________________________________________________________________________Billion Rials
L— - ~  . I » ' § ~  ~ I - ^  “  ■
1966 1969
l
1972
J
1973 1974 1975 1976
2
Annual Growth Rata 
At'Constant Prices
Education 18.6 22.0 39.7 53.0 90.3 125.1 174.7 14 %
o f/0 (3.9) (3.2) (3.3) (3.0) (2.9) (3.6) (3.9)
Health 7.9 9.9 13.6 18.2 39.7 51.2 62.3 12 %
G f/° (1.7) (1.4) ( 1 .D (1.0) (1.3) (1.5) (1.4)
G.D.P. 473.3 690.7 1190.2 1783.6 3070.8 3477.4 4579.6
Note: 1- Figures in ( ) show the ratio relative to GDP (Percentage) •
2— The growth rate at constant prices has been calculated according to data on government expenditure at the
aggregate level.
Source: Budget Acts 1970—76; and United Nations, Statistical Year Book 1973,
u
SchooT Enrolment By Level of Education and Sectors
Table (5-7) (>000) Persons
1966 1972 - 1976
Level of Education Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total
Without School Certificate 304
% (4.0)
288
(2.6)
592
(3.1)
431
(4.1)
284
(2.0)
715
(3.0)
- -
Elementary, (1 to 6) Grade 2477
% (32.6)
1291
(11.5)
3768
(20.0)
3585
(34.3)
2214
(16.7)
5799
(24.5)
Secondary, (7 to 12) Grade 911
% (12.0)
103
(0.9)
1015
(5.4)
1863
(17.8)
325
(2.4)
2188
(9.2)
University 1 + Years 106
% (1.4)
3
*
109
(0.5)
195
(1.8)
5
*
201
(0.9)
Certificate Not Reported 35 14 49 16 9 25
Total Literate 3833
% (50.1)
1700
(15.2)
5533
(29.4)
6091
(48.4)
2837
(21.4)
8928
(37.7) (64.0) (25.7) (43.3)
Illiterates 3770
% (49.9)
9540
(84.8)
13310
(70.6)
4347
(41.6)
10416
(78.6)
14763
(62.3) (36.0) (74.3) (56.7)
Total Population Over 
7 Years
7603
% (100.0)
11240
(100.0)
18843
(100.0)
10438
(100.0)
13253
(100.0)
23691
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Sources Plan and Budget Organization, Population Census 1966; Manpower Sampling 1972; BMI, Annual Report 1976.
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necssary education for the whole of the country* Distribution of expenditure 
with regard to education falls short of equality* The questions are whether 
or not lack of supply has been the only factor responsible for the short­
comings in the education service and whether or not the lack of demand has 
left education supplied bythe government unutilized* Wore importantly, what 
have the effects of supply and demand of education on the labour productivity 
and the structure of employment been ? These effects are not only related 
to the supply and demand conditions, but also, depend on the quality of 
education with regard to its appropriateness to the economic structure of 
the society* In order to evaluate these effects, we have divided this- section 
into three sub-sections:
1- Supply of Education- a) Elementary Schooling, b)- Secondary Shcooling, 
c) Technical and Uoctional Training and d)- Higher Education*
2- Demand for Education (Role of Family)
3- Effects of Education- a)-Productivity, b)-Structure of Employment*
5-2-1-1 Supply of Education
Primary Education
Both, the private and public sectors, have been active in the supply 
of primary education. The share of the private elementary schooling is not 
more than 8*9 percent of the total of elementary students (table 5-8)* The 
pupils in private elementary schooling are largely from upper and high 
middle class families:who are able to afford the high cost of education* 
Although these schools have enjoyed the government's assistance, these sub­
sidies are relatively low* However, the private elementary schools are able 
to employ the most qualified and experienced teachers and the best method 
of education* Private schooling has always been able to produce education 
as a privilege to the upper classes and this is not United to the experience 
of a particular country * Thus, a slight increase in the share of the prl-
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Stucjflnt Jjumber^ By Public and Private 
Classifications
Table (5—8) ___ __  ____________________________Percentage
I
--- ... _.. Elementary. ... Secondary
Total ‘ Public Private Total Public Private
1959 100.0 92.5 .7.5 100.0 84.6 15.4
1966 100.0 92.4 7.6 100.0 81.9 18.1
1968 - - - 100.0 78.2 21.8
1970 100.0 91.9 8.1 100.0 81.3 20.7
1972 100.0
in•o\ 8.5 100.0 75.0 25.0
1975 100.0 91.1 8.9 100.0 82.6 • 17.4
Source: Plan and Budget Organisation, Statistical Year Book 1972-75.
t
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vate elementary schooling should not be considered as a significant change 
In the pattern of development in the Iranian educational system*
The government has the major responsibility for elementary schooling 
and has been facing two basic problems, the financing of education and the 
lack of supply of teachers* As far as former is concerned, the share of 
capital expenditure (building and facilities) is not significant, even in 
the early stage of development, and it is the current expenditure which 
create the major bottleneck* For instance, the current expenditure during 
the Fourth Plan accounts for 80 percent of the total government expenditure 
in education, out of which teachers' salaries are the most important* How­
ever, the rapid expansion of public education in the rural areas has been
accompanied by an increase in the capital expenditure during the Third and 
14
Fourth Plan* •
The latter has always been the most important problem* The lack of 
qualified teachers is basically related to the capacity of teacher training 
colleges and the relative attraction of the salary* Colleges which accept 
secondary-school graduates for one-year courses have not been able to meet 
the large demand for teachers* The poor salaries in education particularly 
compared with other Jobs in the public sector has made teaching the last 
choice for students. This situation is related to the problem of financing 
education and its position in the total government expenditure* However, 
the probleme of financing and the lack of qualified teachers have been 
bridged by employing non-qualified and part time teachers* Bridging the 
gap between supply of and demand for teachers, particularly, in the rural 
areas, by expansion of different one or two years courses for students of 
12 to 15 years of age has reduced the quality of education to a level incom­
patible with the education in the urban areas* Although, in this way, the 
problem of low salaries may have been solved and a sort of localization in 
the education ( in the sense of more contribution by the local people) has
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been created, in tha long run this will generate a large gap between urban 
and rural education and it will reduce the degree of success for rural * i- 
students in secondary education.
Another source of supply of teachers for elementary education is the 
educational corps men. Some of the secondary ahcool graduates receive a six 
month training, the compulsory military service, and they work under the 
Ministry of Education for 18 months* However, the lack of experience, and 
the compulsory and short-term nature of the teaching have reduced the quality 
of education, although it could solve the problem of low salaries* This and 
the above show that the aim of the government in providing elementary school­
ing in the rural areas has been largely the provision of minimum literacy 
rather than preparing a base for secondary education*
Although the quality of elementary education in the rural areas is 
far lower than that in the urban areas and particularly large cities, the 
supply of elementary schooling has been sufficient to cover the whole country* 
Thus, the low percentage of enrolment in the rural areas and to some extant 
in the urban areas, cannot be attributed by the mere lack of supply of ele­
mentary education* In 1971 around 43 percent of the 6-13 year old population 
was enrolled in schools in'the whole country, but this percentage had increased 
to 75 percent on 1976 ( table 5—9)* When breakdown figures are considered, 
the rural areas have the worse postion* Only 59 percent of the above age 
group in the rural areas was enrolled In schools in 1976, compared with 98*6 
percent in urban areas. Tha rapid increase in the percentage of enrolment 
during the last two years has been due to the large government subsidies 
in the form of free meals for elementary students, which has reduced the 
coat of education borne by families* However, according to the ILO^, around 
89 percent of 6 year olds in large cities, 80 percent in small towns and 
71 percent in the rural areas snrol in schools, but the drop-out rates are 
substantial* The figure for 1972 shows that only 47 percent of 6-9 year olds
Population In 6 — 13. Ape Group And
1
Numbers*' In Schooling ^
Table (5-9) Thousand Persons
1971 1973 1976
A - Population in (6 — 13) 
Years Old 6932 7308 7867
Urban (2774) (3007) (3351)
Rural (4158) (4301) (4516)
B - Population Of Schooling 
in (5 - 13) Year-Old 3022 4039 5928
Group
/° (43.0) (55.3) (75.3)
Urban (1849) (2293) (3285)
ef/o (66.6) (76.2) (98.0)
Rural (1173) (1746) (2643)
% (28.2) (40.6) (58.5)
Note : 1— Percentage share indicate the ratio of A/B • 
Source : BPII, Annual Report, 1974 — 6.
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In the urban araas end 22 percent in the rural areas were enrolled, which 
is fsr lower than the figure for the 6 year old population* It shows that 
the major drop-out rate is ih the first three years of schooling* The reason 
can be seen in the position of families in Iran (see PP*325-28 ).
Secondary Education
The private sector has played a more important role in secondary edu­
cation than in elementary education. In 1975 around 17*4 percent of students 
in secondary education enrolled in private schools (table 5-8)* A similar 
argument to that of elementary education may be valid for the existence of 
private secondary education* These shcools have always been subsidized through 
the general budget* Since 1974-5, the total financing of private schooling 
has been undertaken by the government and the cost of education (in the form 
of high tuition fees in private schools) may no longer be a source of dis­
crimination against the low income families* Although, the discrimination may 
still remain due to the different schools' policies, the total existence of 
this system is more questionable because it is largely dependent on the possi­
bility of financing the educational system* The large increase in oil revenue 
during 1974-6 made the financing possible, but whether it can be a permanent 
scheme is in doubt* for the present time, it can be regarded as a sort of 
subsidy to the middle class families who demand the private shcools as the 
source of privileged education* As the result of the government's policy, the 
supply of secondary education has become its own responsibility totally* 
Generally, the government has been confronted with a similar but mors 
serious problem to that of elementary education* The supply of teachers is 
more inelastic and the salary as the determinant of the supply of teachers 
is more important* The supply is inelastic due to the low capacity of tea­
cher training colleges at the university level* The only university of tea­
cher training (Oansshsera-e Alii) with a capacity of 600 graduates a year can 
not meet the?national demand for teachers* Moreover, the large opportunities
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for university graduates make the supply of teachers mors elastic relative 
to the salary payable for different jobs* The low level of salaries even 
makes the student of teachers' training colleges and Honeresara-ye 
Ali Narmak ( Narmak Technical College) (not inclined) towards employment 
in the rtinistry of Education especially those in science and technical 
courses,*•**N^6 Contrary to elementary education, the expansion of short­
term courses for holders of lower qualifications is not possible, due to 
the nature of the curricula of secodary education* Thus, solving the prob­
lem of low salaries and financing in secondary education by the expansion 
of short-term courses, seems to be out of question and the lack of teachers 
has become the major bottleneck«The limited supply of teachers has made 
the expansion of secondary education into the rural areas almost.impossible* 
This has increased the role of families in providing the necessary educa­
tion to a vital point* Secondary education for rural families is only possi­
ble if they can afford the extra cost of living for their childern in the 
nearest town or city*
Uhile the expansion of secondary education has been a major problem 
and the lack of qualified teachers has been enormous, the introduction of 
the new educational system has accentuated the problem* The aim of the new 
system is to bring about a change in the educational system to adjust to 
the existing economic conditions* To do so, tschnical work has been empha­
sised* Uhile according to the past system, the yealry examination was the 
main criteria for promotion, the new system has given the power to the 
school to determine the branch of study, during the three years of orienta- 
tion, for the four years of upper secondary schooling , The school particu- 
lary can determine who can carry on with his study to higher education and 
who has to go to different technical and voctional training* In fact the 
new educational system has Introduced a compulsory technical and voctional 
training into secondary schooling* Also, in this system, the existing
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entrance examination for univereity and higher education ie to be eliminated*
To be brief, school aa an educational institution determines the potential
division of labour before individuals actually come to the labour market*
To put:the complicated-educational system into practice, qualified
and experienced teachers as well as administrative staff are needed, and a
lack of this has been felt throughout the years* However, as the result of
different educational levels in the rural areas, small towns and large cities,
the system has resulted in an atmosphere of confusion for childern, parents,
teachers and administrative staff and it is still not known whether the >
system can work* This confusion is particularly strong since it is believed
that deeieien making under the existing social circumstances may be delib-
fcate and affected by the influence of families*
However, the considerable cost of providing equipment and retraining
courses for teachers has already been created* Theoretically, compared with
the old system, the only advantage of the new system is that it can provide
a possible technical and vocational training for the school-leavers in the
secondary schools* The rate of drop-out for the first year of the secondary
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school was approximately 64 percent in 1970* If the aim is the introduction 
pf compulsory technical and vocational training into secondary education,it 
may be confronted with the same problem which the existing technical schools 
are facing that is childern or parents may refuse to accept the technical _ 
training as the only alternative to higher education* Moreover, the new 
educatioal system may not only be unable to expand the secondary education 
to the rural areas, but also the need for higher capital expenditure due to 
its technical nature and the necessary qualified manpower attached to the 
technicality of the profession, may even Jeopardise the existence of second­
ary schooling in small towns* Thus, it may aggravate the problem of a suffi­
cient supply of secondary education*
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Technical end Vocational Training
Technical education in Iran varies from industrial education to rural 
vocational training including art and crafts* The number of students has 
rapidly increased during 1970—75* This increase in technical education has 
been largely due to the introducation of the new system* The number of 
technical students has increased from 19059 people in 1968 to 151588 in 
1975; of which the new compulsory technical education accounts for 30 percent* 
Its share in the total secondary education has increased from 2*3 percent 
in 1968 to 17*7 percent in 1975 (table 5-10).
The development of technical and vocational training in Iran shows 
that service education has increased very rapidly* Its share in the total 
of technical and vocational students has risen from 9*6 percent in 1968-9 
to 31*7 percent in 1975 ( table 5-10)* When the breakdown figures for the 
old and the new system are considered, service education accounts for 43 
percent of technical education under the new system while its share was not 
more than 29 percent in the old system in 1974-5.(table 5-11)* This shows 
that the new system has largely expanded the service education which ranges 
from commerce and banking to secretarial and hotel staff training* About 
90 percent of girls in technical education were involved in service education 
in 1975.
Industrial education has not received considerable attention, although 
in the last two years the number of students in industrial education has 
more than doubled* This trend has been the same for all branches of tech­
nical and vocational training due to the compulsory nature of the new system 
and the relative increase in govsrment expenditure in education at the agger- 
gate level* However, industrial education suffers from both the lack of 
supply and the lack of demand* As far as the former is concerned, l a c k ,  
is affected by the higher capital expenditure related to industrial educa­
tion ( such as different eorts of machines, tools and buildigns) and thereby
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Technical And Vocational Trainino
Table (5-10)
1
by Typ-g
Percentage
Industrial
Education
Service
Education
Rural
Vocational
Education
Total2
Students
1968 88.5 9.6 1.9 100.0
1970 86.3 13.7 - 100.0
1971 83.5 16.4 - 100.0
1975 56.8 31.7 10.5 100.0
Note- 1- The share of technical and vocational training in the total 
secodary students was 2.3 percent in 1968 and 17.7 percent 
in 1975.
2- Number .of Students in Technical and.Vocational. Trpiping rose 
From 19059 people-in 1968 to 151588 in 1975.
Sources plan and Budget Organzation, Statistical Year Book 1973-75.
Distribution of Technical and 
Vocational Students 8y Neui and 
and Old System in 1974-5
Tabla (5-11)_______________________________________________ Percentage
Neu System Old System 1
Industrial Education 36.8 65.7
Service Education 43.2 29.1
Rural Vocational 20,0 5.2
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Plan and Budget Organization, Statistical Year Book 1973-75.
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the higher cost of education per student, and the insufficiency of qualified 
teachers for industrial education* This is particularly significant due to 
alternative opportunities available to skilled manpower*
The demand for technical training is limited, on the one hand, because 
demand for graduates from these schools is limited* This is so, because 
courses offered by the technical schools do not correspond the current indus­
trial needs* On the other hand, the social status attached to the 'white 
collar* Jobs makes 'blue collar' work look unattractive ; and the middle class 
families^ in patricular, are reluctant to accept technical training* How­
ever, the difference in the 'white collar' and the 'blue collar' Job is largely 
due to the difference in the income rather than mere social status( see pp031-$* 
Hioher Education
Higher education in Iran shows a high rate of growth during 1967-76*
Its share in the total enrolment has increased from 1*1 percent in 1967 to 
2*4 percent in 1976, but is still relatively low* The annual growth rate of 
enrolment in higer education was 20 percent during 1967-71 and it declined 
to 11*6 percent in 1971-76 period (table 5-12)* The lower rate of growth 
during the latter period can be attributed entirely to the lack of supply 
because the annual demand for higher education is extremely high and only 
around 15 to 20 percent of applicants can enter the-higher educational 
institutions* The high demand for higher education is related to high 
salary and the social status attached to the 'white collar' Jobs in Iran 
( see pp 331-7 )•
The lack of supply is affected by the budgetary constraint and the 
structure of demand for university graduates in the labour markat* These 
factors have affected the composition of higher education both with regard 
to the field of study and the level of education * The budgetary constraints 
penalized those fields with higher cost of education per head such as,
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§harn of Higher Education and Technical 
and Vocational Training In Total Student. 
• Numbers
Table (5-12) _______________Person
1956 1971 1975
Annual Growth Rate 
Percentage 
1966-71 1971-76
Higher Educa-1 32440 97338 151505 20.0 11.6
tion %  ( 1 • 1) (2.0) (2.4)
Technical and** 19956 47451 151588 24.3 47.3
Vocational %  (0.5) (1.0) (2.4)
Total Students 3025773 482127B 6329356 9.6 7.0
Note-1- ( ) show percentage share in the total students.
Source: Plan and Budget Organization, Statistical Year Eook, 1972-75.
Distribution.Of Students in Hiqher Education
Specialization
Table (5-13) Percentage
1967 1971 1975
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Social Sciences 14.2 22.0 20.0
Humanities 28.9 22.0 17.0
Engineering 9.4 18.0 22.0
Medicine 17.2 10.0 12.0
Natural Sciences
& Mathematics 9.7 16.0 16.0
Agriculture 3.5 4.0 5.0
Fine Arts 4.5 3.0 3.0
Educational
Science 7.7 3.0 3.0
Laui 4.5 2.0 2.0
Sources Plan*and Budget Organization, Statistical Year Book, 1972-75
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engineering, natural science and medicine, despite the high demand for them 
in the labour market» It has been estimated that the capital cost per head 
for the above courses is five times as high as that of the social sciences »
The relitively higher rate of growth of social science during 1967-71 
can be attributed to the budgetary constraint which has penalized other 
fields of studies with the higher cost per head, on the one-' hand, and the 
expansion of government agencies which created a substantial demand for . 
social sciences' graduates, on the other hand. The relative change in the 
pattern of higher education during the 1972-76 period has been due to the 
lower rate of growth of humanities and the expansion of short-term courses»
The share of humanities in the whole of higher education has declined from 
26.9 percent during 1967 to 17 percent during 1975-6 (table 5-13)» This was 
largely due to the unsuitability of expanding of this group felt by the 
government»
The growth of short-term courses is noticeable» The share of these 
courses in higher education has increased from 33 percent in 1972-3 to 45,2 
percent in 1975 ( table 5-14). These courses seems to be suitable to the 
structure of the industrial sector which largely demands medium level tech­
nicians» Relatively, the short-term courses have become a substitute to the 
degree courses» This change is particularly important in engineering, natural 
sciences and humanities» However, despite the expansion of short-term courses, 
the lack of supply compared with the demand for higher education is signi­
ficant. But the question is whether or not the increase in the supply of 
higher education in order to meet the demand is a rational investment with 
regard to the structure of economy».In this respcet it is related to the 
employment situation id Iran (see pp ,331-37).
5-2-1-2 Demand for Education 
(the Role of the Family)
The family as a socio—pconomic unit, which provides the necessities
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Distribution of Students in Higher
Education 8y Field of Study and 
Degree
Table (5— 14) _____________ Percentage
. •
-1972 1975
Short- . 
Courses
Degrees. Total Short- . 
Courses
• Degrees Total
Total 33.5 66.5 100.0 45.2 54.8 100.0
Social Scien 15.5 84,5 100.0 15.1 • 84.9 100.0
ces
Humanities 33.9 66.1 100.0 51.7 48.3 100.0
Engineering 65.5 34.5 100.0 71.2 28.8 100.0
Medicine 33.0 67.0 100.0 34.2 65.8 100.0
Natural Scien-
ces& Mathematics 25.3 74.7 100.0 49.0 51.0 100.0
Agriculture 43.3 56.7 100.0 35.9 64.1 100.0
Fine Arts 30.8 69.2 100.0 42.6 57.4 100.0
Educational
Sciences 37.3 62.7 100.0 12.0 88.0 100.0
Lau 12.4 87.6 100.0 29.7 70.3 100.0
Source: Plan and Budget Organization, Statistical Year Book, 1972-75.
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for a child, ranging from food to amusement, has to bear the cost of educa­
tion* On the one hand, education is an extra cost to tha family budget, 
whilst on the other hand, it is a determinant of the opportunity cost for 
investment in education versus sending a child to the labour market* The 
latter is an independent determinant from the supply of education* It has 
rightly been argued that under capitalism, ' the family cannot be a site 
of the training of the labour force because it is not economically self-suffi­
cient, **• (and thus)***, the training of the labour force necessarily means
20the training for employment outside the family.» However, one can further 
argue that the position of the family determine the site of training, that 
is, the work places or educational institutions* And it is the difference 
between the site of training which ultimately distinguishes the 'white collar' 
and the 'blue collar' occupation* This is not to say that all who receive 
training through educational institutions would receive a 'white collar' 
job, but, at least, it can provide an opportunity for climbing the hierarchy 
of occupation to the top*
From the family point of view, primarily, what makes educational 
training distinct from the work place training is that the former is a sort 
of long investment while the latter is a direct training for occupation and 
at the sane time is a source of income earninings* Thus, the ability of the 
family to bear the cost of education, including the actual cost of schooling 
and higher education as wall as foregoing the opportunity of earnings in 
the mean time, is the main determinant of demand for training through educa­
tional institutions* Uhile the direct cost of education may be affected by 
the supply of education, the opportunity cost of education is determined by 
necessity of present consumption relative to the higher consumption in the 
future* For a peasant family which lives at subsistence level, the present 
consumption is necessary for perpetuation of the family«3 life and the cost 
of education is high enough to accept a direct training in the work place
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for his child.~A similar condition exists for a working-class family ( a 
work place can be anywhere from a peasant farm to small work-shop to a large 
firm, and the unity or separation of consumption units from production units 
may not make any difference to the opportunity cost of education).
The impact of the supply of education on the determinant of opportunity
cost is insignificant while its effects on the direct cost of education la
considerable. Thus, the expansion of the supply of education may be faced with
the lack of demand from families due to a low level of income. This effect
can clearly be seen from table (5-15) which shows that the share of 10-14
year olds in the total employed labour force had not changed during 1966-72
despite the rapid expasion of educational institutions. Its share has remained
stable at 9.5 percent of the total employed population. However, the effect
of the supply of education can be seen from the figures of the enrolment of
6 year old childern. As was mentioned before, around 75 to 90 percent of the
total of 6 year olds enrol in schools, but the rate of dropout during the
first three years is very high. This shows that schools can absorb young
childern before the age accepted by the families as the working age and the
high rate of dropout indicates the significance of the opportunity cost of
education for families. Unless a generous public education system which can
provide the cost of living for students and give equal opportunities to all 
be provided,
childerny the demand for training through educational institutions would be 
limited to the improvement in the income position of peasants and workers* 
families. Under existing conditions the middle class families, who can '’ 
already afford the investment in education, benefit the most.
5-2-1-3 The Effects of Education
Productivity
The relationship between education and productivity is not clear. 
Although an improvement in the overall productivity of different sectors of
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the economy can be observed* there ie no way to distinguish the effects of 
technological improvement on the total productivity from those of educational 
improvements* A better use of tools or machinery due to the new method of 
training can show the direct effects of education* But the question is the 
relation between the ordinary educational system and productivity rather 
than technical training or technical learning in the process of production* 
The latter which increases productivity can be learnt without any ordinary 
schooling and literacy is not necessary related to technical learning* 
Historically speaking* man has been able to develop the tools he 
worked with long before he was able to read or write* Uhile technical train» 
ing may not be directly;related to literacy when the organization of produc­
tion is simple* the comlexity of the organization of production attached to 
the modern technology makes industrial relations more complicated* This com­
plexity of Industrial relations and • technical communication* ranging from 
technical orders to technical understanding calls for literacy* However* 
even at this stage as Landes says '•*** a large share of Industry can be 
performed by illiterates* although certain workers-supervisory and office
personnel in particular- must be able to read and do elementary arithmatic
21operations in order to perform their duties*' Thus* compulsory elemen­
tary education may not directly affect overall productivity* but its indierct 
effect is most certain since it can provide a foundition for more advanced 
work and it tends to facilitate and stimulate mobility and to ease the 
selection of talent to fit the needs of the society when industrial relations
are becoming more complex-* This is why some economists have found that in
/
the early stages of industrialization elementary education has considerable
22effects on total productivity. • At least in Iran* the manager of Kazvine 
Development Authority estimated that the cost of a scheme would have been 
reduced by 40 percent if all agricultural workers in the area had been 
literate , An interpretation of this statement is the higher productivity
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of litarata workers,
While elementary education has the general advantage of literacy, 
ordinary secondary schooling not only has no direct effect on productivity, 
but also its indierect effect is in doubt and it is mostly focused on pro­
portion for higher education. Although the new educational system emphasises 
the technical training during the secondary schooling, a large percentage 
of students is still prepared for higher education, Thdse who receive higher 
education would be expected to have the same effect as that of vocational and 
technical trainees on productivity. But with the high rate of early school- 
leavers, secondary schooling may not be considered as an effective educa-'- 
tional course unless the school leavers receive complementary vocational 
training. However, the ordinary secondary education creates an upgrading 
in the overall level.
The greater complexity and precision of manufacturing equipment and
the closer control in order to reduce the inefficiency as well as the higher
standards of technical knowledge, especially in the upper level of the produo-
tive hierarchy, call for well qualified and trained manpower. Thus, the most
direct effects on the productivity can be expected from the technical, voca-
24tional and higher education • These courses are related to occupation and 
the capacity for training in the coureses is the main determinant of the 
supply of qualified, skilled manpower. The bad performance of these courses 
may reduce the total productivity of skilled manpower. When private ener- 
prises in Iran refuse to employ graduates from technical schools, it indicates 
that the productivity of workers so trained is lower than is expected,
Although the share of technical training and higher education has increased 
from 1,6 percent in 1966-67 to 4,8 percent in 1975-76 (table 5-12), the 
type of courses (the large share of service education in the technical and 
vocational courses and social sciences and humanities in higher education) 
and the low quality of training have reduced the potential effect of the
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educational aystera on total labour productivity*
Structure of Employment
Educational institutions function as an intermediary in the labour 
market to balance the demand for and the supply of skilled manpower* In 
this respect, the degree of effectiveness of the educational institutions 
depends upon two factors: Firstly, the degree of coverage of the educa­
tional system, that is, training through educational institutions versus 
training in work-places* Secondly, the extent to which the existing imbalance 
in the labour market is due to the structure of the labour market* Here, we
make a distinction between two different types of imbalance, the 'aggregate'
25and the 'structural* * The former is a type of imbalance in which the 
supply of labour at the aggregate level exceeds the demand for labour* The 
latter is the one in which the pattern of supply does not match the pattern 
of demand due to the differences in the place of occurrence of supply of 
and demand for labour or the requirement of special skills* The educational 
system may be effective only in the case of structural imbalance and parti­
cularly when the imbalance is due to the required skills*
In relation to the first condition, we are concerned with technical 
training which is directly related to occupation, rather than with the gene­
ral education* Technical training through the educational institution in Iran 
is insignificant* In this respect, the supply of technical education cannot 
be the only factor responsible, since the pattern of demand and the tradi­
tional work-place training has a significant position* Due to the industrial 
structure of the Iranian economy in which the small-scale industries play 
the dominant role in employment, the demand for school-trained graduates 
is low* The small-scale industries with an average of three workers tradi­
tionally prefers to employ their own trainees* The high share of 10-14 year 
olds workers in the total employed population shows tha above tendency* bihsn 
the structure of the employed population by occupation is considered, the
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share of 10-14 year olds is Important for both agricultural and industrial 
workers* The share of the 10-14 group in the total employed population in 
the above occupations has increased from 6*1 percent for agricultural , 
labourers and 6*5 percent for industrial workers in 1956 to 11*2 and 10*2 
percent respectively in 1966$ and the 1971 data even shows a higher estimate 
(table 5-15)«The development of the industrial sector, particularly the 
small-scale industries and the agrarian reform have been the main factor 
for the rapid increase in the share of young workers*
However, the low demand for school-trained graduates from the small- 
scale industries is not due only to the low level of training in the educa­
tional institutions, but it is also a resistance against education* The indus­
trialists who fear that education would lead to disclosure of the secrets of 
their business, which has given them a privilege, prefer to employ their 
own trainees* This situation allows them to have a better bargaining posi­
tion against their employees* Due to the above factor, generally, the level 
of wages in the small-scale industries is lower than that of large-scale 
industries«for similar Jobs* tilith the low demand of small-scale industries, 
the effect of education on employment is largely limited to the expansion 
of the large scale industries, which are the main source of demand for tech­
nical graduates* Technical and vocational training is related to the large 
enterprises and an understanding of their needs would help to provide them 
with the necessary skilled manpower* The bad performance of technical schools 
at the level of secondary education has led the large enterprises to choose 
university graduates to perform the job rather than the school graduates*
The above pattern of demand shows that technical training cannot be 
attractive to students, partially because of the limited demand for school 
graduates either due to the attitudes of the small-scale industries or due 
to the bad technical training, and partially because of better prospects 
for higher education graduates, both due to the higher demand for them and
333
Share of Employees Of 10-14 Years of Age In 
Total Employed Labour Force By Activity
Table (5-15) Percentage
Group of Activity 1956 1966 1971
Total Employed Population 5.8 9.6 9.8
Professional and Technical 
Workers 2.1 0.5 0.4
Administrative and Manage­
rial Workers 1.0 * 0
Sale Workers 1.7 2.0 1.0
Service Workers 9.2 12.8 7.9
Agricultural Workers 6.1 . 11.2 12.5
Production Workers 6.5 10.2 10.7
Not Adequately Described 1.9 6.7 4.6
Source: Plan Organization, 1956 and 1966 Population Censuses; Ministry 
of Labour, ThB Result of Manpower Sampling in 1971.
Distribution of Employed and Unemployed 
Population By Year of Schooling
Table (5-16)__________________________________  Percentage-
1966 1. 1971 . 1972
Year of 
Schooling
Employed
(1)
Unem- . 
Ployed 
(2)
percentage 
Share of
1 / 1  + 2'
Employed .Unem­
ployed
,Employed
No Schooling 73.0 75.5 10.0 - - 66.7
1 to 6 Year 20.2 16.7 8.1 mm - 24.7
7 to 12 Year 15.4 7.4 12.9 - - 6.9
13 and Over 
Not Clearly
1.0 0.3 2.8 mm - 1.5
Stated 0.3 0.1 - - - 0.2
Total Employed 
Total Active
100.0 100.0 9.7 — 100.0
Population 91.3 9.7 * 89.1 10.9 — ■
Source: Plan and Budget Organization, Statistical Year Book, 1967-76.
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the higher income earnings* The low demand for technical training in second­
ary schools explains the rational reaction of educational institutions to 
the demand for technical education under the existing conditions. In this 
respect, the rapid expansion of service education indicates the reaction 
to the demand for service occupations which can be observed clearly from the 
high share of the service sector in the GDP and its rapid expansion* There­
fore, the pattern of development of the industrial and service sectors has 
determined the pattern of demand for skilled manpower*
The above also explains the high demand for higher education, but 
the question is whether or not the Iranian economy is able to absorb the 
graduates from higher eduaction. Although the lack of demand for university 
graduates has not bean strongly felt, its expansion may be limited to the 
development of large scale Industries on one hand, and particularly the expan­
sion of the public sector on the other hand* The 1971 data on the employment 
situation in Iran shows that only 1*5 percent of the employed labour force 
has received higher educational training which is relatively low (table 5-16). 
According to the 1966 data, the rate of unemployment for university gradu­
ates is not more than 2*8 percent* With the same rate of unemployment at! 
the aggregate level in 1971, no significant change in the structure of unem­
ployment can be expected* However, this low rate of unemployment may have 
been due to the limited supply of higher education* Each year, around 80 
percent of applications for higher education are rejected which shows that 
the restricted supply has reduced the rate of unemployment for university 
graduates*
While the limited supply of higher education has become a buffer for 
the unemployment problem at the university level, it has put more pressure 
on secondary school-leavers and graduates* The unemployment rate for the 
7-12 grades in schooling has been around 13 percent in 1966* To some extent 
it has been due to the large percentage of ordinary education and the bad
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performance of technical schools, but, largely, the middle-clasd attitudes
26
toward the 'blue collar* jobs can be blamed • The students resistance against 
manual work is strongly backed by the middle—class families who are able to 
support their childern until they find a place in higher educational institu­
tions or find a clerical occupation. Even in this respect, the families' 
understanding of the situation may* not be irrational for the difference 
between the wage level for 'blue collar' and 'white collar' jobs is signifi­
cant; and it reduces the opportunity costs which the middle class families 
have to bear when they support their childern against being manual workers.
It can be expected that the importance of social status attached to the 'white 
collar* jobs will decrease whan an adjustment in the wage levels is made. As 
far as the effects of education on employment is concerned, it can be said 
that education has been a privilege for the middle-classes. This can be > 
explained by the high percentage of illiterates in the total employed labour 
force. In 1966, around 73 percent of the employed population was illiterate; 
while this percentage was reduced to 66.7 percent in 1972, the relative 
increase was largely in the 1-6 years school group. When the total of these 
two groups is considered, the percentage has decreased from 93.2 to 91.3 
which is insignificant (table 5-16).
Iiihen the source of demand for skilled manpower is considered, the 
rational reaction of the educational system with regard to the high percen­
tage of ordinary schooling can be seen. A large percentage of demand for 
secondary school graduates and higher education comes from the government.
As table (5-17) shows the share of higher education graduates in the govern­
ment's permanent employees has increased from 10 percent in 1963 to 1 3 ,1  
percent in 1971 and rapidly increased to 23.1 percent in 1975. This shows 
that the government has been the major employer for the higher educational 
graduates, particularly compared with 1.5 percent, the share of higher educa­
tion in the total employed population. And around 41 percent of government
Distribution Of Government Permanent Employees 
By Year Of Schooling
Table (5—17)___________________________________ _________________________________ Percentage
1956 1963 1971 1973
t
1975
Less Than Diploma 
Under 12 Years Schooling
93.5 90.0
43.5 42.6 35.6
Diploma
12 Years Schooling 43.4 41.6 41.3
Higher Education 6.5 10.0 13.1 15.8 23.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source : Plan Organization, Statistical Year Book, 1967 - 76.
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employees have received complete secondary education uhich is far higher than 
the national average i.e* 6*9 percent* However, the high percentage of unem­
ployment in the secondary education, to some extent, has been due to the 
attraction of the public sector* One may argue that the enlargement of the 
public sector tended to favour employment for clerical and administrative 
workers* Since the balance of Job opportunities has shifted more in favour
of clerical employment, there is a mounting demand for the academic second-
27
ary schooling which has provided an excess in such positions *
The new educational system may not be more effective than the old one 
when the pattern of demand is considered* The new system has already empha­
sised service education in secondary schooling which is not different from, 
academic secondary education. To be brief, the distribution of qualifications 
in the labour force has been a response to the structure of occupation in 
Iran, and to this extent has been effective* And the solution to the problem 
of employment should be sought at the aggregate level and the structure of 
the economy on the one hand and in the uage differential on the other*
5-2-2 Health Service
Introduction
In Iran, like most countries, both the private and the public sectors 
are involved in the provision of the health service. The importance of the 
public sector in the total supplied health services has risen, particularly 
since 1973, after the rising of government revenue, rapidly. However, the 
health service has not received the attention it deserves* Here, we will 
discuss the health situation and effects of government expenditure with 
regard to the health sector on two grounds:
a) Provision of a health service by the government- Uhether the supply of a 
health service has been sufficient to meet the need of the country and how 
the government has distributed its expenditure in this sector*
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b) Productivity - Uhat have the effects of health on the productive capacity 
of economy been ?
Provision of a Health Service by the Government
In the evaluation of the government expenditure with regard to the 
health sector* among many problems there are three in particular which should 
be considered at the aggregate level. First, is the government intervention 
in the provision of health service necessary ? Secondly, If the total health 
service be provided by the government, how much should it spend on the pro­
vision of such service ? Third, what factors determine the amount to be allo­
cated to the health sector and how should it be distributed ? As far as 
the first question is concerned, one should distinguish between sanitation 
and preventive services, and the medical treatment. The first group by its 
nature is not provided by the private sector. One may say this group is the 
one which best fits the 'public good' qualifications, externalities, indivi­
sibility and collectiveness. Therefore, the intervention of the government 
in the provision of such services is necessary because of their nature. It 
is the second group which is not necessarily based on the social choice, but, 
mainly depends on individual demand.
The question is that whether the medical treatment should be consi-
28dered as a 'need' or 'demand'. • If the former is accepted, it means that 
medical treatment should be considered as a 'public good' and therefore it 
should be financed publicly. If the latter is accepted, government interven­
tion would be limited to what would be determined by the market mechanism 
and whereever, the private sector is not active. However, there is consi­
derable agreement among economists that the health service should be pro- 
vided on the base of 'need' rather than 'demand* . The main arguement is 
that there are several reasons which distrot consumer rationality in the 
health sector, the factor which is to take care of maximization of resources
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in a market economy:
a) — The consumer's ignorance— Health ae a commodity has different characteris­
tics from other products. Consumers who seek medical treatment usually do so
31before they know how much cost they will-be-incurring ..Also, ihey^do not
know what they are buying and consumers are highly dependent on the producer
32for information concerning the quality of a product . In this respect, one
study shows that physicians make decisions reflecting their own prefernces,
33though constrained by out-of-pocket cost to the consumer •
b) - Restrictions on Competition- Several restrictions on the entry of a new
physician to the market are assured through the medical profession's control
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of medical schools, licensing requirements and hospital appointments • In 
developing countries, the small capacity of medical schools has also created 
a natural restriction to new entry. These factors have resulted in a very 
high wages for the medical profession and has increased the cost of medical 
treatment to every individual where ever the cost has been borne by a patient 
individually. In developing countries, the cost may be so high, relative to 
the consumer's ability to pay that the need for medical care may not be ref­
lected in effective demand at such price. Therefore, the private sector may 
not expand its activity beyond the provision of a health service to particular 
income-groups. In this respect, while the*'need' is genuine, it cannot be 
materialised due to the low-income of consumers and the high price of the 
health product.
The above reasons indicate that medical treatment should be considered
35as a 'need'. However, need is a relative and not an absolute concept . There
is no finite allocation of resources that could eliminate all health care
needs. If there exists such relativity, the demand and supply should be _
36
matched by some medical agencies or experts . However, the expert's opinion 
is not based merely on medical needs for the patient, but, it is also affected 
by the actual level of provision of health service. In practice, need seem­
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ingly tends to grow in line with provision, as doctors react to any expan­
sion in supply of realigning their conception of need further along the possi 
37ble continuum • Therefore, there is no limit on the need for medical care 
and the only restriction on the provision of a health service is the budget­
ary constraint where ever the necessary manpower is available«
The above explanation shows that government intervention is necessary, 
if the 'need' is accepted as a base for the provision of medical care and 
preventive services. This brings us to the second and third questions, that 
is, how much should be spent on the health services and how should it be 
distributed« There is no a set of established criteria for the amount that 
should be devoted to a health service« Nevertheless, there is considerable 
agreement that the share of national Income which is spent on the health 
increase along with the rising of income per capita« It is now usual for 
economically advanced countries to devote 6 to 7 percent of their gross
national products to direct health care expenditure« In poor countries the
38comparable figure is very likely to be closer to 2 to 3 percent of GNP « 
However, these figures show the actual share which has been spent on 
the health service and not what is needed« It is true that the rising of 
income would raise the margine that can be devoted to the health sector«
But, it is very likely also that a country with a high income per capita 
would inherit a cheaper and larger stock of health from the past which 
reduces the share of income that should be allocated to provision of health 
service. For low income countries, the small stock of health may call for- 
a higher share to be allocated to the health service. This may reduce the 
importance of income as a determining factor in the allocation of resources 
to the provision of health service, One may argue that as far as the allo­
cation of government expenditure to different government services is con­
cerned , since there exists a budgetary constraint, the share of health 
service is determined by the trade-off between different government expen—
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ditures. As we have explained in part one» such a trade-off is strongly 
affected by socio-political factors. In a democratic society, the ballot 
box may reflect the need for a particular service and determine its share 
in total government expenditure. In most developing countries, the lack of 
such a democratic process distorts the pattern of government expenditure 
(see part one). Therefore, in Iran the political structure of the society 
may have been the major factor responsible for such a low government expen­
diture on the health service. The government's allocation for health has 
not even kept pace with that of the rising of GOP and consequently its share 
in the GDP declined from 1.7 percent in 1966 to 1.0 percent in 1973. Although 
since 1973, its share has risen, it is still below the 1966 level (1.4 per­
cent in 1976). This Shows that the rising of income per capita has little 
effect on the share of health service (table 5-6).
Although the relative importance of the health sector has been under­
mined in the allocation of government expenditure, the rapid rise in the 
government's revenue has benefited this secotr with regard to the per head 
expenditure during the 1970's. In particular, a sharp increase in the per 
head government expenditure on health can be seen during 1973-6. For instance, 
the per head expenditure has risen from 35Cf Rls. in 1966 to 583 Rls in 1973, 
to 1240 Rls in 1974 and 1857 Rls. in 1976. However, the rapid rise in the 
later years may be misleading since they are affected by the high rate of 
inflation during 1973-6. At constant prices, the per head expenditure in 
1976 is not more than 661 Rls. in comparison with 441 Rls. for 1973. However, 
the per head expenditure does not say anything about the distribution of 
government expenditure and its incidence (table 5-18).
With regard to the distribution of health service, one may argue that 
since the health servioe should be regarded as a 'public good' and should be 
financed publicly, therefore, an equal distribution of such government expen­
diture must be ensured. However, the data on distribution of expenditure to
Distribution Of Expenditure On Health
By Programme find Per Head Health Expenditure
Table (5— 18) Pillion Rials '
1969 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Total Health and Treatment 9.8 13.6 18.2 39.7 51.2 62.4
tsf* (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Treatment Services 6.6 7.6 10.4 17.1 20.5 23.7
% (67.3) (55.9) (57.1) (43.1) (40.0) (46.0)
c
Prev ntive Services 2.1 2.2 2.7 5.3 6.5 8.5
* cf
r* (21.4) (16.2) (14.8) (13.3) (12.7) (13.6)
Rural Treatment and 2.4 3.0 4.2 5.6 6.7Prevantive Services
af - (17.6) (16.5) (10.6) (10.9) (10.7)
Family and Population 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.9 1.9Control
cf
/o - (5.1) (4.9) (3.3) (3.7) (3.0)
Nutrition Programme 0.1 0.3 10.7 15.4 14.5
% -■ (0.7) (1.6) (26.9) (30.1) (23.2)
General Services 1.1 1 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.3 2.1
c f
/G (11.3) (4.4) (4.9) (2.8) (2.5) (3.4)
Per Head Expenditure (Rls) 350 447 5B3 1240 1556 1857
At Current Prices
Per Head Expenditure (Rls) 303 365 441 750 '563 661
At Constant Prices
Note : 1- Including 0.5 Billion Rials joint Hygienic and treatment services.
Source : Budget Acts, 1970 - 77} BP1I, National Income Of Iran; and Plan and Budget Organization, 
Statistical Year Book of Iran, 1976 (2536).
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different sectors In detail is not available* Here* us explain the situa­
tion to the extent that the budgetary allocation and distribution of health 
personnel allow us to do so* In the aggregate level, the rising share of 
the government health service relative to the private sector may be inter­
preted as a more equal distribution of the health service because while the 
private health service has concentrated in large cities, the expansion of 
public health is accompanied by the supply of a health service to rural areas* 
But, it is the distribution of government expenditure among different .type- 
of health services which determine the incidence of government expenditure* 
Although in the later stage of development, a large share of govern­
ment expenditure on health belongs to current expenditure, in the ealry stage 
of development of the health sector, the capital expenditure including buil­
ding for hospitals, sanitation and preventive services accounts for a subs­
tantial share of government allocation for this sector* During the Second 
Plan (1955-1962), around 75 percent of the total plan allocation for health 
was allocated to compaign against Malaria ( from which 55 percent of the 
people in the north and 30 percent in the south were suffering) and smallpox*
Only 14 percent was allocated for the construction of hospitals mainly in 
39large cities * Since a large share was spent on preventive services, the 
incidence should be considered as equal because of the 'public good' nature 
of the spending* However, with the rising of health stock, the government 
has devoted more to the health care which mainly served the urban areas* 
During the Third Plan, the government allocation for preventive services 
declined to 63*7 percent and that of Investment in hospitals rose to 27*3 
percent^. The trend continued during the Fourth and Fifth Plans, the allo­
cation of government expenditure to treatment services increased, out of 
which the urban areas received a large and rising share of-it. During the 
Fourth Plan 57 percent was allocated for the treatment services* More detail 
information about the distribution of government expenditure in rural and
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and urban areas has bean provided in table (5— 18). As this table shows in 
1972 only 17.6 percent was directly allocated to rural treatment and pre­
ventive services. The per head expenditure of health service in the rural 
areas was 138 Rls. in comparison with 750 Rls. in the urban areas. The figure 
for 1976 indicates that the situation in the rural areas has deteriorated 
relative to that of urban areas that is the per head for rural areas was 374 
Rls. in comparison with 2371 Rls. in urban areas. The above pattern explains 
that with regard to treatment services, the government expenditure has bene­
fited the urban areas while the majority in the rural areas has been neg­
lected. Still, one may argue that the high degree of concentration of health 
in cities and towns may reduce the cost of treatment end also allow it to be 
utilized by the rural pppulation. However, taking into account that Iran is 
a large country with a scattered population where the cost of transport is 
high and its rural population poor, the utilization of hospital facilities 
by these poeple is out of question. In such a country some degree of 'thin- 
ness* may be useful in order to serve the rural population .
Also, the same table shows that with the rising of government revenue, 
since 1974 around 26.5 percent of.government allocation to health service 
has been spent on the nutrition programme. Such a programme can be criticised 
on two grounds: First, it affects only a small fraction of the population 
that is those between 6 to 12 years old while malnutrition is not limited 
to childern in this group. Second, this programme may be very temporary. Al­
though it is true that the health condition in developing countries is 
affected by diet and lack of nutrition, this problem should be tackled struc­
turally through better distribution of income. However, it seems that the 
government has tried to grasp some popularity through its welfare programme, 
rather than make a genuine effort to combat the problem of malnutrition.
Uhile there is no change in the pattern of distribution of income, such sub­
sidies can be temporary and may be easily cut back when a serious budgetary
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constraint is felt.
The above pattern shows the maldistribution of health care and the 
temporary nature of the health programme* However* this pattern is not only 
affected by the government expenditure policy* but, it is also influenced 
by the structure of education and the reaction of the medical profession.
In 1975 there was 11800 doctors and 1800 dentists who have provided the nece- 
ssary service for a population of 33 Millions • This means that there is 
only one doctor and one dentist for every 2900 and 18300 persons respectively. 
Although the above figures may not be low for a developing country, the dis­
tribution of doctors and dentists throughout the country indicates that 
around 50 percent of the former and 60 percent of the latter are in the central 
province (Tehran) and these percentages show an increasing trend. In some 
provinces there is no more than one doctor for every 11200 people and one 
dentist for every 120000 people and virtually all the doctors and dentists 
are located in cities and*therefore* the above figures would be higher for 
the rural areas. The lack of doctors and the unequal distribution of the health 
service* has been due*.to some extent* to the limited capacity of medical 
courses on one hand* and the budgetary constraints on the other. As has been 
expalined* the internal supply of medical doctors in the short run is fairly 
inelastic due to the length of the courses. Therefore* the effects of the 
relaxation of constraints from the educational expenditure in the last three 
years is still to be seen. However* this situation has created a monopolistic 
condition in the medical services. This low supply of doctors allows them 
to refuse to go to the remote areas and the possibility of high Income earn­
ings lead them to choose the large cities with a better social life. Cer­
tainly, for most doctors the choice Is not based on humanitarian grounds. This 
has been an important reason for the concentration of specialized personnel 
in the Cental Province, although in addition the structure of educational 
system with regard to the degree of coverage which has given the urban citi­
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zens, paticularly in large cities, the monopoly of secondary and higher 
education may be, to some extent, responsible* This monopolistic condition 
in the health service has made the private medical services mors attractive, 
and this has led to high cost of medical services to families* Around 60 
percent of doctors provides private medical services*
The above situation explains why the government has failed to per­
suade doctors to go to the rural areas desptie the higher salary payable 
for rural medical services* However, since 1974 along with the relaxation 
of budgetary constraints, the government has been able to bridge some of 
the demand for medical services by employing medical doctors and dentists 
from aboard. Although the share of foreign doctors in the total is not more
*  m
than 13 percent* , it explains that the lack of medical services has not 
been only due to the low capacity of medical courses, but the relative 
insufficient allocation of expenditure to medical care is also an important 
factor* It shows that whenever the budgetary allocation allows, even in a 
short run the necessary service can be provided* These foreign doctors along 
with the health corps men (the compulsory military service) provide the * 
medical service in the rural areas* Nevertheless, the lack of medical ser­
vices is still enormous and needs attention both with regard to the distri­
bution of government expenditure and to the educational opportunities for 
the rural population in a long run.
Productivity
To the extent that health services lead to better health, they make 
a contribution to the productive capacity of economy. On the one hand, it 
increases the supply of potential man-power through a reducation in mortality 
and it decreases time lost because of illness and disability* This means 
that the total potential productivity will increase by the rate which people 
are available for work. Moreover, since the productivity of labour is diffe­
rent at different ages, lower at the lower age group and higher in the
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middle age-group, the rising of average life expectancy ia an important
factor in increasing potential productivity* This, also indirectly, would
change attitudes towards work and savings* On the other hand, common sense
suggests that better health should result in more production per man as
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well as more men available for work •
However, as far as the first effect is concerned, it is true only 
under certain conditions. Although health would contribute to the rising 
of supply of potential man-hours, the problem is that for most developing 
countries, the insufficient supply of other economic factors, in particular 
capital, may leave the potential supply of man-hours under-utilized* There­
fore, if the rate of population growth is above the rising of supply of 
complementary economic factors, this would reduce the consumption per head 
as well as savings available for investment. This is particularly.important
since the age group up to 15 year olds is mainly consuming rather than pro- 
45ducing . Therefore, the reducing of the birth rate can contribute to the 
future productivity by increasing the saving rate in a developing country.
One estimation shows that the worth of preventing a birth in a typical LDC 
is about 2*6 times the output per head while the cost per birth prevented
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during a half decade is not more than p 5 • With such a low cost, one may
expect the government of developing countries to pay attention to birth cont­
rol where ever surplus of labour may hamper the economic development*
Altogether, the above explanation indicates that the health services 
can contribute to the productive capacity of the economy by increasing 
average life expectancy and by reducing the birth rate which realizes more 
savings and raises the share of the productive age in the total population*
To measure the above effects, one may use two indicators, the mortality rate 
and birth rate. It is worth mentioning that due to the voluntary nature of 
birth control , the effect of the health service is very much dependent on 
other social and economic considerations while the reducing rate of mortal-
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ity cornea as a direct effect of the health service and nutrition* Therefore, 
one may expect to see stronger effects in the case of reducing the mortality 
rate than in birth control where ever the social barriers are against it*
In Iran, both indicators register some degree of success for the 
health sector* The rate of mortality has decreased from 18 per thousand in 
1967 to 12.5 per thousand in 1974. With the decreasing rate of infant mor­
tality from 169 per thousand in 1967 to 102 per thousand in 1974, the total 
effect of the expansion of the health service could have been increasing 
the rate of growth of population, if the birth rate had remained stable. But, 
due to the higher degree of literacy and urbanization as well as an increasing 
average age of marriage, the provision of birth control by the government 
has reached a limited degree of success in urban areas. The birth rate in 
urban areas decreased from 47 per thousand in 1967 to 42.9 per thousand in 
1974 . Nevertheless, the success has.been limited due to a low degrea of
literacy in rural areas, strong religious barriers and the structure of the 
economy ( peasants may think of their childern as free manpower). The health 
situation in rural areas in particular needs special attention with regard 
to both the rate of infant mortality and birth control. Still the rate of 
infant mortality in the rural areas is as high as 121 per thousand in 1974 uhich 
indicates the lack of a health service. Although the rate has declined during 
1967-74, the success has been largely due to the campaign against major 
diseases. There will be more need for medical care, if the rate of mortality 
is to be reduced. The political structure of the society has failed to ref­
lect such a need for medical care; and a higher share of government expen­
diture has to be devoted for medical services particularly where there is 
enough room for economising the government expenditure on non-productive 
sectors such as military expenditure and government luxury buildings.
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5-2-3 Defence Service
In a developed economy, the determinants of defence expenditure is
partially economic both due to its effects on the aggregate consumption and
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its effect on the employment and the production of arm industries • The 
economic determinants of defence expenditure in a developed economy can be 
considered as an instrument for the implementation of fiscal policy* But. 
in a developing country, the impact of defence expenditure would be a by­
product effect, a result of the socio-political determinants* The difference 
arises from the different nature of the problem of a mature economy and an 
under-developed economy. To be brief, in the former, the problems are the 
lack of effective demand and Keynesian unemployment* In this respect, the 
role of fiscal policy is the maintenance of full employment. Thus, the defence 
expenditure has the necessary impacts on the employment and effective demand*
As far as the latter is concerned, the problem is structural due to the low 
productivity and lack of capital formation. Therefore, the role of fiscal
i
policy is to ensure the necessary capital formation and to ease the economic 
bottlenecks* In this case the defence expenditure is not an instrument of 
fiscal policy, so its determinant is not subject to economic factors*
The above argument’indicates that the basic problem in the evaluation 
of the effects of defence expenditure on the economic performance of a develop­
ing country is the separation of the determinants of defence expenditure from 
its effect on the economy* However, the effects of defence expenditure in 
a developing country can be considered in terms of 'usefulness' of expen­
diture and rational utilization of the factor endowments (capital and labour)* 
In order to maximize the utilization of scarce economic factors in develop­
ing country (both capital and skilled manpower), it may be appropriate to 
assume that defence expenditure is economically unnecssary and one can con­
sider only the political determinants*
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The political determinants of defence expenditure leave.-^he economists
almost without any appropriate criteria to determine the maximum limit for
the defence expenditure and to evaluate its effects* The common approach
for evaluation of economic performance in the respect of defence expenditure
is the comparative study of the share of defence expenditure relative to the
GDP in different countries. The obvious problem is that the strategic situa-
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tion and existing threats to different countries cannot be the same • It 
is almost impossible to find two countries with similar conditions. For ins­
tance, in the Middle Fast, while the Arab countries on the borders of Israel 
certainly have to bear a large defence expenditure due to their historical 
conflicts with Israel, Iran does not have a similar condition. These differe­
nces make one recognize that the discrepancies in the share of defence expen­
ditures relative to the GDP may not be an appropriate criterion.
For the reason above we prefer to evaluate the relative importance of 
the defence expenditure in the process of the development in one country only. 
Since the strategic situation of the country and the possible threats to 
the country are more likely to remain unchanged during peace time, a compa­
rison of the share of defence expenditure relative to the GDP for various 
years seems to be a more satisfactory criterion. In this respect, we should 
make a distinction between the conventional defence of a country's borders 
and the international burden imposed on a country by ideological conflicts. 
The latter can take the form of either an aggressive defence policy or an 
undertaking of the responsibility of security for a particular area; in both 
cases coverage of army activities goes beyond the country's borders. This 
is the second aspect which, since 1965, has called for a rising share of 
defence expenditure in the GDP in Iran. For instance, the sub-commitee's 
report to the US Senate described the need for a large arm purchase in 1976 
as follows. " Although Iran is arming against a number of potential threats 
ranging from the Soviet Union to blockage of the mouth of the Gulf (the
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straits of Hormuz) and external support for separation in Baluchestan, it 
is clear from our discussion that factors other than operational effective­
ness! such as deterrence and prestige, seem to motivate Iran's hardware 
purchses." Therefore! since the necessity of the expansion of the army! 
after the stage Df conventional defence! is subject to the international 
ideological conflicts or, as the Prime Minister of Iran has put it, it is 
a source of prestige and pride, any increase in the defence expenditure 
relative to GDP can be regarded as economically unnecessary for the purpose 
of defence of the country's borders. As we have seen in the earlier chapter, 
the ratio of defence expenditure to GDP has increased from 5*2 percent in 
1965 to 14 percent in 197552. '
The above shows that the defence expenditure in Iran has been well 
above what is necessary for the defence of the country's borders; and thus, 
the natural and human resources allocated for defence purposees is above 
the limit we assume to be economically appropriate* It indicates that from 
the economic standpoint the allocation of natural and human resources to 
defence has been irrational and totally affected by the political determinants. 
The most important effect of defence has been depleting of foreign exchange 
reserves thereby reducing investment in the productive sectors and the employ­
ing skilled manpower which could be utilized in the industrial sector.
The problem of measuring these effects arises from the lack of adequate 
data on arms imports and technical manpower employed in the military forces. 
The balance of payments does not show arm3 imports, and it is not known 
whether arms imports is excluded from the balance of payments or if it is 
hidden in the other items; as the following figures show the latter may be 
the case. However, the scattered data indicates that from 1965 to 1972 arms 
imports have increased in average to 130 Million dollars per year • Although 
the annual figure for the period 1973-76 is not available and due to the 
'bulkiness* of arms contracts it is not possible to workout the average
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figure, the huge contract for arm3 imports, which reached 10290 Million 
dollars' (from the USA only), shows that the average figure should be far 
higher than in the 1965-72 period. Still, the above figure excludes the 
government’s arms purchases from Britain and the Soviet Union. In Order to 
determine the total foreign exchange spending for the arms purchases, one 
may use the general budgetary allocation for defence expenditure by uses 
(table 5-19). It indicates that the share of machinery and equipment, which 
are mainly imported, in the total defence expenditure has increased from 
9.4 percent in 1970 to 44.2 percent in 1976. Comparing these figures with 
the total imported goods, they accounted for around 5 percent in 1970 and 
25.3 percent during 1973-76. If the services related to the arms purchases 
are included, the share of foreign exchange paid for the arms equipments and 
services must have been above 30 dr 35 percent of the total foreign exchange 
earnings.
While the above figure can explain the effect of defence expenditure 
on the financial resources, there is no figure available to show the effects 
of defence on the skilled manpower as a scarce resource. Although we cannot 
show the distribution of army personnel by occupation, theoretically, it is 
possible to say the more sophisticated the weapon in use, the larger is the 
need for skilled manpower. Particularly, the expansion of the air force and 
tank units must be accompanied by the necessary skilled manpower^ otherwise, 
the lack of latter would reduce the utilization of the machines and equip­
ments. This is particularly important since the quality of the army is ., 
strongly dependent on the full utilization of the capacity of weapons. This 
has already raised the question of whether the existing military personnel 
is able to use the new sophisticated weapons to their full potential. The 
utilization of weapons may also be affected by the lack of maintenance 
capabilities and the infrastructre in ports facilities, roads, rail nets 
and so on. Based on these factors, the sub-committee's report indicates that
Share Of Arms Machinery In Total Defence Expenditure and In Imported Goods
Table (5-19)_____________________________________________ ■_________ __________________________ Percentage
1970 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Share Of 
In Total 
diture
Arm machinery 
Defence Expen- 9.4 17.3 15.8 50.4 58.4 44.4
Share Of 
In Total
Arm Machinery 
Imported Goods 5.0 9.3 7.4 27.7 22.6 25.3
Source ; Budget Acts9 1970—76j 8 M , Annual Report, 1970-76.
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"Iran will not be able to absorb and operate within the next five to ten 
years a large proportion of the sophisticated military systems purchased 
from the US unless increasing numbers of American personnel go to Iran in 
a support capacity. This support, alone, may not be sufficient to guarantee 
success for the Iranian p r o g r a m , T h e  economic implication of this question 
is that more and more skilled manpower is to be employed in the army to - 
increase the utility of the puchased arms and raising the defence expenditure 
for purchasing the necessary services for operating the army machine.
However, the very high share of government expenditure has still had 
deeper effects which has distorted the whole pattern of economic develop« 
ment in Iran, Not only it has created an atmosphere of privilege for the 
top army officers, but, more importantly, it has raised the power of army 
in the structure of decision making. This means that the political importance 
of such a huge military machine not only shifts the trade-off point of diffe« 
rent government expenditures toward a higher expenditure in defence, but_also, 
other government expenditure is tailored to contribute to the efficiency of 
the military machine. For instance, most of infrastrctural investment in 
roads and buildings (see chapter 4) have been in areas where the military 
needed them the most. Also as was explained in chapter(4), the industrial 
sector too has been affected by the importance of military expenditure. These 
show that the Iranian economic system has altogether been tailored to serve 
the army.
The above pattern clearly indicates the economic irrationality of the 
system by undermining the necessity and importance of economic criteria in 
determining the effects of government expenditure. Certainly, the main reason 
for such irrationality has been the political system which has not been able 
to reflect the true importance of different social and economic needs of 
the majority.
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Conclusion
Government services have been the main reason for the large base 
end the rapid growth of the service sector during the 1960-76 period* While 
the lack of infrastructural investment and human capital has been an impedí* 
ment to the growth of some of the economic services such as transport and 
social services such as education and health services* the defence services 
exibit sharp increase*
The lack of infra-structural invetment in roads and ports has been 
the result of two considerations* First* the nature of the transoprt infra­
structure which is extremely costly* exceptlonaly long lasting* severely 
indivisible and has few alternative uses* Second* the short-sighted planning 
which has baen affected by the revenue constriant and the domination of 
political determinants which has pushed out the investment in infrastructure 
in order to finance the military expenditure* However* the lack of an effi - 
clant transport system appeared ss one of the moat important bottlenecks within 
the Iranian economy during the 1970's and one of the cauaee of inflation*
The government expenditure for education has been relatively low and 
the educational aystem has not received the attention it daeerves* As the 
consequence of the budgetary constraint* the educational aystem hss not been 
expanded sufficiently and tho lack of supply of education particularly in 
aecondary and higher education is enormous* The utilization of the educational 
capacity has also been hampered by the lsck of demand for education* in the 
rural arses which arises from the low income of peasant families* In the 
main* the budgetary constraint has discrimnated against the expansion of 
supply of education to the rural araas and has widened the gap between rural 
and . urbaneducation and ‘it saems that rural education is 
not going beyond simple literacy and cannot be regarded as a base for secon­
dary education* Not only in the short run* has the rural areas been refused
356
■ part of oil money and the distribution effects of government expenditure, 
but, also in the long run, the gap would accentuate the existing low produo» 
tivity and need for specialized manpower in the rural areas* Although in the 
long-run, the lack of human capital may hamper the growth of the industrial 
'and other productive sectors, in the shor—run, the reaction of the educa­
tional system to the structure of occupation in Iran at the present time has 
been rational and effective*
Similarly, the lack of supply of health service has been enormous*
While in the early years of development of„the health sector, some improve­
ments in the health stock were achieved through the provision of public sani­
tation and preventive services, which also reflected the public good's nature 
of government expenditure, in the later years by emphasising the provision 
of medical care in the urban areas, a large percentage of rural poplation 
have been ignored while there has been more room for more equal distribution 
of government expenditure:and some degree of 'thinness' in provision of health 
service* At the aggregate level, one can say that along with the increase 
in importance of oil revenue and the independency of the state from its socail 
base, the consideration of distribution offsets of the government expenditure 
has been undermined) and the health service as one of the government functions 
has not been distributed equally and has been limited to a fraction of tha 
society* The underestimation of both education and health services reflects 
the short-sighted planning and the political sturcture 6f the society in 
which the state ensure the interest of the minority of people on whome it 
has relied on* With the change in the political atructurs of the society 
toward the domination of the military forces, defence sxpsnditurs has bean 
over-emphasised *
The political determinant of defence activity has given priority to 
defence expenditure which registered an increase of seven percent relative
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to the GOP during 1965-76« The offset« of such a high defenco expenditure 
on the economy, have not only been the depletion of foreign exchange reserves 
and the absorption of skilled manpower in the army, but also the distortion 
of the pattern of industrial development and the over-utillration of infra­
structures« Not only it has created an atmosphere of privilege for the top 
army officers, but, more importantly, it has raised the power of army in 
the structure of decision making« This means that the political importance 
of such a huge military machine not only shifta the trade-off point of diffe­
rent government expenditures-'.toward a higher expenditure in defence, but, 
also, other government expenditure is tailored to contribute to the efficiency 
of-the military machine« The above pattern clearly indicate the economic 
irrationality of the system by undermining the necessity end importanfea of 
economic criteria in determining the effects of government expenditure« 
Certainly, the main reason for such irrationality has been the political 
system which has not been able to reflect the true importance of different 
social and economic needs of the majority«
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